Royal Assent

The following Measures were given Royal Assent:
	Care of Cathedrals Measure,Ecclesiastical Fees (Amendment) Measure,Mission and Pastoral Measure.

House of Lords: Membership
	 — 
	Question

Lord Grocott: To ask Her Majesty's Government how many additional Peers from each of the parties that contested the 2010 general election are required to meet the commitment in the coalition's programme for government to establish "a second Chamber that is reflective of the share of the vote secured by the political parties in the last general election".

Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, the coalition programme made clear that, pending reform of this House, appointments would be made with the objective of creating a second Chamber reflective of the share of the vote secured by the political parties in the last general election. We have now published our proposals for a wholly or mainly elected House, and we intend that the first elected Members will join this House in 2015. The Prime Minister will continue to move towards the objectives set out in the coalition programme.

Lord Grocott: My Lords, that was an Answer to two questions, neither of which was the Question I asked. Can I assume that neither the Leader of the House nor anyone in the unit in the Civil Service that is dealing with these things has read the document published by the Constitution Unit of University College London, which calculates that if the coalition agreement's plans for appointment to this House were to be met, an additional 269 Peers would be required? We have two simultaneous government policies, one set out in the coalition agreement, which provides for a House in excess of 1,000 Members, and the other in the document published last week, the draft Bill, which provides for a House of 300 Members. Will the Leader of the House explain the Government's thinking?

Lord Strathclyde: I think the noble Lord is making a frightful meal of this. There is no complexity in it at all. The Prime Minister has said, as outlined in the coalition document, that we will move towards this objective over time, but we may not reach it. If we get to 2015 and have elected Members of this House, it will, of course, be unnecessary. What all the figures demonstrate is that the Labour Party is extremely well represented in this House. If anyone needs more Members it is the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats.

Lord Rennard: Does the Minister agree that one of the important principles that should be preserved in this House is that no one party should ever have an overall majority within it? Does he also accept that in the House as presently constituted, 80 per cent of Members are male and 20 per cent female, with an average age of 69, and that any future appointments or any future electoral system should be geared towards improving the representative nature of this House to make it more reflective of the diversity of the country as a whole?

Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, I agree with my noble friend's first point. It is a matter of record that the coalition-the combined forces of the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats-is no more than 40 per cent of this House, which means that it is a minority. The Labour Party does not like to be reminded of the fact that it is the largest group in the House of Lords, but that, too, is a fact. I am sure that my noble friend's statistics on the male-female ratio are correct. We are also a substantially older House than many other assemblies and parliaments in the world, which of course is not such a bad thing. It is a good opportunity to let the House know that it is my noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway's 94th birthday today.

Lord Campbell of Alloway: I thank my noble friend very much. I was wondering whether noble Lords in this House were more interested in retaining its ethos than in diversity. Does my noble friend agree?

Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, I am a great believer in the ethos of this House, which has served the interests of the nation over a long period of time. I very much hope that if we do get to an elected House its essential ethos will not change.

Lord Pearson of Rannoch: Is the noble Lord aware that the Prime Minister wrote to me last August saying:
	"I do take on board what you say about the number of UKIP Peers currently in the House of Lords and I will, of course, keep this matter under review".
	Since UKIP got more than 3 per cent of the vote at the last general election, that would give us some 24 Peers by the present numbering instead of the two we now have. How is the Prime Minister's review proceeding?

Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, the Prime Minister is still keeping it under review.

Lord Kakkar: My Lords, does Her Majesty's Government believe that the appointment of a large number of additional Peers will help your Lordships' House to serve the people of our country more effectively, or might some of the proposals of the Bill introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Steel of Aikwood, help to achieve that objective better?

Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, there is no intention at present to increase the number of Peers in this House. However, from the point of view of my noble friend Lord Steel's Bill, I can inform the House that my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral's proposition has been published in a Procedure Committee report, will be taken in the course of the next few weeks and, I hope, will be agreed by the House.

Lord Cormack: My Lords, amusing as all this is, can we not abandon the constitutional gobbledegook to which we have been subjected? Can my noble friend not recognise the worth of this House and the good sense of the Steel Bill proposals, reform this House, and abandon plans to abolish it and replace it by an elected assembly, which could only be second best?

Lord Strathclyde: I was unaware of any constitutional gobbledegook during the course of this Question. It is because my noble friend Lord Steel's propositions on permanent retirement from this House are so sensible that the Procedure Committee has agreed a report which I hope will be agreed by the House.

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, I am sure that many of my noble friends would welcome the noble Lord's announcement that the Government have no intention to increase the number of Peers, thus breaking another promise in the coalition agreement, but one which we welcome wholeheartedly. Does the Leader of the House agree that, while neither the Conservative Party nor the Liberal Democrats have a majority in this House, as the coalition Benches they have a political majority, which has fundamentally changed the workings of this House since the advent of the coalition?

Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, there is no intention at present to increase the size of the House of Lords, but that-for the avoidance of doubt-is not a moratorium. As for the political majority, it is true that the coalition has more members than the Labour Party, but that is not the whole of the House of Lords. The Cross-Benchers play a substantial and serious-minded role in this House-one the Labour Party wishes to abolish from the future House. I am, on the other hand, entirely in favour of the Cross Benches remaining an important and integral part of a reformed second Chamber.

Education: English Baccalaureate
	 — 
	Question

Lord Anderson of Swansea: To ask Her Majesty's Government what representations have been received about the place of religious education in the proposed English baccalaureate.

Lord Hill of Oareford: MyLords, since announcing the subjects that would count towards the English baccalaureate in the 2010 performance tables, the department has received a wide range of correspondence on whether it should include religious studies. Ministers and departmental officials have held a number of meetings with interested parties. The Government are currently considering the content of the English baccalaureate for the purpose of the 2011 performance tables. We intend to publish information on all measures to be included before the Summer Recess.

Lord Anderson of Swansea: My Lords, surely the inevitable consequence of the exclusion of religious studies as an examination subject in the English baccalaureate will be its downgrading and increasing marginalisation. Is that what the Government intend? Given the widespread popular support for religious studies as evidenced by a petition signed by well over 100,000 people, would not the Government be well advised to consider a possible two-out-of-three option for the humanities component of the English baccalaureate? That means two out of history, geography and the very popular and rigorous religious studies.

Lord Hill of Oareford: My Lords, I am aware of the proposal for a two-out-of-three option and my ministerial colleagues who are responsible for this area are aware of it too. On the noble Lord's point about the marginalisation of religious studies, I am glad to say that in recent years the opposite has been the case-more pupils have been studying religious studies at GCSE, so we are starting from a position of strength. As the noble Lord will know, the thinking behind the EBacc is to try to ensure that more children have the chance to do a core of academic subjects which will enable them to progress to A-level and into higher education. That was the focus of what the EBacc was attempting to do.

The Lord Bishop of Blackburn: My Lords, the Church of England is concerned about high-quality RE and religious studies not only for the 1 million pupils in its own schools and academies. Is the Minister aware that it is not just religious organisations that feel dismayed at the exclusion of RE from the English baccalaureate?

Lord Hill of Oareford: Yes, my Lords. As I said in my initial Answer, we have had a series of meetings and representations, and I am aware of the wide range of views that have been expressed on the importance of religious studies-a view which I share-and that those views have been expressed not only by churches and faith bodies but also more widely. It is generally accepted that religious studies plays an important role in educating children and giving them an understanding of some of the ethical and moral issues that we want all our children to learn about.

Lord Judd: My Lords, does the Minister accept that many of us who favour the inclusion of religious education in the syllabus are equally anxious that the tradition of humanism should be there alongside specific religious studies?

Lord Hill of Oareford: The noble Lord illustrates one of the difficulties that one has when one starts to expand the number of subjects that one would like to have in some kind of EBacc. There are many people who can make an extremely strong and persuasive argument as to why particular subjects should be included-the subjects of music and creative arts, for example, have been raised in Questions before. If one wants to have a small core of subjects that enables us to see what is being offered, one has to try to keep it to a core. I understand the point about the range of subjects, but the principal drive in this is to ensure that children, particularly those from poor backgrounds, have the chance to study a core of academic subjects alongside vocational subjects, and then there is time for a range of other subjects to be taught alongside them.

Lord Elton: Can my noble friend think of any time in history when an understanding between different faiths was more crucial to the future of world peace? Does he not think, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, pointed out, that a step which will inevitably result in a marginalising of this subject is a step in the wrong direction?

Lord Hill of Oareford: Well, my Lords, an understanding between two religions could have been usefully applied in our own country in the 16th century. I accept my noble friend's basic point about how important it is. Nothing that I have said, I hope, or that the Government are intending for religious studies, in any way undermines our support for the subject. I agree about the important role that it plays, particularly in a religiously and culturally diverse society. It is a statutory subject and the take-up is increasing, which I very much welcome.

Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton: My Lords, can the Minister give an absolute assurance that no school's performance will be assessed on the basis of retrospectively applied rules and that all schools will be judged on the rules that applied at the time that they were assessed?

Lord Hill of Oareford: Yes, my Lords. As the noble Baroness will be aware, the point of the EBacc is to provide information. It is not a performance or accountability measure. We use the same measure as we inherited from the previous Government-that is, five A to C GCSEs. The point of the EBacc, alongside other measures, is to try to provide more information. One would want to see more information being made available about schools offering RE, alongside the other, vocational subjects. The more that parents can see what a school is offering, the better it will be.

Baroness Brinton: My Lords, does the Minister agree that it is essential that all pupils have access to a broad syllabus in the bacc, including religious education that teaches all faiths and none, which is about what people believe rather than teaching them what to believe? Does the Minister further agree that, in addition to RE being an academically rigorous subject, effective all-faith teaching promotes understanding, social cohesion and tolerance?

Lord Hill of Oareford: I very much agree with my noble friend's second point-I think that it does precisely that. The position with EBacc subjects is as I have set it out. The Government are considering the subjects and will make them clear before the Summer Recess.

Crime: Homeowners' Liability
	 — 
	Question

Baroness Gardner of Parkes: To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will review the rules on homeowners' liability in the event of injury to intruders on private domestic property.

Lord McNally: My Lords, the Government believe that the civil law provides effective protection to property owners and other victims of crime against possible claims for damages by those engaged in unlawful activity. We have no plans to review the law in this area.

Baroness Gardner of Parkes: I thank the Minister for that reply. Can he reconcile the contradictory advice given to homeowners, particularly in rural areas? In some areas, they are advised to lock up their lawnmowers and be very careful about their sheds, whereas in Surrey and Kent the police advise people that, whatever happens, they must not put any wire mesh on their garden sheds in case it injures a burglar.

Lord McNally: I saw the report of that advice. All I can say is that it is an example of overcompensation. Certainly, putting wire mesh on a shed is not disproportionate. The law warns against disproportionate protection measures. The property owner has protection in law to protect their property proportionately.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: Does the Minister see any reason to vary Section 329 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which provided that civil proceedings brought by a burglar could be brought only with the permission of the court? It is a defence for the householder to say that he believed that the claimant was about to commit an offence or that he was defending himself. Does the Minister see any reason to change that position?

Lord McNally: No, my Lords. I believe that the party opposite can take credit for the Criminal Justice Act 2003 because, as my noble friend said, it included a test to make it more difficult for a person who has been convicted of an imprisonable offence to make a civil claim for damages unless what they had encountered was grossly disproportionate to the circumstances. It is interesting to note that, since the introduction of Section 329, we are not aware of any claims by criminals for trespass to the person succeeding.

Lord Mackenzie of Framwellgate: Does the Minister agree that the starting point in dealing with burglars injured during the commission of an offence is that they are the author of their own misfortune?

Lord McNally: Yes, and this is a good opportunity to emphasise from this Dispatch Box wise guidance that was given by the Director of Public Prosecutions in 2005, who is now my noble friend Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. He said:
	"The law is on the side of householders ... It is only in the most extreme circumstances that householders are prosecuted for violence against burglars".
	He goes on to say that householders,
	"are entitled to use violence to protect themselves",
	and that,
	"Indeed we routinely refuse to prosecute those reacting in the heat of the moment to finding intruders within their homes".

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: Is my noble friend aware that some of the more ridiculous cases are stimulated by claims management companies and that there are recommendations about their activities in Lord Justice Jackson's report? Will he update the House as to where we are on the possible implementation of those proposals?

Lord McNally: My Lords, my department will respond to Lord Justice Jackson's report shortly, but anyone who thinks that they can get a no-win no-fee prosecution on this basis will end up with no fee.

Lord Hamilton of Epsom: My Lords, is not the absurdity of the advice given by the police as outlined by my noble friend Lady Gardner a very good example of why we need elected police commissioners to reconnect with the public they are supposed to serve?

Lord McNally: What a good question. While a Bill is before the House, that can be used in evidence. As I said at the beginning, this is a report of advice given by the Surrey police which, on reflection, they would probably think is not proportionate. In a case in Florida recently someone wired up their window frames to the electricity mains and electrocuted a burglar. That is disproportionate. Wire mesh on the windows is not.

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath: My Lords, I am not surprised that the Minister did not answer the noble Lord's question, because he gave the game away. He suggested that elected party political police commissioners will interfere in the day-to-day operations of the police force. That is why that Bill has to be defeated.

Lord McNally: I will not be drawn into this. My noble friend was suggesting that a little common sense in these matters would be beneficial to the police and the public in general.

Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville: Does my noble friend recall that the Criminal Justice Bill 2003 was amended by your Lordships' House twice as often as any other Bill in the Government's programme that year?

Lord McNally: I was not aware of that but I have never been, certainly in the last 10 years, averse to sensible amendments being carried in this House.

Crime: Rape
	 — 
	Question

Lord Bach: To ask Her Majesty's Government what is their policy on sentencing for the offence of rape.

Lord McNally: My Lords, the Government believe that rape is a very serious offence, with dreadful consequences for the victim. The seriousness with which the offence is viewed by the Government, Parliament, the courts and society at large is reflected by the fact that the maximum penalty is a life sentence and that the average determinate custodial sentence imposed is eight years.

Lord Bach: My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply. However, does he agree that the careless and damaging remarks made last week by his right honourable friend the Lord Chancellor have undermined the confidence that victims have in the criminal justice system? The views expressed seemed hopelessly out of touch and out of date, and have offended many people, including victims of sexual violence. Will the Minister confirm that there will be no downgrading in the priority given to prosecuting those who have committed offences of sexual violence; and that the Government will not reduce the number of specialist rape prosecutors -now around 840 in number-employed by the Crown Prosecution Service over the comprehensive spending review period?

Lord McNally: I do not know who is damaging confidence most, if damage has been done. It certainly was not anything that my right honourable friend said. Anybody who analysed what he said would accept that. I was caught by a paragraph in the Stern review, which said:
	"We need to look at rape victims as people who have been harmed, whom society has a positive responsibility to help and to protect, aside from the operations of criminal law. Whether the rape is reported or not, whether the case goes forward or not, whether there is a conviction or not, victims still have a right to services that will help them to recover and rebuild their lives".
	That is the policy of Her Majesty's Government and we will stick to it.

Lord Low of Dalston: My Lords, does the noble Lord agree that it was extremely regrettable that the leader of the Labour Party chose to jump on a populist bandwagon the other day in an effort to undermine a Secretary of State who is pursuing some of the more progressive and enlightened policies of this coalition Government?

Lord McNally: I am very grateful for those comments. The Labour Benches and the Labour leader must make their own minds up whether that intervention was opportune. All I know is that this Government and this Secretary of State have put rape support centres on a secure financial footing for the first time, with £10.5 million of grant funding allocated to existing centres across the country over the next three years. Up to £600,000 is also being provided to develop four new rape support centres. We have run a grant-funding programme to award the voluntary community and social enterprise sector up to £30 million in grant funding over three years. We have guaranteed funding of up to £2 million a year for the next three years to fund specialist support for adult victims of human trafficking. We have provided Victim Support with £114 million in grants spreading over the next three years. That is the action that this Government have taken on rape: standing by women, supporting them and giving them the support they need. Everybody realises it is an extremely traumatic experience.

Lord Campbell-Savours: My Lords, would it not be quite wrong for the Government to duck legislating in the area of rape, given the problem we had this last week? In particular, the argument over whether men should have anonymity in rape cases remains outstanding, as does the question of whether women who make false allegations should enjoy the anonymity that they currently enjoy.

Lord McNally: I know that the noble Lord has raised these matters on a number of occasions. The Government's sentencing and legal aid Bill will shortly come before the House-or, rather, before Parliament, as it will go to the Commons first-and it will give us a chance to consider again the issues that he has raised consistently. However, his assertion that there are large numbers of false claims for rape is not, as far as I am concerned, borne out by research.

Lord Lloyd of Berwick: My Lords, leaving aside what the Lord Chancellor may have said, does the noble Lord agree that sentencing in rape cases, as indeed in all cases, is a matter for the judges? Subject to the maximum sentence for any given crime, which in the case of rape is, as the noble Lord has pointed out, life imprisonment, it is for the judges to decide where the particular case fits, subject of course to the guidance of the Sentencing Council.

Lord McNally: My Lords, perhaps this is an opportune time to say from the Dispatch Box that this is certainly a case where Parliament should trust the judges, and so should society at large. Only the judge hears the full case, the full information and the full background and is able to make a proper judgment as to the required punishment. Nobody should be in doubt that the judiciary, the Government and society at large treat rape very seriously and the perpetrators will be punished appropriately.

Baroness Finlay of Llandaff: My Lords, are the Government considering reclassifying consensual sex by two people under the age of 16, given that that appears to be very different from rape? Only 5 per cent of victims feel able to report rape and, for two-thirds of victims, rape by a partner or ex-partner involves violence to the point of choking or strangulation.

Lord McNally: The case that the noble Baroness brings up is one that is best left to the good judgment-and it is the good judgment-of the authorities involved in those cases. It is extremely difficult to make broad-brush assumptions. I note what she says and, for our review of sentencing, I will take back the particular point that she has raised.

Baroness Gale: My Lords-

Lord Thomas of Gresford: My Lords-

Noble Lords: This side.

Baroness Gale: My Lords, all incidents of rape are serious and to indicate otherwise sends the wrong message to victims of rape. Will the Minister give an undertaking to ensure that there is a public awareness campaign about the laws on rape and consent so that we make it absolutely clear that non-consensual sex is a serious offence? I believe that this would clear up any misunderstandings that have happened over the past week.

Lord McNally: I do not think that there are misunderstandings from over the past week. There has been no doubt that this Government take rape very seriously, and the Secretary of State takes rape very seriously. The amount of money, even at a time of difficulty in overall spending, has been maintained and the number of rape advice centres has been extended. However, I agree with the noble Baroness that it is time to publicise the seriousness of rape, and I think that that could be started in the schools and by looking at some of the worrying things in advertising, in pop music and in some of the newspapers, which have been so quick in their editorial pages to condemn my right honourable friend. Some of those should look at where they put the position of women in society and whether they encourage young men to give women the respect that they should have. That might be a start.

Parliament Office of Science and Technology (POST)
	 — 
	Membership Motion

Moved by The Chairman of Committees
	That Lord Haskel be appointed to the board of the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST) in place of Lord Taylor of Warwick.
	Motion agreed.

Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Monetary Penalty Notices and Consents for Interceptions) Regulations 2011

Link to the Grand Committee Debate

Motion to Approve

Moved by Baroness Verma
	That the draft regulations laid before the House on 6 April be approved.
	Relevant documents: 20th Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, considered in Grand Committee on 17 May.
	Motion agreed.

Postal Services Bill

Bill Main Page

Third Reading

Lord Strathclyde: I have it in command from Her Majesty the Queen to acquaint the House that Her Majesty, having been informed of the purport of the Postal Services Bill, has consented to place her interests, so far as they are affected by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.
	Clause 2 : Report on decision to dispose of shares in a Royal Mail company etc
	Amendment 1
	 Moved by Lord Young of Norwood Green
	1: Clause 2, page 2, line 6, at end insert-
	"( ) the strategy for achieving the objective of making post offices the principal location for the provision of government services over the next ten years"

Lord Young of Norwood Green: My Lords, as we have scrutinised this Bill, many noble Lords have stressed the crucial importance of maintaining the link between Royal Mail and the post office network. We have urged the signing of a new 10-year interbusiness agreement of long enough duration to give a sense of security to the people who run our post offices and the many members of the public and businesses that rely on them. The Government have made helpful moves in providing the details for the IBA to be included in the report to Parliament. The Minister has said that she expects a new IBA in the spring and that she hopes that the agreement might extend to 10 years or more. That is good news. Royal Mail work accounts for the largest single stream of income for post offices, about a third, but government services are also very important. They account for more than 25 per cent of post office income; they used to account for more than 40 per cent.
	I fully understand the difficulties facing the Government. It would have been wrong to prevent pensioners receiving their pension direct into their bank account if they so wished. It would be wrong to prevent the public from applying for licences by internet if they so wished. We understand the constraints of European competition law. So the Government should be realistic. They should not raise hopes only for them to be dashed and they should turn warm words into practical projections and plans. But when it comes to converting fine intentions into actual work, the results have been disappointing. The document produced by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills in November 2010, Securing The Post Office Network In The Digital Age, contains welcome words. It boldly declares:
	"We want to see the Post Office become a genuine Front Office for Government at both the national and local level ... acting as a natural home for the delivery of face-to-face government services and helping citizens interact with Government online".
	Those are wonderful words, but the document is in truth a little thin on this particular subject. There are promises of pilots and one or two isolated examples. Indeed, Mr Billy Hayes of the Communication Workers Union described the Government as being as "joined up as spaghetti" in this respect, with different government departments each adopting a different approach.
	The first practical test that came along was the DWP contract for so-called green giros, which are paid to an estimated 250,000 to 350,000 people on benefits or pensions who do not have a bank account or card account. In contrast to the record of my noble friend Lord Mandelson in suspending the bidding for the post office card account, the one actual decision that the Government made was to take away from post offices the multi-million pound contract to process so-called green giros. I suspect that that is a bigger blow to sub-post offices because of the added footfall that it brings than it is to Post Office Ltd as a whole, but it was a serious setback to the confidence of sub-postmasters. But the Minister for postal services was clear when he said that:
	"BIS has no intention of subsidising DWP and I am sure DWP has no intention of subsidising BIS. I would simply say that if new services are put forward by any Government Department, unless there are issues that prevent a competitive procurement, those Whitehall Departments have to go through a proper procurement process and Post Office Ltd would have to compete with them".-[Official Report, Commons, Postal Services Bill Committee, 23/11/10; col. 349.]
	It is the usual stance of other departments and local councils, especially at a time of cuts of 20 per cent or more, to concentrate more on saving money, so there are practical steps that can be made. Injection of modern technology at post office counters, for example, could benefit from the comprehensive spending review funding; then there is the imaginative use of the post office as a central and trusted point in community life. There are deadlines for decisions on procurement and projections that need to be made. The views that I have expressed are views shared and supported perhaps even more strongly by the National Federation of SubPostmasters.
	This amendment is intended to concentrate minds and encourage a strategic approach to the future of government services provided through post offices. It is an important addition to the call for a long-term interbusiness agreement, on which the futures of many of our post offices hang. The Government will be judged on this issue, to quote the words of the Suffragettes, through deeds not words. I beg to move.

Baroness Wilcox: My Lords, Amendments 1 and 2 seek to introduce new requirements into Clause 2. On Amendment 1, as we have discussed previously, Post Office Ltd has developed a clear strategy to deliver a commercially self-sustaining business while maintaining a network of at least 11,500 branches. This Government have allocated a funding package of £1.34 billion which will allow Post Office Ltd to deliver this strategy, as part of which Post Office Ltd has been clear in its ambition to become a front office for both local and central government. The Government fully support Post Office Ltd in this, as does the National Federation of SubPostmasters.
	The National Federation of SubPostmasters realises that this strategy, along with the other elements of the Post Office's plan, such as the introduction of Post Office Local outlets, must succeed in order for the Post Office to become the vibrant business we all believe it can be. Indeed, the National Federation of SubPostmasters stressed the importance of the front office for government strategy last week, when welcoming the publication of the Co-operatives UK report on options for a mutual Post Office. The front office for government strategy is already under way and the Post Office is working hard to develop competitive, innovative services targeted at both local and central government. It is also engaging with a number of departments, agencies and local authorities to develop the role it will play, particularly as all parts of the Government plan how to deliver their services in new and increasingly digital ways. This is beginning to yield results.
	Only yesterday, the National Federation of SubPostmasters welcomed the beginning of a pilot scheme which offers document verification for pension applications across 106 post offices in the north-east. I welcome it too. The Post Office, the National Federation of SubPostmasters and the Government all agree that this is simply a good start and that more work should follow. It is therefore good news that the pilot is actually just the first of three planned pilots with the Department for Work and Pensions, which has set out that it will continue to work with the Post Office to explore opportunities for delivering welfare in the future, including universal credit. The Post Office has also been successful in its bid to provide registration services as part of an initiative to enrol local authority employees into a government employee authentication service.
	The annual report on the Post Office network required under Clause 11 will provide ample information regarding its progress in delivering government and other services across its network, and that will be provided each and every year. I see no benefit in duplicating the information in the report to be delivered on a Royal Mail transaction. As such, and due to the reassurance I have given on the progress that Post Office Ltd is making in securing new government business, I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw Amendment 1.

Lord Young of Norwood Green: My Lords, I thank the Minister for her words. I will obviously study the detail of them. I found them helpful and I do feel able to withdraw Amendment 1. In my desire not to take up too much time, I did not speak to Amendment 2 which, with the House's indulgence, I should like to address.

Baroness Hayman: It might be to the assistance of the House if the noble Lord withdrew Amendment 1. He could then move Amendment 2 and get a response to it. That might be helpful.
	Amendment 1 withdrawn.
	Amendment 2
	 Moved by Lord Young of Norwood Green
	2: Clause 2, page 2, line 6, at end insert-
	"( ) the criteria and method by which the value of shares or overall sale value of the Royal Mail Group, or part thereof, which is to be disposed of, has been assessed"

Lord Young of Norwood Green: My Lords, Amendment 2 addresses a concern that, in the pursuit of other no doubt laudable objectives, attention may be diverted from getting the right valuation of Royal Mail and ensuring that the taxpayer is not short-changed. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, drawing on considerable professional banking experience, reminded us of her wicked past, although I doubt it was enough for a super-injunction to be called for. She said that it was,
	"good to have the warning that past sales of assets have not really achieved the maximum price that could have been achieved under more effective disposal mechanisms. The Government tend to be quite poor at procurement of almost anything, including a price for the sale of assets".-[Official Report, 14/3/11; col. 103.]
	Those are wise words, based on experience.
	There is a compelling case to show that in the heyday of privatisation, the 1980s and 1990s, privatised companies were consistently sold at too low a price. The noble Lord, Lord Lea, on the basis of his thorough research, pointed out to the House that it has been estimated that for 1986 alone the average share issue premium on major share issues was 7 per cent. On privatisation issues the average premium on the first day of trading was 77 per cent. One of the reasons for this undervaluation is that it is extremely difficult to place an accurate valuation on a company in which no shares have been traded recently. That would certainly be the case with Royal Mail. It is not uncommon, when a public body has kept records for other purposes, for its inventory not to be perfectly up to date for the purposes of a sale.
	Ministers have previously warned that they do not want to publish the valuation of the company for fear of affecting the sale price adversely. In other words, they think they might undervalue the assets, compared with what someone is willing to pay. They have also been unwilling to guarantee that there will be an independent valuation, or to share the valuation prior to the sale with the Public Accounts Committee in another place. They have indicated that there will be an internal confidential valuation and that the accounting officer of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills will be obliged to ensure value for money overall. That might be reassuring were it not for the fact that similar obligations also applied in the palpable underselling of public corporations in the 1980s and 1990s.
	This amendment does not seek the publication of any figure for valuation. It does not even ask for a figure to be shared with the Public Accounts Committee in advance. It simply provides for the Government, at the time of their report to Parliament-already promised in Clause 2-and prior to the sale of Royal Mail, to make clear the criteria for and method of their valuation. That does not mean the valuation itself but at least the criteria and method of valuation. I hope the Minister will be able to give some indication of a willingness to present this or similar information, if not to Parliament as a whole then to the Public Accounts Committee.
	Could the Minister also address a question raised by the coalition review of its year in office? It made reference to the timescale for European state aid clearance, which seems to have been extended by six months to May 2012. That conflicts with previous statements that this might be achieved in the winter of this year. I would welcome some reassurance-clarification might be a better word-on that.
	We are pleased overall to help improve the safeguards in the Bill; to safeguard the viability of Royal Mail; to strengthen regulation transparency and accountability to Parliament; to strengthen the safeguards to the universal service and the post office network; and to ensure that we get the best possible value for public money in the event of a sale. I beg to move.

Baroness Kramer: My Lords, in my defence, although I continue to think that the Government do not have a very good track record in valuing companies that they put forward for sale, I did not think that the Floor of this House would be any more effective in coming to an appropriate valuation either. Therefore, I support the Government in this instance.

Lord Whitty: My Lords, I support this amendment. The Government have to recognise that despite the hours which this House and another place have spent on this Bill and the very protracted proceedings, to which the noble Baroness replied in a very courteous and often very helpful way, the central fact of this piece of legislation, which deals with one of our national institutions and an essential part of our national infrastructure, is that nobody-not the Government, employees, customers, competitors or potential investors -knows what Royal Mail will look like once this legislation is passed. We do not know who the prospective buyers are. We do not know what mechanism the Government are intending to use for the sale, and therefore we do not know who will call the shots in Royal Mail's future decisions once the privatisation is complete.
	In those circumstances it is not entirely surprising that the basis for valuation causes concern. This is what lies behind my noble friend's amendment. He is right that, historically, assets were sold off at a price that proved to be less than their value. However, in the 1980s, at least it was clear how we were going to sell them, which were going to IPOs and which were to be sold directly to particular bidders. This is not the case here. It is therefore even more important that this great national institution is not passed to an unknown process of sell-off, or to an unknown buyer, without Parliament and the public as a whole being confident about the basis on which that valuation is carried out.
	As my noble friend has said, the amendment does not say that we should publish a valuation and therefore undermine the Government's negotiating position, but it does say that we ought to know the criteria in the Government's mind on which the valuation is based. This is a fairly minimal requirement. I hope that the Government, who are determined on this course, will at least have the self-confidence to make the public feel confident that this great asset will not be seriously undervalued. I hope that my noble friend's modest proposal would go some way to achieving that objective if at this late stage the Government were to concede that such a measure should be included in the Bill.

Lord Razzall: My Lords, I have some sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, describes as a modest proposal. However, I completely endorse the remarks of my noble friend Lady Kramer. What worries me about the amendment, were it to be carried, is that the most likely outcome would be a sentence in the report simply saying, "It was the best price we were offered".

Baroness Wilcox: We have debated at length the issues around revealing the Government's internal estimation of the value of Royal Mail shares prior to a disposal. Amendment 2 would not require the Government's estimation of the value to be revealed, but would require us to publish the methods and criteria for making that valuation. Our expectation is that we will apply a range of valuation methodologies to our assessment of the business's value.
	I reiterate what I said on Report-that we would, of course, expect that both the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee will wish to review the sale process, including the valuation methodologies that we have applied. They would both provide their own independent view to Parliament on whether the Government had achieved value for money for the taxpayer. This is consistent with the reporting requirements for previous sales of government assets. What should matter is not the technical valuation methodologies that we may apply, but whether we have the right objective for the sale. In that respect we have committed to report back to Parliament prior to a sale process beginning, and this report will confirm our objective for the proposed sale.
	I reiterate a further point with regard to valuation. As your Lordships will fully understand, we cannot, and should not, reveal our estimation of the value of the company. Doing so would be giving the whip hand to the potential investor and would severely undermine our ability to negotiate the right deal for the taxpayer or for the company. Put simply, it does not make good business sense.
	The noble Lord, Lord Young, raised a point about the taxpayer losing out through undervaluation at previous privatisations; noble Lords have a great deal of knowledge about them. That is one of the great assets of your Lordships' House, but I am afraid that I cannot answer for why those privatisations were done in the way that they were or what their objectives were. What I am absolutely clear about is that our intention will be to secure the best deal for the company and the taxpayer, consistent with the objectives. We will ensure that, whatever form private sector investment takes in this instance, it will be done with those objectives in mind.
	Finally, I remind your Lordships that the previous Government's Postal Services Bill in 2009 did not include a requirement, as this Bill does, for the Secretary of State to report to Parliament before a disposal of shares. That Bill required a report after a sale and there was no requirement on the Secretary of State to report on the criteria or method used to assess the value of Royal Mail shares. The previous Government did not therefore believe that this was necessary or appropriate then, and I do not believe that the case has been made for it now. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
	With the indulgence of the House, I should like to make a few further remarks. Throughout the passage of this Bill, your Lordships have requested information about the Government's timetable-for example, in relation to the state aid application. We have endeavoured to be transparent about our plans. In this spirit, I should like to set out briefly our plans for taking forward the provisions in the Bill, following Royal Assent.
	On the specific question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Young, about the state aid timetable, I can provide the following reassurance. As he will know, the state aid approval process is highly complex; however, we intend to submit our notification shortly, and hope to conclude the process by March 2012. I will come forward with more details when we have notified. However, I can reassure the noble Lord that we remain on track.
	The Bill provides for the regulatory responsibility for postal affairs to transfer from Postcomm to Ofcom. We intend for the transfer to take place in the autumn, at which point the bulk of the regulatory powers will also come into force. This will enable Ofcom to establish in spring 2012 a new regulatory framework that reflects the new regulatory regime, including the overarching objective of securing the provision of the universal postal service and having regard to its financial sustainability.
	We will then need to implement the pension solution as the next step in the process towards a sale. I believe that all noble Lords will agree that the sooner the company is relieved of the crippling burden of its £8.4 billion pension deficit, the better it will be for the company and for the pension plan members. For this reason, it is the Government's intention, subject to state aid approval, to relieve Royal Mail of its legacy pension deficit with effect from March 2012.
	I know and respect the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, from the time when he was a Minister and I was in opposition, and from when he took over as the chairman of what was the National Consumer Council, which became Consumer Focus. I would always do my very best to reach an agreement with him. However, once all these changes have been implemented, we will be focused on that final, critical piece of the jigsaw-securing private capital for Royal Mail. As I have said throughout these proceedings, we are committed to doing the right sale at the right time, consistent with our objectives, to secure the future of the universal postal service. We have brought our talents to bear, including our knowledge of the City and business. We have been able to build on the previous Bill that the previous Government worked their way through. I hope that in the light of that the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, will have a little more confidence in our ability to fulfil what he would like to happen, without us telling him beforehand how we are going to do it. I hope that your Lordships will find this information helpful.

Lord Young of Norwood Green: My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply and for her clarification of the timescale; it was helpful to place that on the record. To respond briefly to a few points, I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that I was not suggesting that this House should do the valuation. I agree with her assessment: valuation by committee-what a thought.
	My noble friend is right: this is a modest proposal. It is true that it was not in the Bill presented by the previous Government, but as I have said on a number of occasions, we were not going for the full monty, 100 per cent privatisation. Perhaps in hindsight we did not get every aspect right anyway. I freely confess that. Although I welcome some of the points that the Minister made, the reassurances in relation to the National Audit Office and so on are all post-sale. We were trying to get a bit more transparency into the process that precedes the sale. I recognise that she has gone about as far as she can go, as the song said, and in the circumstances I will study carefully what she said but I am prepared to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 2 withdrawn.
	Clause 24: Information
	Amendment 3
	 Moved by Baroness Wilcox
	3: Clause 24, page 14, line 20, at end insert-
	"( ) In the event that a section of the RMPP is constituted as a separate pension scheme the members of which consist of or include persons who are qualifying members of the RMPP-
	(a) any reference in subsection (2) to the RMPP includes that separate pension scheme, and
	(b) any reference in subsection (3) to the trustee of the RMPP includes the trustees or managers of that separate pension scheme."

Baroness Wilcox: My Lords, Amendment 3 is designed to future-proof the information-sharing provisions in Clause 24 of Part 2. Clause 24 sets out a legal gateway to facilitate data sharing between the government scheme, the Royal Mail pension plan and the employer of the RMPP members. The framework will help to ensure that the administration of the two schemes is seamless so that, for example, members with rights in both schemes will need to notify a change in personal circumstances to only one point of contact rather than two. That is an important objective that we share with the trustees of the RMPP and, I believe, with all Members of the House.
	The management of the ongoing Royal Mail pension plan will be a matter for the company and pension trustees. Amendment 3 simply ensures that if separate sections of the Royal Mail pension plan are split off into separate schemes at some point, the information-sharing framework provided under Clause 24 will extend to those separate schemes. That additional flexibility will help to ensure that we are in a position to meet our commitment to seamless administration, regardless of any changes that may be made to the RMPP by the trustees and company in future. I beg to move.

Baroness Drake: My Lords, government Amendment 3 to Clause 24 is in itself desirable. If the Royal Mail pension plan is to be divided into two or more pension schemes, as distinct from sections, it is better that all trustees co-operate with efficient administration and have the power so to do. What is most interesting about the amendment, however, is that it reveals for the first time during the Bill's progress that the Government's intention may be to split the Royal Mail pension plan into two or more separate schemes, as distinct from sections.
	It would be possible not to split the scheme and run the Royal Mail pension plan as a segregated scheme similar to the railway pension scheme. From the perspective of scheme members, that may well be a preferable outcome, because the governance structures would remain in place, but one can anticipate that that may not be the Government's preferred outcome. As the amendment now introduces separate schemes into the Bill, as distinct from separate sections, it raises questions that I put to the noble Baroness.
	Is it now the Government's decided intention to split the Royal Mail pension plan into separate schemes post-privatisation? If the Royal Mail pension plan is to be so divided, is the Post Office scheme to be hived off, leaving the reduced Royal Mail pension plan with the privatised Royal Mail, or vice versa? What is the Government's intention on consulting the trustees on such separation?
	A fourth point that I know will be of concern to scheme members attracted some attention in the debate in the House of Commons. There is no power to wind up in the rules of the Royal Mail pension plan. That is a very important safeguard for the current members, which ought to be replicated.
	During the House of Commons Committee debate on 30 November 2010 the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Mr Edward Davey, commented to the effect that inserting a winding-up provision would be prevented by the then Clause 19 of the Bill, which is now Clause 20, dealing with the "no worsening of benefits" provision. He said-

The Countess of Mar: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness. Might I ask the two people speaking behind the Woolsack to retreat into the Prince's Chamber, as is suggested in the Companion?

Baroness Drake: The Parliamentary Under-Secretary said:
	"Any amendment to the RMPP rules that would allow the scheme to be more easily wound up would fall foul of the protection provided for members under clause 19(2), as any such amendment would have a material effect on members' 'relevant pension provision' ... and given that our intention is to take on the historic deficits for the Royal Mail together with a more manageable scheme, it would not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to make any amendment to the RMPP that would allow the scheme to be wound up".-[Official Report, Commons, Postal Services Bill Committee, 30/11/10; col. 445.]
	In view of that debate, and in view of the fact that this amendment now introduces an intention to separate the plan into separate schemes rather than separate sections, is it the Government's position that there will be no change to the winding-up provisions in any separate scheme if and when a section of the RMPP is constituted as a separate pension scheme?

Lord Young of Norwood Green: My Lords, I certainly concur with the points made by my noble friend Lady Drake, and I shall not repeat them because once again she has covered the waterfront on that issue. I want to take the opportunity to say, first, that we welcome the constructive approach of the Government Front Bench, led by the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, with her ineffable charm in listening to the representations, in bringing forward a number of appropriate amendments and assurances. Our every wish has not been granted but I did not expect that that would be the case.
	I pay tribute to the many noble Lords who have contributed to the debate and I would single out two: the noble Lord, Lord Low, who unfortunately is not in his seat, but I am sure that it will be conveyed to him, and my noble friend Lord Clarke, who is not with us today. He reminded us how much of his life has been invested in what we both joined as the GPO. It is also traditional in these cases to pay tribute to the Bill team, who have served us very well. I was reflecting that it was led by Jo Shanmudalingam-I probably have her name wrong. I do not know whether she is in the Box today, but I know that she is expecting her second child. I could not help reflecting that some mothers pay a lot of attention to what babies hear when they are in the womb, and play them Mozart. I am thinking of this child who has been exposed to House of Lords debates, whose first words, instead of "Mama" may be "My Lords". The only hope is that she will grow out of it, or it might be a career destination. In any event we thank the Bill team.
	My final piece of advice to the Minister is to remember what they put on the side of fragile parcels or packages, and the same goes for this Bill: handle with care.

Baroness Wilcox: I shall start by giving my last response on this Bill to the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, and reassure her, I hope, that there is no change in policy. Clause 18 allows for the RMPP to be divided into different sections to reflect the restructuring of the Royal Mail Group Ltd under Part 1 of the Bill. We do not have powers to create a separate pension scheme. However, in the fullness of time it is possible that the businesses might wish to alter the pension arrangements by transferring a section of the RMPP into a new stand-alone arrangement. Any such change would need to meet the safeguards provided under statute and under the scheme rules. The amendment simply ensures that in this event, the information-sharing framework provided under Part 2 would apply to the new scheme as it did to the old section. The trustee would need to consent to any proposal made by the employer to create separate schemes under the scheme rules and under general pensions legislation.
	I will conclude the debate by offering my sincere thanks to all Members of this House who have, without exception, made wise, informed and passionate contributions to the debate. I pay particular thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Young, who has been a passionate and informed advocate for Royal Mail and the Post Office from the Benches opposite. The Government have sought to be open to the debate, to reflect on the concerns raised and to work alongside noble Lords to ensure that the Bill leaves this House in a form that gives us the best chance of securing the future of the universal postal service. The amendments passed in your Lordships' House have been the result of constructive cross-House working and I sincerely thank all noble Lords for approaching the Bill in this spirit. I, too, have understood how difficult it has been for some noble Lords who have a very different view of what should be the future of the Royal Mail and who do not see privatisation as any answer to this. I thank them in particular for their good grace and for the marvellous stories that they have shared of their experiences over a long period in a service which, over many years, has served its country well.
	Amendment 3 agreed.
	Bill passed and returned to the Commons with amendments.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Bill Main Page

Third Reading

Motion
	 Moved by Lord Wallace of Tankerness
	That the Bill do now pass.

Lord Cormack: My Lords, I do not wish to detain the House long, because the next business before the House-

The Countess of Mar: I do not know whether the noble Lord is aware that paragraph 8.153 of the Companion states:
	"The motion 'That this bill do now pass' is moved immediately after third reading has been agreed to or, if amendments had been tabled, as soon as the last amendment has been disposed of. The motion is usually moved formally. It may be opposed, and reasoned or delaying amendments may be moved to it, but in other circumstances it is not normally debated".

Lord Cormack: Well, I will certainly be guided by the noble Baroness who sits on the Woolsack, but I was informed that it was entirely proper to make a brief speech at this point.

Earl Attlee: My Lords, perhaps I may assist the House. Of course the noble Countess is right, but it seems to me that the rule is honoured as much in the breach as in the observance.

Lord Cormack: Then perhaps I can join the breach. I will-

The Countess of Mar: In the first report from the Select Committee on Procedure of the House, which was agreed by the House, the recommendation was that:
	"The motion 'That this bill do now pass' should be moved formally and should not normally be debated. Ministers should if necessary respond to points raised on the motion by other Lords. The motion should not be an occasion for thanking those involved in the passage of the bill".

Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton: My Lords, perhaps I may draw the government Whip's attention to the fact that the word "normally" is used here, and "normally" in your Lordships' House means that it might not always apply.

Earl Attlee: I am sure the noble Baroness is right.

Lord Cormack: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I want briefly to say two things. First, having taken part in all stages of this Bill, I thank the Minister for his unfailing courtesy, sensitivity and willingness to listen. Secondly, I express the hope that what was not a terribly good Bill but is now a slightly better Bill will come back from another place in the state in which it leaves this House. In other words, I hope that the Cross-Bench amendment passed a couple of weeks ago will remain in the Bill. It will give great encouragement and comfort to those of us who have had certain concerns about it.

Lord Bach: Following the very brave intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, I follow him briefly to thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, who has conducted his part in this Bill with great skill and understanding. I speak on behalf of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton, who led for the Opposition on this Bill, in saying that we hold him in the highest respect for the way in which he has dealt with this legislation. It does not stop us thinking that this is completely the wrong way of passing constitutional change in this country, and I believe that if there had been a free vote in this House-here I am looking particularly at Conservative Peers-there certainly would have been four years rather than five. My last hope is the hope that the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, expressed, which is that the Bill is accepted by the Commons as it leaves here today.

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Cormack and the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for their kind words, which are appreciated. This is an important Bill. It is an important constitutional development. We made it clear at the time that we were not able to support the amendments that gave rise to a sunrise and possibly also a sunset clause. No doubt the other place will consider that constitutional novelty. That apart, this Chamber has engaged in its role of proper scrutiny, improvement and revision, and therefore, subject to what I said about one particular amendment, I think this Bill goes to another place in a better shape than that in which it came here. I thank all noble Lords on all sides of the House who have contributed to that. It has been work well done. Once again, I encourage noble Lords to pass the Bill.
	Bill passed and returned to the Commons with amendments.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Bill Main Page

Committee (3rd Day)

Relevant documents: 13th Report from the Delegated Powers Committee, 14th Report from the Constitution Committee and 11th Report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights.
	Amendment 26
	 Moved by Baroness Hamwee
	26: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause-
	"Pilot schemes
	(1) Section 1 and other provisions on police and crime commissioners and police and crime panels shall commence-
	(a) in accordance with section 158 in respect of not more than six police areas designated by the Secretary of State, and
	(b) in respect of other police areas only in accordance with an order made by the Secretary of State.
	(2) No order shall be made under subsection (1)(b) unless-
	(a) pilot schemes have been undertaken for at least two years in the police areas designated under subsection (1)(a), and
	(b) the Secretary of State has reported to Parliament on the pilot schemes."

Baroness Hamwee: In addition to this amendment, I also have Amendment 47 in this group. They are two amendments among a number proposing different models of piloting the proposed new policing governance. Before I turn to the substantive issues, noble Lords will be aware that we have quite a difficult day ahead of us in that the groupings of amendments today have been described as aggressive in an attempt to get us to move on more swiftly with the Bill. Apart from one enormous grouping of about 60 amendments, I have been quite happy to go along with this, but I think it may leave the Committee in a difficult position. It is inevitable that on a number of the groupings many of us will make rather more general speeches than we might otherwise have made, and I am just a little concerned that we will not give the word-by-word content of the Bill this House's normal detailed scrutiny. Perhaps I say that not on behalf of the whole Committee, because I am sure other noble Lords will be more competent than I in dealing with this situation, but just as a disclaimer on my own behalf.

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath: My Lords, one way to deal with that would be for the Government to write letters in response to the amendments so that the technical details, which might normally be addressed in the winding-up speech of the Minister, could at least be on the record and placed in the Library. When we come back on Report, the noble Baroness and other noble Lords would then have the benefit of a Government response. I do not know whether that is helpful. It might be one way in which to alleviate the concerns of the noble Baroness.

Baroness Browning: My Lords, in response to the noble Lord's suggestion, I am very happy to agree to that.

Baroness Hamwee: My Lords, that will be helpful. I would merely add that I have always had a bit of a concern about responses being dealt with by letter because they would not be in Hansard and easily accessible by those who may seek to look for them. In fact, this is a matter on which the Leader's Group on the working practices of the House of Lords has made some suggestions.
	To turn to the issue of piloting, the very number and variations of proposals for amendments demonstrates the importance of the issue. Whatever model of governance we end up with, we all have a great concern that it should work well. After all, that is our role. Certainly, piloting is not equivalent to not taking the changes forward, which is why my amendment would provide for pilots for a two-year period. I see a lot of sense in a longer period but I did not want the suggestion that this was a matter of trying to undo the proposals to become mixed up with the issue of piloting.
	Piloting is hardly a new concept. It is what the outside world regards as sensible, about which a lot of people, having become aware of this issue over the past couple of months, have commented on to me. The Government do it as well. Last week, the Merits of Statutory Instruments Committee had a statutory instrument on dentistry which was taking forward the piloting of new arrangements. It is not simply directed at a yes or no answer to the proposition but tests all the aspects of that proposition, including-I come to them again-the checks and balances, which, if they are too limited, will be insufficient. Checks and balances have to be sound in themselves individually, and extensive. Otherwise, they will be ineffective because ways around them will be found.
	I have always thought that it was necessary to look at checks and balances in the round. There may be different views of the role of scrutiny; that is, the role of the panels here. The tagline of the Centre for Public Scrutiny-I am a member of its advisory board-is, "Good Government Needs Good Scrutiny". It should not be in arrear or by way of commentary. If it is oppositional, it should be active, constructive, collaborative and preferably consensual, thus providing a reality check.
	This is not just the role of the police and crime panel. Another major area of concern expressed by your Lordships is the boundary of responsibility and function between police and crime commissioners and chief constables. We have a protocol in draft form. We debate the term "operational". Seeing how the model works and where the boundaries lie in practice would be more than useful: it is essential. The decisions that must be taken above the local level is an issue that was touched on at the last stage when the noble Lord, Lord Laming, raised child protection. Counterterrorism is an obvious issue, but child protection, trafficking and a number of other matters may have to be dealt with not just very locally but at levels above that.
	The NSPCC raised this with me and said that it would be happy for me to quote from its briefing. It says that child protection is a complex task, and that to be successful,
	"it requires a combination of the highly visible elements of policing with the less visible elements such as engagement in multi-agency work and investigative work".
	What is needed, says the NSPCC,
	"may not be identified as a priority, as it is unlikely to be among the mainstream crime issues that are prioritised by the majority of people within local communities".
	This is something we have also touched on. The NSPCC also said that,
	"there has been limited opportunity to thoroughly test the practical implications and measure the impact of the Government's proposals".
	The NSPCC therefore recommends that these changes,
	"are piloted and evaluated by the Home Office prior to national roll-out to ensure that relevant lessons can be learnt, especially, though not exclusively, for child protection".
	My Amendment 247 is consequential on the main Amendment 26, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for adding their names to it, along with my noble friend Lord Shipley. I have suggested pilot areas designated by the Secretary of State-up to six areas, and that is because I realise there are huge variations in police areas: variations in geography, size, demography, the urban and rural mix and so on. I do not pretend to know which would be the best test for these. I am not sure whether the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is going to move his amendment to this amendment. He specified some particular areas; if he is moving it, he will justify his choice.
	I have explained the period of up to two years. There should be a report from the Secretary of State. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, in his amendment, suggests an independent report from the HMIC, and I think that that is a splendid idea. My noble friend Lord Bradshaw has a slightly different approach again, but we all share the view that there needs to be not just time for reflection but quite structured reflection before a full rollout, with a mechanism for altering the provisions.
	The Local Government Association has also supported the notion of piloting, which it says would result in "tangible feedback." It says that it would be wise to gather further evidence and thus be able to gather a wider support from members of the police, public, councils and Parliament prior to implementation.
	I am not deaf: I heard the Government's response to this amendment before it was even tabled, and I know that they are concerned about pilots. Therefore, perhaps my most important question to the Minister is whether, if piloting ceases to commend itself, the Government can find another way of testing, assessing and evaluating the model. London cannot be regarded as a pilot. We have had reference in the debate to the number of letters received by the mayor's office when the current mayor took over responsibility for policing. However, London is not like the rest of the country, so I hope that that is not used as an argument against. I am sure the Minister will agree that we want evidence-based policy, not policy-based evidence. I beg to move.

Lord Brabazon of Tara: I have to inform the Committee that, if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 218.
	Amendment 27 ( to Amendment 26) not moved.

Lord Cormack: My Lords, as my name is attached to Amendment 26, I should like to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for the manner in which she introduced it. It is very much a probing amendment. I do not want to repeat my concerns about the election of police commissioners-my noble friend the Minister is well aware of those and has been most gracious in her recognition of them. She has already shown that she is indeed a listening Minister. We are in a slightly peculiar position, having passed the amendment that we passed a couple of weeks ago. I did not vote for that; I voted with my noble friend the Minister, because I felt that it was consistent with the role and responsibility of this House that we should accept the general principle from the House of Commons and then seek to improve what it had sent to us. It seemed to me that the most constructive way of seeking to improve it was to sanction pilot schemes.
	This is in no sense a wrecking tactic; it merely says, "Make haste slowly. Make sure you've got it right and be aware that there are very real problems that Members in all parts of the House have already touched on". I am concerned about the possible impact on national issues of the election of essentially local commissioners. I am very concerned about the party political nature of the commissioners. It is almost beyond any doubt that unless we include in the Bill a provision specifically to say that those affiliated to a political party cannot stand, it is almost certain that most commissioners will be affiliated to a political party. I am saying not that they cannot do their job but that I have real concerns about it, as does the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I think that many Members in all parts of the Committee would urge the Minister to discuss the strength of feeling with the Home Secretary and her other ministerial colleagues to see whether the pilot scheme cannot be accepted and adopted, or to come up with an alternative that meets some of the legitimate concerns and objections that have featured in debates so far.
	I do not wish to detain the Committee further, but I think that, far from being a wrecking tactic, this is a constructive suggestion. I hope my noble friend Lady Browning will recognise that when she comes to reply.

Lord Condon: My Lords, I sympathise with the motivation behind the amendment. Although I realise that it is a probing amendment, I cannot support it. The perfect storm of change that understandably surrounds policing needs to be resolved in the quickest and best way possible. However, pilots might be an unnecessary delay for a number of reasons. A small number of pilots might tell you a great deal about the relationship between some individual police and crime commissioners and some individual chief constables in localised areas, but I am not sure that we would learn great lessons that could be extrapolated to the whole of the country in all circumstances over 40 police forces. Although I acknowledge that this is a probing amendment that seeks a way to test, explore and challenge some of the rationale behind elected police and crime commissioners, I am not sympathetic to pilot schemes. Having discussed them with serving chief constables, I know that not many of them are supportive either.

Lord Dear: My Lords, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Condon, has said, because my views accord very much with his. Normally, I am a great fan of pilots-they give you a step-by-step approach, they are often sensible, they lead to a sense of being sure-footed, and they hammer off the rough edges of what was proposed in the first instance. In this case, however, I submit that they would lead to a sense of great unreality.
	I, too, have taken a straw poll of members of police service, ACPO members and so forth, and I have met with the same result. So far as I can make out from a fairly detailed survey, the service wants a degree of certainty, certainly nationally. That is particularly so when one looks forward. One does not need much of a crystal ball to recognise that more is coming down stream towards us that has not yet reached your Lordships' House, such as the national crime agency, which relates to national issues. Today, we have been focusing more on the local, and issues of leadership that are bound to flow from what part 2 of the Winsor report will propose. All those things and others depend on a sense of certainty. If we get into pilots now and they overtake us, the service will not be in a position to handle the other issues that are bound to come before your Lordships' House in the next 12 months or so.
	What I propose flows logically from the argument that we have just heard. We should make quite sure that the proper checks and balances surround the whole concept of police and crime commissioners and at that stage vote yes or no. We either have them or we do not, having given them due and appropriate consideration in your Lordships' House. We should not get into the business of pilots, which will be disruptive.

Lord Soley: I share the concern about pilots, but I also very much share the concern expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. The Bill contains so many unanswered questions that we are in danger of causing policing in this country more problems than we need. My profound anxiety is that, having spent the past 10 or more years trying to get the police from where they were 20 years ago, which was not a good place, to where they are now, which is a very much better place, we are in danger of losing that if we do not think this through.
	I pick up on the suggestion made by the noble Baroness and echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, that there is a strong case for the Government to go away and think about this. They should think about how they can ensure that this Act will not introduce profound changes to the police that are unpredictable in their outcome and that might move us backwards rather than forwards. The police are in a better position than they used to be. Let us not throw out the good for the sake of something that we think might be better but that does not have the checks and balances that are necessary.

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath: My Lords, I have two amendments in this group: Amendments 38 and 253. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, who I assume will speak to his amendment in a moment, I propose a system of pilots.
	I listened with great interest to the words of the noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Dear, who are worried about the impact of pilots. As they said, the feedback that they are getting from chief constables is that the worst thing of all for them is to have uncertainty about the future. I understand that point of view. I declare an interest as chair of an NHS foundation trust and as a consultant and trainer in the NHS. We are going through a similar process in the NHS. Obviously, people worry about uncertainty and about where they are going, but the crux of the point is that made by the noble Lord, Lord Dear; he said that we should see what checks and balances we can get into the Bill and then vote yes or no on the whole thing.
	I understand the noble Lord's point. I have no doubt that if the Minister responds sympathetically to some of the points put by noble Lords in our debates on recognising the need for stronger checks and balances, the argument for pilots would become less persuasive. However, the enormity of the change that is being proposed and the potential politicisation of our police forces are serious matters. There has been no Green Paper and no pre-legislative scrutiny. No evidence whatever has been produced to justify the changes that are being proposed.
	On that basis and despite the uncertainties that this might produce for chief constables, I suspect that, retrospectively, if elected police commissioners were introduced without checks and balances, those chief constables might look back and wish that there had been pilots so that some of the most contentious points of the arrangements could have been tested. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has gone for two-year pilots, the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, for three years, and I have gone for four years. However, the substantive point is that they need to be long enough to see how this works out in practice. I also think-and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, really has endorsed this-that there needs to be an independent evaluation as well. That would give confidence that the experiment has been judged and considered, and it would give Parliament time to consider the matter again. Above all, it would raise issues around governance, checks and balances, and the role of the panels, which the Government might wish to consider in the light of experience of those pilots.
	In reflecting on and understanding the point about uncertainty, and given the Government's position at the moment, the case for pilots is pretty persuasive.

Lord Elystan-Morgan: My Lords, I particularly support the submissions and remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. Although I have immense regard and sympathy for the amendments, the answer does not really lie in pilot schemes at all. I look upon it as the Government embarking on a very revolutionary experiment. Whether one agrees with it or not, one cannot deny that it breaks new ground in a massive way. Here is a machinery that has the potential to be successful but also to be extremely dangerous. How do you test that to destruction, before you bring the whole scheme into being? In other words, what is the legislative equivalent of the wave tank or wind tunnel that will give you an answer to that problem?
	I listened of course with total respect and regard to the remarks of the noble Lords, Lord Dear and Lord Condon, with their immense and distinctive experience in this field. Uncertainty is also a very great enemy of the morale of the police service in this matter but, nevertheless, these are massive questions. You may have a situation where perhaps 30 of the forces involved find themselves well and successfully served by a commissioner. What if you had 10, 11 or 12 situations where it did not work? The damage and the disastrous consequences would be so immense. That is the danger that we face.
	The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, spoke of national issues, and I will speak about a Welsh national issue. The Welsh Assembly Government were conscious of the very particular situation that we have in Wales with the four police forces and the possibility of amalgamation, which raises immense constitutional questions. In Wales you now have the outline of statehood and the question of whether you should have one single police force for a country and nation-not a situation that, at the moment, we are facing in the United Kingdom. The Welsh Assembly set up a high-powered body, which reported, I think, in February this year and recommended very strongly that there should be full discussions between the Welsh Assembly and Her Majesty's Government on this most sensitive of matters.
	Here we have been told by the Government-and I have no doubt that the Government are sincere in this -that this is a matter on which local views, attitudes and conditions have immense pertinence. That can be put to the test by respecting that attitude in relation to Wales.
	Lastly, speaking as a former family judge, I accept completely what has been said about the secrecy involved in dealing with the protection of children. These are not matters that can be laid down as huge lines of policy. They are sensitive matters where a great deal has to be done by way of trust and, if I may say so, covertly in so far as the general public are concerned. I do not for a moment believe that the role of protecting children is mainly that of the police; agencies in local government, and indeed in the health service, have that as their main concern. If I may say as an aside, I believe that the best protection that any child in danger can ever have is to have one person responsible for collecting and collating information-that, above all, is the best service that can be given to children. The police certainly have a massive and impactive role to play, but I do not think that their role can be improved in any way by the sort of structures contemplated in the proposals for police commissioners, with every respect to Her Majesty's Government. The matter needs to be approached with great imagination and great sensitivity.

Lord Bradshaw: My Lords, those of my colleagues who read the Daily Telegraph will have noticed from yesterday's edition that the stated main purpose of the coalition is to save us from economic disaster. The paper berated some of my noble colleagues for being left-wing trouble-makers. I have never regarded myself either as a trouble-maker or as particularly left-wing, but I believe the Bill to be essentially a flawed piece of legislation.
	I will speak very briefly to the amendments in my name, and I do so as a gardener. One of the things that you learn as a gardener, when you move about the country as I have done, is that you leave the place virtually alone until you know about what is growing there; you do not just go in and hack everything down. I am afraid that Ministers have a tendency to the hacking approach rather than the gardening approach. I must say to the noble Baroness the Minister that, so far, we have had no message in this House that would cause us to believe that Ministers in another place will actually listen to and discuss the concerns that we are raising. We have had many meetings, but those have not been productive meetings as we have been told, "This is what is going to happen". Indeed, I believe that instructions have been issued to police authorities that they are to prepare for Armageddon.
	Why would my amendments provide for three-year trials? I believe that it is essential that you go through two complete budget rounds before you know whether the arrangements work and what they will cost-I am very concerned about how much they will cost. I also believe that the experience in London, which the Policing Minister cited as the pilot study, is anything but a pilot study. I would ask the same Policing Minister whether, if he thoroughly approves of the way in which things are done now, he would still do so if Mr Livingstone is successful in 18 months' time. One of the rules in politics is that the pendulum does swing, and sometimes it swings pretty violently with great reaction against the party that it is leaving. Many organisations are then left to pick up the bits and to start reconstructing again.
	Turning back to the economy, I cannot see one iota of evidence that says that the proposed move is necessary or that it will save money. I believe that the Government have masses of things to do and, with due respect, I believe that this could be kicked into touch and nobody would notice.

Baroness Henig: I rise briefly to support the amendment, and I do so for a number of reasons.
	First, there is a tremendous lack of detail in the legislation, as has been mentioned before. Some very general ideas are put forward, but there is not much supporting detail about how it will all work in practice, as we have already commented. I am particularly concerned about how a PCC would interact with local government-not just with the councils but with all the bodies that local councils work through, including such local strategic partnerships as still exist and the crime and disorder partnerships that have been mentioned. I am also concerned about the relationship between the PCC and the panel, however the panel ends up and whatever powers it might have. There is clearly a relationship there that needs to be tested, and at the moment we have a very dim idea of how that would actually work.
	There is another set of reasons why I would like to see some pilots, relating to the electoral system. We have not talked about this yet, although I am sure that we will in due course. The Government have come forward for these PCC elections with an electoral system which I would like to see work, particularly in places such as Thames Valley and West Mercia. We have not actually had elections like these before in our history-one-topic elections over considerably large areas of the country, such as Thames Valley, where we have three local authorities, not one. I would be interested to see what the turnout would be in such elections and how the election campaign would be conducted. It seems reasonable to suggest that that would be worth studying. I would certainly want to see different models. I would like to see something happening in the West Midlands or Thames Valley because of the huge size of those places, but then you have very compact areas such as Cheshire and Warwickshire, which have rather different dynamics. It would be interesting perhaps to tweak the modelling to emphasise slightly different things in slightly different places.
	Politicisation is something that we have talked about. It is a huge problem for all of us and we are all very worried about that. Clearly, some sort of trialling might give us a handle on how elections could be conducted perhaps without party-political slanging. I would, for example, like to know whether we are right in thinking that no independents could conduct these elections. That was raised two sittings ago, and the point was raised that we are assuming that these elections will be contested by party-political candidates; yes, I am assuming that, because of the expense of the exercise. Maybe I am wrong-maybe independents could contest them. Again, one might get a better idea if one had some sort of pilot running.
	My very last point is that, while it is no secret that I have grave concerns about the proposals in this legislation, I am always prepared to admit that I might be wrong. Actually, what the Government are proposing might be fantastic for policing and I might have it wrong; my concerns might be misplaced. I am always ready to put my hand up and say that that is the case. Equally, however, I would expect the Government to be as flexible and say that perhaps they have got it wrong. It is possible. If we were in the private sector, it would not be seen as a terrible admission of anything to trial something before you went full tilt; you would say that it was very sensible. I do not see why in the public sector one should not adopt the same kind of cautious approach.
	For a whole number of reasons, I strongly support the amendment.

Baroness Browning: My Lords, before I respond to the debate that we have just had regarding the issue of pilots, it might help the House if I clarified the position regarding policing in Wales, which was spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan. Within this group of amendments, and a number of subsequent groups which we hope to debate later today, there are specific amendments that address matters of devolution and I dare say seek to probe the Government's negotiations with the Welsh Assembly Government. I am aware that there was not enough time at Report and Third Reading in the other place to debate the specific provisions within this Bill that had to be amended as a result of the failed legislative consent Motion. I therefore feel it is appropriate to set out publicly and on the record the narrative behind these provisions and, I hope, avoid any misunderstanding of the Government's position.
	I am grateful to noble Lords who have tabled amendments that will provide me with this opportunity. The Government have worked hard to try to secure a negotiated solution specific for Wales in the spirit of the devolution settlement. I must emphasise at the outset that policing is a reserved matter under the devolution settlement. However, there are related matters that are devolved.
	At the start of the planning for this reform in government, Ministers in the Home Office sought, and entered into, early engagement with the Welsh Assembly Government at both ministerial and official level. Their intention was to discuss how the Bill would apply in Wales and how it could respect those devolved institutions. On a number of occasions throughout the Bill's development, the Home Secretary and the Policing Minister met the Welsh Assembly Government's Minister for Social Justice and Local Government, Carl Sargeant, who was reappointed earlier this month to the same ministerial portfolio. Indeed, the Policing Minister also made visits to Cardiff to speak to the Welsh Assembly Minister and his officials to address directly the concerns of the Welsh Assembly Government and the Members in the National Assembly for Wales.
	From the outset, the Government acknowledged that the Welsh Assembly Government were opposed in principle to the abolition of police authorities in Wales and against the proposal to replace them with directly elected police and crime commissioners. However, the UK Government, including the Secretary of State for Wales, remained firm in their opinion that it is not in the interests of the people of Wales to have a different governance and scrutiny structure for their forces. Our reason is quite simple: there cannot be two models of governance for a police service whose officers and assets so regularly cross the regional boundary between England and Wales in pursuit of making our communities safer and tackling crime. The Welsh Assembly Government recognised this position and, while they do not agree with it, continued to respect the fact that policing remains a reserved matter to the Government in Westminster.
	When the original Bill entered the other place there were certain elements which affected the legislative competence of the National Assembly for Wales. Specifically, this was with regard to the provision for police and crime panels to be formed and maintained by the local authorities in the police area. As noble Lords will be aware, the Welsh National Assembly has legislative competence over oversight and scrutiny committees of local authorities. Therefore, in respecting the devolution settlement, the Government agreed with the view of the Welsh Assembly Government that the consent of the Assembly would be required to legislate on establishing police and crime panels in the form set out in the original Bill.
	In addition, the Government recognised the unique political landscape within Wales which had not, until this Government came into office, been formally recognised within policing governance structures in Wales since devolution. My ministerial colleagues in the Home Office and the Cabinet sought to address this by offering the Welsh Assembly Government the power to appoint a representative to the police and crime panels within Wales and to afford that member full voting rights. Furthermore, due to the unique funding stream that the Welsh Assembly Government afford to community safety partnerships and the legislative competence over social justice and community engagement, the Government offered provision for police and crime panels in Wales to have an additional veto to those in England. This veto would have enabled the panel to require the PCC to come to it for its consent if the PCC intended to merge community safety partnerships in Wales or require them to submit a report. This not only protected the policy and financial interests of the Welsh Assembly Government but fostered a stronger working relationship between the PCC and the Government in Cardiff, via the panel. The Welsh Assembly Government proposed a Motion to the Assembly to support the Government's negotiated solution in respect of the status of police and crime panels but it was defeated. It is regrettable that the then Government in Cardiff abstained from a vote that, if passed, would have strengthened their voice within policing governance.
	Nevertheless, the Government have respected the decision of the Assembly and have therefore amended the Bill to give the Secretary of State, rather than local authorities, the power to form police and crime panels within Wales. These panels will not form within local government structures but the Bill still seeks to ensure that the panels are made up of locally elected representatives, invited to form such a body at the request of the Secretary of State.

Lord Wigley: I apologise to the House that I missed the earlier part of this debate, although I have heard all of the Minister's comments. She mentioned the role of local government and that there might be an involvement in the activities that she has just outlined. Can she confirm that each local government area would have a voice in this, as they do at present on the police authorities-a unique situation in Wales, where every authority is represented?

Baroness Browning: I have to say to the noble Lord that these negotiations and discussions are still ongoing. However, I hear what he has said and will certainly feed back what he has suggested today.
	We have also amended the Bill to ensure that the provisions on community safety partnerships do not touch on matters in respect of which Welsh Assembly Government Ministers have functions. I hope that this account explains how we have reached the provisions set out in the Bill at present. Policing remains reserved. It is this Government's intention to secure the same reform for the people of Wales as for those in England, following the decision taken in the first session of this Committee. The Bill now removes the current arrangements for policing governance, but I can assure your Lordships' House that there are ongoing discussions to make sure that we get this absolutely right. I am grateful for the patience of your Lordships' House. There are amendments that relate specifically to Wales not only in the current group but in subsequent groups.
	I turn now to pilots. The amendments tabled by my noble friends would require the Government to pilot police commissions-or police and crime commissioners, as remains the Government's intent-in certain police areas before establishing them across England and Wales. In the spirit of constructive debate, I will deal with this group as though the amendments affected the original policy and clauses that would have established police and crime commissioners in England and Wales. Your Lordships will know that we are in difficult territory here. We are dealing with two very different bodies in the context of piloting.
	I shall not repeat what I have said in debates on previous amendments but I spelt out some of the research that has been done, which clearly demonstrates the public's appetite for more engagement with policing in their local areas. The success of the crime mapping website launched this year is evidence of this, with 410 million hits since January. Cabinet Office research showed that more than two-thirds of the public wanted an elected person to hold the police to account. I heard what my noble friend Lady Hamwee said about not praying in aid the experience of the Mayor of London. However, I cannot ignore what has happened in London. They mayor is there and the policing structure in London is there, and has been there for a while. While it was not exactly floated as a specific pilot, none the less we cannot ignore the fact that since the Mayor of London took on responsibility for policing, MPA correspondence has more than quadrupled. For these reasons there is no need to conduct pilots to establish these matters. Pilots also present practical problems.

Baroness Henig: In the research that the Minister cited, and certainly in the research that I have seen, when members of the public were told that police and crime commissioners would have a party political label, I understand that only 7 per cent of them wanted individuals with a party political label to be in charge of policing. That is not quite the same as what we are being told by the noble Baroness.

Lord Bradshaw: Will the Minister reflect on the fact that London is a unique area, with unique and very large media coverage? I ask her to think about places such as Devon and Cornwall and the distance from Barnstaple to Penzance and the distances to be covered in several other areas. People in different areas do not listen to the same radio programmes or read the same papers. It is only by having representatives of the divisions within an area that you will get any form of representative democracy.

Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton: My Lords, will the Minister accept from me that the fact that people checked on crime in their local area does not give an indication either way? My husband checked but I assure the noble Baroness that he would be very cross were she to assume from that that he is in favour of the Government's proposals.

Baroness Browning: My Lords, I would not dream of presuming what the noble Baroness's husband has made of all this. That would be a step too far for a mere Minister. My noble friend referred to the uniqueness of police forces across the country. That is the essence of this matter. Each police force is unique in its nature. Nobody is suggesting that what works in London will be exactly replicated in the Devon and Cornwall forces, or any other force. That is why piloting such a scheme would not give us a representative picture of what one sees in forces across the country. It would be interesting perhaps, but I genuinely believe that it would not take us any further forward, and it would cause delay.
	There are practical problems associated with pilots, such as how they would be chosen, who would decide that matter and who would be denied democratic policing while they were carried out. Also during the piloting scheme the two different forms of police governance would be running alongside each other, which would cause uncertainty. The noble Lords, Lord Condon and Lord Dear, with their vast experience in this area, referred to the uncertainty that this would create not least among chief constables. We are looking to the chief constables to show the leadership that is needed in working with the police and crime commissioners on these reforms to introduce the change that will allow the public to believe that the duo at the heart of these reforms will make a difference to the way that they see the police and can engage with them and with policing matters in their area.

Lord Clinton-Davis: Is the noble Baroness arguing that there are no common factors, or that there are some? Is it not reasonable that where there are some, the alteration that is envisaged should take place?

Baroness Browning: My Lords, of course, there are common factors across all police forces, although each force is unique. However, notwithstanding those, I believe that spending time on pilots would cause uncertainty, as I have said. Costs and delay would arise in sorting out this publicly recognised issue-that the public want to engage with policing in their area and to be represented by somebody who is democratically accountable directly to them. That very important matter is at the heart of these changes.
	Noble Lords have continued to ask about checks and balances. I cannot commit to changing the text of the Bill in order to satisfy the demands with regard to pilots. However, I am genuinely open to discussing checks and balances across the piece. I say to my noble friend Lord Bradshaw that although I have attended meetings, I have not yet held meetings to discuss checks and balances, as I promised the House on the previous Committee day. A letter will be sent out today to those noble Lords who have expressed an interest in the protocol, inviting them to meet immediately after the Recess so that I can hear their views. Other meetings will be offered as the Bill goes through your Lordships' House. I hope to hold them before the Bill leaves this House. Given those assurances, I hope that the noble Baroness will not press the amendment.

Baroness Hamwee: My Lords, this has been a serious debate, for which I am grateful. When my noble friend Lord Bradshaw talked about hacking in the garden, I thought that he would mention pulling things up by the roots, but perhaps I should not pursue that. I believe that his reference to meetings concerned an earlier regime-I am not sure whether that is quite the right term-but certainly before the noble Baroness took up her ministerial office. I am grateful to her for her offer to hold discussions throughout the passage of the Bill.
	I take very seriously the issue of certainty, which has been raised. I accept that the problem of uncertainty is inherent in the proposal for piloting or trialling. There is certainty and uncertainty on the one hand, and on the other there is getting it right-that is the dilemma we are in-and making sure that there are proper checks and balances, as the noble Lord, Lord Dear, said. The coalition programme for government refers to "strict" checks and balances.
	I do not want to take the time of the Committee by going through all the useful comments that have been made. However, I cannot resist picking up on what that the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, said about one-topic elections. That is the problem, although possibly not in the way she presented it. Local issues are so often subsumed to national issues and we have one-topic elections, but not perhaps in the way that the noble Baroness meant.
	As for the Minister's response, I, too, checked the crime map for my area. I would have been more hesitant in doing so if I had thought it might be held against me in some way. All forces are indeed different, but they have some common characteristics, which are the ones we should look at.
	In conclusion, I am a little disappointed, and it may be that the Minister has been unable to think of another alternative. She does not seem to have answered my question: can the Government find another way of testing, assessing and evaluating the model? It may be that we can continue to discuss this issue, because there must be evaluation and a reaction to what one finds from that evaluation. In that hope, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 26 withdrawn.
	Amendments 28 and 29 not moved.
	Amendment 30
	 Moved by Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
	30: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause-
	"Applicability of memorandum of understanding: operational independence
	The Minister must ensure that any memorandum of understanding finalised and approved in accordance with section 155(2) is applied to non-geographic police bodies in the United Kingdom, including-
	(a) the British Transport Police Force;
	(b) the Central Motorway Policing Group;
	(c) the Civil Nuclear Constabulary;
	(d) the Ministry of Defence Police;
	(e) the Port of Dover Police;
	(f) the Port of Liverpool Police; and
	(g) the Serious Organised Crime Agency."

Lord Stevenson of Balmacara: My Lords, I will link what I say to Amendments 231, 231A, 231B, 234ZA and 234ZB in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, my noble friend Lord Faulkner of Worcester, and the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. They effectively seek to ensure that the British Transport Police has the same powers and authority as geographical police forces. For reasons that I hope will become apparent, we support these amendments, which seem to make good operational sense.
	Additionally, in this group are a number of amendments in the names of my noble friends Lady Henig and Lord Beecham, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, that require police forces in the scope of the Bill, when enacted, to have particular regard to co-operation and collaborative working arrangements. Again, we support those amendments. Amendments 83ZA and 83B in the names of members of our Front Bench cover much of the same ground, but additionally require these working arrangements to be independent and impartial, and included in the memorandum of understanding.
	A memorandum of understanding has an important role to play in policing, irrespective of the Bill. In last week's Committee debate, the Minister encouraged us to regard as a first draft the memorandum of understanding circulated earlier this month by the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice. She invited comments and we should very much like to take up her offer of a meeting at an appropriate point to discuss the text in more detail. Although the MoU was referred to in our Committee discussions last week, it was not given much detailed consideration. I should therefore like to spend a little time on it, in the spirit of constructive debate, before arguing that the MoU, once agreed, should apply also to all UK police forces and, in particular, to the British Transport Police.
	What do we want from a memorandum of understanding? The model that comes to my mind is in part the military covenant and in part the BBC royal charter. Like the military, the police put themselves at the service of their country and have to endure risks on a daily basis, sometimes paying the price of such service with their lives. Like the military, this ought to be recognised in a compact with the state. As with the BBC, the police clearly need to be independent and be seen to be independent. Therefore, there needs to be a document setting out the high-level principles that we think should apply to policing, defines the aims and objectives of policing, guarantees the independence of the police operating within those parameters, indicates how the success of police operations will be measured, and defines how accountability will be discharged-accountability that should surely be to Parliament.
	It should, in short, be adjudged to be part of our constitutional writings, as is acknowledged in the draft. Much of it already exists in other documents and in legislation. The task, therefore, is one of bringing the material together in a readable and appropriate form. It is a pity that that has not been the approach taken to date. The draft which has been circulated does not achieve those aims. It ought to be an authoritative disquisition about the operational independence of the police, a clear statement about what we, the people, want our police to do and defining how they may do it, putting flesh on the bones of that admirable construct, policing by consent.
	In fact, what we have been given is somewhat polemical in approach, containing as it does a rehash of the arguments for the Bill and, in particular, a case for the role of the police and crime commissioners. It states:
	"The election of Police and Crime Commissioners is at the heart of the Government's plan to cut crime".
	Perversely, it starts off in a negative mode and is full of warnings about what it does not contain. It states:
	"This Protocol does not supersede or vary the legal duties and requirements of the Office of Constable",
	instead of positively defining what those duties are.
	These documents are not easy to get right, and I sympathise with Ministers struggling with them. I hasten to add that there are some very good sections in the MoU but, to my mind, they come much too late in the document and lose their impact because of what you have to read through to get to them. The section on the chief constable and what, to us, seems to be at the heart of the memorandum, the section on operational control, need to be considerably expanded and should come up front so that, for example, the sections on relationships with local interests and with the Home Office have a context.
	I make two other points. The document would be much improved if more attention was paid to the inevitably complex lines of accountability and control in policing. For example, the assertion that the chief constable holds office under the Crown but is appointed by the PCC needs to be unpicked and given much more detailed consideration. There also needs to be much more in the memorandum about the assertion:
	"The PCC and Chief Constable must work together to safeguard the principle of operational independence",
	but the sentence continues,
	"while ensuring that the PCC is not fettered in fulfilling the role set out above".
	Those two aspirations pull in opposite directions and seem irreconcilable.
	Amendment 30 is intended to ensure that the citizens of the United Kingdom and our visitors can be assured that the standards of policing in this country are broadly comparable wherever they are and whatever they are doing, not only across the geographical police forces, which are in scope to the Home Office, but the non-geographical forces, listed in our amendment, which are in scope to other departments such as the Department for Transport and other departments of state.
	Surely we should be striving for a commonality of approach while respecting local and operational differences. My concern is that a memorandum for one set of police forces will exacerbate the present differences between the geographic and non-geographic forces. Where the Bill has to introduce new structures, they should support a seamless policing environment from the citizens' point of view.
	I declare a past interest in that I was for several years an external mentor for the excellent senior management development scheme in the British Transport Police. I confess that I knew next to nothing about policing or even the existence of BTP, but I soon came to recognise that BTP was, and remains, a very special police force. I have a high regard for its ethos, its approach to policing, the quality of its senior management and its overall operation as Britain's only national police force.
	BTP's history can be traced back to 1826 and the origins of the police service in Britain. The railways and high-speed rail in particular are a unique policing environment with a unique set of needs. BTP's 2,835 police officers and 1,455 support staff exist to provide a specialist policing service to meet those needs. The officers and men of BTP police the tracks and provide a service to rail operators, their staff and passengers across the whole of the country, including the London Underground system, Docklands Light Railway, the Midland Metro tram system, Croydon Tramlink and Glasgow Subway. BTP safeguards about 6 million people every day. Railway passengers do not recognise the boundary between the railway and the community more generally. Crime and the fear of crime know no boundaries. Criminal behaviour is promiscuous and it crosses areas and networks. It is surely vital that our policing services do likewise with the minimum interruption from the structural concerns. At present, the systems and structures, pay and conditions, training, the use of HM inspectorate, the uniforms and the rest ensure that the BTP is seen by the public as an integral part of our policing system. Senior officers of the BTP, for example, regularly serve as gold commander at public events such as sporting occasions and state visits.
	Our amendment seeks to ensure that, when the memorandum of understanding is introduced, the Bill takes account of any danger that it might separate the non-geographic from the geographic forces. We think that the way to do that is to require that the memorandum of understanding, once it is finalised and approved in accordance with Section 155(2), is applied to non-geographic police bodies in the United Kingdom. Only in this way, I believe, can we guarantee that visitors coming to London through our ports, via the Channel Tunnel or by using our motorways, can be sure of parity of service provision, or that people attending the Olympics or the Commonwealth Games can be confident that the police service will match the highest standards found in the community and that our commuters and their families will be sure that they are as safe out and about as they are at home and that the standards applied are equivalent. I beg to move.

Baroness Henig: Amendment 77 is in my name, so perhaps I may say a few words about it. Before I do so, I did not declare my interest on the previous occasion and perhaps I may seek clarification. Do I need to declare my interest at the start of every Committee day, or does the fact that I did so on the first day mean that I do not need to do so again?

Lord De Mauley: My Lords, I am reliably informed that once is enough.

Baroness Henig: I am grateful for that. Amendment 77 relates back to an issue that this House discussed on our previous Committee day-that is, exploring the role of the police and crime commissioner in relation to the crime aspect of their portfolio, in addition to the aspect relating to policing.
	In that debate I mentioned my concern that this aspect of the police and crime commissioner's role is underdeveloped in how it is described in the Bill, which seems largely to focus on the ability to make grants to organisations engaged in crime reduction. The amendment seeks to link the role of the police and crime commissioner to this wider role in preparing policing and crime plans. It is clear that it is the Government's intention to enable crime-related issues and priorities to be included in the functions of the police and crime commissioner and therefore, by extension, in these plans. The issue here is whether it would be possible, without explicit powers, to do what the Government want. Therefore, I am trying to make explicit what the Government hope the police and crime commissioner will do and to give a permissive power to the police and crime commissioner to work with partner organisations, and not just the police, and include them in crime reduction plans.
	I have indicated before that I consider the Government's proposals regarding police and crime commissioners to be very ambitious. I quote what the policing Minister stated in a speech at the IPPR on 28 March 2011:
	"The role of commissioners will be greater than that of the police authorities they replace. That is the significance of the words 'and crime' in their title. They will have a broad remit to ensure community safety, with their own budgets to prevent crime and tackle drugs. They will work with local authorities, community safety partnerships and local criminal justice boards, helping to bring a strategic coherence to the actions of these organisations at force level".
	I hear that, and it is what I should like to happen but there are no explicit linkages in the Bill to ensure that it does happen. It is an aspiration but I want to make sure that it happens in delivery terms, and I am therefore trying to put something explicit in the Bill. We all know about good intentions but that does not necessarily mean that delivery happens on the ground, and I am most concerned about how this works out on the ground.
	Therefore, perhaps in her response the Minister can address whether she believes that the plans, as currently set out in the Bill, will be able to pick up priorities related to this wider crime role and not just policing priorities or whether she thinks that what I am trying to suggest here in my amendment is helpful. Again it comes down to collaboration with a whole range of bodies that exist at local level at the moment, and on giving the police and crime commissioner an explicit remit to go out and do all these things. They have been mentioned but I would like to know that they will happen.
	I was disappointed that the Minister did not address my query at our previous sitting about how the Government see the wider crime role of the police and crime commissioner fitting in with the new payment-by-results approach, which the Ministry of Justice is developing in relation to criminal justice bodies. That was not addressed but it is an issue, and it would be helpful if she could address it in her response. I remain concerned about timing. The Bill risks putting in place premature arrangements while the landscape in relation to criminal justice is still being developed. It is not yet clear so I hope that she can reassure me on that point.

Lord Dear: I understand that we are debating an issue of uniformity, which has to be a good thing. I do not think that anyone will be surprised if I remind the Committee that nearly all the organisations mentioned are either controlled by or commercially responsible to either Her Majesty's Government or to commercial concerns.
	I wish to draw attention to the Central Motorway Policing Group, which is in the list. I set up that group in the late 1980s. It was then, and remains, a collaborative agreement between four police forces: the West Midlands, which is at the heart of the ring around the West Midlands conurbation, with substantial stretches in Staffordshire, West Mercia and a small section in Warwickshire. It covers the M5, M6, M40, M42 and the M6 toll road. It is a collaborative agreement in which the constituent chief constables take an interest but it does not fit usefully into that list. Those proposing the amendment, assuming things are not changed, might consider withdrawing it from the list.

Lord Beecham: I rise to speak briefly to Amendment 83A. The clause requires the elected police commissioner to co-operate with a variety of partners in the criminal justice system. One might think that it might be overegging the pudding to require that he should co-operate with,
	"the chief officer of police for that police area",
	but that is what Clause 10(4)(a) says. The clause then identifies a range of other partners, such as the Crown Prosecution Service, the Lord Chancellor in respect of courts, a Minister of the Crown in respect of functions relating to prisons and a youth offending team -effectively NOMS and probation.
	It is arguable that a body might be under a duty to co-operate with such agencies of the criminal justice system but it strikes me as somewhat invidious for a single individual to have that relationship with bodies administering the courts and these other functions. Those powers are sensitive-extremely sensitive, it might be thought-and likely to promote some concern on the part of the public as to whether single individuals should be engaged at that level in such a co-operative enterprise. I should be grateful if the Minister could elucidate the thinking behind that provision. It seems somewhat dangerous to me. One might be more ready to accept the duty if it were that of a police authority, constituting more than one individual. If we do revert to that position, there are some concerns that need to be discussed.

Baroness Hamwee: I have a number of amendments in this group. Like other noble Lords, I found the draft of the memorandum of understanding that we have seen useful as a narrative but disappointing in that it seems hardly to tackle the difficult issues. It would be inappropriate for the memorandum of understanding simply to say in other words what the Bill, or Act as it will become, says. It must go further and deeper. There is a lot that could be cut out, but noble Lords are identifying a lot that needs to be covered.
	Amendment 69AA, on the supplementary Marshalled List, provides for any protocol or memorandum of understanding to be one of the items that must be considered when the police and crime plan is reviewed. Clause 5 lists other items, but we should recognise that a document such as this will be in existence and should be acknowledged in statute. I appreciate that the Minister will want to talk about whether the protocol should have statutory force when she discusses that with other noble Lords.
	Amendments 82 and 83 deal with Clause 10: "Co-operative working". My simple proposal is that victims of crime and their representatives-I am thinking of various voluntary organisations-should be included among those who work co-operatively and should be brought in to the arena. Similarly, arrangements for obtaining the views of the community, covered by Clause 14, should include those who have been the victims of crime and those who support them, because their views should be obtained and made good use of.
	Finally, the Local Government Association asked me to table Amendment 231 on community safety partnerships. The Bill transfers the Secretary of State's authority to commissioners. The amendment would delete the transfer so that authority would remain with the Home Secretary. Noble Lords might be surprised to hear me advocating the retention of a Home Secretary's power: it is not what I normally do. However, the LGA is concerned-and I share its concern-that the introduction of police and crime commissioners could undermine the partnership working that is in place, introduce ambiguity for community safety partnerships over the role of the commissioner and undermine the ability of the partnerships effectively to deliver results. The LGA warns of tension between the differing political mandates of commissioners and local authorities. I remind the House that it speaks on a cross-party basis. It says that to keep the authority over CSPs with the Home Secretary at national level and encourage close collaborative working at local level would be for the best.

Lord Bradshaw: I will speak to Amendments 231A, 231B, 234ZA and 234ZB standing in my name. They relate to the British Transport Police. That body is unique and not, as far as I know, subject to the idea of elected commissioners. However, it polices our railways and goes back in its origins to the days when transport policemen were the signalmen on the railway who looked after the conduct of trains.
	We have moved on a bit and the transport police now are more or less corralled within the boundaries of the railway, so that they cannot exercise their powers outside the railway unless explicit guidance or agreement has been reached with the county force or its successors. These amendments would extend the jurisdiction of the transport police to make them responsible for policing transport interchanges. Nearly every railway station has a car park, a bicycle place and somewhere where people catch the bus. People need to be assured of their safety throughout their journey. Some research I had done about 18 months ago showed that according to the estimates made by the Department for Transport, 11.5 per cent more journeys would be made on public transport if passengers felt more secure. I am not pretending for one instant that letting the transport police embrace the precincts of a station would put that all right, but I know that the moment when people get off a train and transfer to another means of public transport, even walking down the street, is when they feel most vulnerable and is probably when they are most likely to be attacked.
	I am not asking for more money to be given to the British Transport Police, which is, in fact, a matter for the Department for Transport, rather than the Home Office, but it is important that some real force is put behind the guidance. Actually, there is no guidance. Informal arrangements exist in some places, and they work, but they are informal. To take an example I know well, at Reading station, which has extensive bus stops, car parks, some of them rather nasty, and cycle racks, the police cannot even deal with disorder in the park that was built as part of the station but is outside out the limits. We want to use the manpower at the Government's disposal in the best possible way to promote the interests of passengers, and the British Transport Police force is, to a large extent, paid for by the train operating companies .

Lord Faulkner of Worcester: My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, and have put my name to the same amendments in this group. I commend the speech made at the beginning of this debate by my noble friend Lord Stevenson, who summed up ideally the importance of the British Transport Police and the necessity of removing the anomalies in existing legislation. We made some progress on improvements over the past 10 years. For example, at one point, it was illegal for a British Transport Police officer to pursue a pickpocket out of the station on to the neighbouring street. It was like one of those Wild West films where the police's jurisdiction finishes at the state line and the next state's police have to take over. It is an absurd situation. The problem that the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, referred to still exists to a considerable degree. I believe that it is important that when people undertake a journey by train to an airport station, the British Transport Police should be not only on the platform but in the airport as well because they are providing the same sort of security to the traveller and, as far as the passenger is concerned, it is a seamless journey.
	There are some anomalies that we have the opportunity to address with these amendments. I shall concentrate on one aspect of them relating to alcohol. The BTP is at present excluded by Section 1 of the Police Act 1996 from having a view on licensing applications, even though there are now large numbers of retail outlets selling alcohol on stations, as the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, points out. It would be very much in the interests not just of the travelling public but of the public generally that, if the British Transport Police was aware of problems relating to particular premises associated with the railway, it had the opportunity to object to those licences. I understand that at present it is not able to do that.
	A number of these anomalies can be put right, particularly if the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, has tabled and which I am supporting were to be accepted by the Government. I very much hope that the Minister will look at them, and if it is not possible to accept the amendments today will be able to come back to us at a later stage to say that some of these difficulties will be ironed out at later stages of the Bill. I think these are worthwhile amendments, and I hope the Committee will support them.

Lord Harris of Haringey: My Lords, there is a cornucopia of interesting points concealed in this group of amendments. I shall try to confine myself to about three rather than address them all. In response to the speeches made by the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, and my noble friend Lord Faulkner of Worcester about the British Transport Police, although I have a lot of sympathy for what is being said, I say that we need to think through some of the implications. It would not be in the interests of citizens if they never knew where the tentacles of the British Transport Police had so far extended and that they might be relating to them in places considerably different from railway stations or the railway.
	I am conscious of that because some years ago I conducted an exercise, on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Authority, which listened to Londoners about their attitudes to counterterrorism policing. There were a huge number of comments, particularly about stop and search and Section 44. I appreciate that Section 44 is no more. It was interesting that, on analysis, a large number of those comments related to the actions of the British Transport Police. The public, particularly young people, did not make a distinction between the British Transport Police and the Metropolitan Police in that instance. We have to think about how a chief officer of police will have direction and control for policing in their area if this is blurred. But that is not to say that we would want an extraordinary sort of relay race where the baton is handed on when a pickpocket is being chased from one place to another. The position of some of the non-geographic police bodies should be regularised and it is important that they are regularised in this Bill.
	I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Stevenson of Balmacara for putting forward and speaking to Amendment 30, which raises the issue of the Memorandum of Understanding defined in his earlier amendment. Incidentally, I think that it is a different document from that which the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was talking about and which the Government published a couple of weeks back. This is intended to talk about the relationship between different forces rather than the relationship between an elected police and crime commission or a non-elected police and crime commission and a chief officer of police.
	Some specification of the relationship between the non-geographic forces and the mainstream Home Office forces is extremely important. I should like to illustrate that in relation to the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, which is responsible for the protection of nuclear sites and for the transportation of nuclear materials, including at sea. Because of the nature of nuclear materials and the considerable dangers that might be associated with it, it is a very heavily armed constabulary with significant amounts of weaponry, including, I think, cannons for use at sea. It is therefore very important in terms of what might or might not happen in respect of these issues. It highlights potential vulnerabilities of particular sites or when nuclear materials are being transported and the public, quite rightly, would expect those materials and sites to be properly protected.
	However, it is slightly anomalous that, as I understand it, the members of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary are paid on different, lower scales than other police officers. It is more than slightly anomalous that those officers are not necessarily subjected to the same levels of training. I think that as regards firearms training there now is a lot of read-across, but that was not always the case and there is no requirement for that to be the case. This is potentially of enormous public concern and we want to see that the governance and arrangements are managed properly.
	The relationship between the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and Home Office forces in the vicinity also worries me. As I understand it, agreements are in place between the Civil Nuclear Constabulary around particular establishments and the local police force. I think the concept-no doubt I caricature it grotesquely-is that if, for example, a particular establishment came under sustained attack from the massed ranks of al-Qaeda or whoever else it might be, the Civil Nuclear Constabulary would be able to hold off that attack for a certain period while the local constabulary would come to its aid. The problem, I suspect, is about what the local constabulary would be able to do under such circumstances. Often these are in quite rural and remote areas; the forces concerned do not have large armed presences that could be summoned at short notice-or they might have to go over mountain ranges or face other difficult circumstances. To clarify what the relationship is and should be not only would be very valuable in terms of this legislation, but also would be extremely important in terms of public safety and the security of the critical national infrastructure.
	I suspect-but I know less about it-that a similar arrangement might well be important in respect of the Ministry of Defence Police. I know there were some discussions-and I acknowledge that I am not sure how they turned out-about the Ministry of Defence Police taking on responsibility, in addition to its duties in respect of Ministry of Defence establishments, for keeping an eye on and protecting certain bits of the critical national infrastructure. Again, the same principles apply about the relationship between its activities and the local force's. Getting that right is important: I think it probably would valuably be spelt out in the context of having independent-minded police and crime commissions or commissioners-whatever we end up with-or the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime in London. It may be important in terms of protecting the national interest and what we all expect to happen with respect to that collaboration if some of these things were capable of being spelt out by a proper Memorandum of Understanding which could be referred to and in which the Home Office and other agencies would want to play a significant part.
	That is one point I wish to make on this group of amendments. The second relates to Amendment 83A, in the name of my noble friend Lord Beecham. This deletes the reference to specific bodies listed in the definition of "criminal justice body". Again, it would be valuable when the Minister responds if she could spell out the direction of travel as far as the Government are concerned. What we have at the moment is an enabling clause within the Bill, designed to enable things to evolve over time. However, we also want some clarity that this is not going to damage some of the existing areas of collaboration; we need to understand what the longer-term constitutional implications of major changes in this area might be.
	For example, at the moment, there are plenty of very good, well worked-out examples of having Crown Prosecution Service staff collocated within police stations. This is designed to ensure a quick and rapid interchange between police officers investigating a crime and Crown Prosecution Service staff about whether sufficient evidence has been gathered as soon as arrangements have been made as to how to take things forward, were a charge to be made. That is good practice, and something which works well. Is it the Government's intention that that should go further-that ultimately the Crown Prosecution Service should come within the ambit of the police, or within the ambit of the police and crime commissioner, the commission or the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime-whatever we end up with? I think that then raises some fundamental issues about the relationship between the police and the prosecution decision. We do not have in this country an inquisitorial system whereby a prosecutor comes in and makes all the decisions on the investigation and how things proceed. By changing that relationship-or potentially changing that relationship-we will change significantly the components of the criminal justice system and the way they relate to policing. Whether that is in the wider interests of the public, I think we need to be clear and we need to debate. I have a fairly open mind on it, but it raises some quite big constitutional issues.
	Similarly, I can see that considerable savings might be made were some elements of probation and policing to be brought together. Checking whether people are meeting their probation obligations might fit in usefully with local policing, but the distinction between the end point of criminal justice-the punishment end or whatever else it may be called-and ordinary policing would then be blurred. Again, I have an open mind as to whether that is good or bad, but it raises profound constitutional issues about the independence of those different functions. We should be clear about what the Government see as their direction of travel.
	On court administration and court services, tremendous benefits in terms of cost savings could be achieved by removing some of the extraordinary anomalies whereby police officers hang around indefinitely almost for the convenience of courts, magistrates or judges. If all those services were under the control of a single individual-the police and crime commissioner, the police and crime commission or the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime-efficiencies could be introduced in the way those systems worked. That would no doubt be good news for the public purse; it might be good news in terms of people awaiting trial and disposal by the courts, because things would happen speedily and when people expected them to happen; it would certainly be in the interests of witnesses; and it might well be in the interests of police officers who could spend their time otherwise. However, fundamental constitutional questions are raised about the relationship between the courts and the police. I am quite happy for us to have that debate but I would not want it to happen by default on the basis of a comparatively obscure clause in this Bill, as opposed to us looking at what the implications might be and whether there are serious unintended consequences of what might otherwise seem a sensible proposal.
	I shall make my final point briefly because I appreciate that I have spoken for quite a long time. It relates to Amendments 230A, 230B and 230C, which are on crime and disorder strategies and propose essentially to link into them the police and crime commissioner, the police and crime commission or the MOPC. The amendment ties in with the amendments that we debated last week about the relationship with local authorities. It is important to make sure that the accountability mechanism created under the Bill, whatever its final picture looks like, is seen to have a read-across at divisional level and at very local level. If a single individual ends up being in charge of all these things, the mechanism risks becoming centralised into a county-wide and force-wide process of debate and discussion, and you will lose the local dialogue which is essential to crime and disorder strategies at a local-authority level. It would also be more difficult to bring about the neighbourhood dimension. Making the strategy an explicit responsibility of the police and crime commissioner, the police and crime commission or the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime makes enormous sense.

Lord Bradshaw: The noble Lord said that stop-and-search powers had been clumsily or excessively used by the British Transport Police. Will he give the Committee the benefit of knowing when that took place and acknowledge that a great deal has changed since then?

Lord Harris of Haringey: I think that the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, heard what he feared I was saying rather than what I actually said.

Lord Faulkner of Worcester: I heard it, too.

Lord Harris of Haringey: Well, both your Lordships are strong protagonists of the British Transport Police. My point was about the potential confusion. I am sure that all of us in this Committee know instantly whether a police officer whom we see is from the Metropolitan Police, the British Transport Police or the Ministry of Defence Police. We recognise the hat badges and the different detail around the cap, but most people do not. I was simply demonstrating that this was an area of considerable confusion.
	There was equally severe concern and criticism of the way that the Metropolitan Police had used Section 44 of the Terrorism Act in terms of stop and search and there was also enormous confusion about whether it was Section 44 of the Terrorism Act or stop and search under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act or whatever else. The point is that people do not understand these processes. Before we go down the road of saying that the remit of British Transport Police officers should automatically be extended, we need to think through how that will be managed and dealt with.

Baroness Browning: My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for raising the potential implications of the protocol or memorandum of understanding for the non-geographic police forces within England and Wales. Of course, the Bill does not change the governance structures of these bodies. With the exception of the Serious Organised Crime Agency, they are not answerable to the Home Secretary, who is to issue the protocol. The protocol will not vary the interaction between the Home Office and non-geographical forces. That is why in the Bill we have safeguarded the direction and control of chief officers. Through that, their operational interaction with, for example, the British Transport Police and others remains unaffected.
	There are also questions about how the protocol, as it is currently conceived, would apply to these bodies, which differ from the geographical police forces significantly in terms of their functions. The Committee has touched on some of these this evening. The governance arrangements and relationship with the public, although overlapping, are often quite different. However, I appreciate that at least some of those forces may benefit from such a protocol being in place. I genuinely welcome further discussion on the merits of widening the protocol's scope.
	However, this has not been the immediate focus of the protocol as drafted and we would be keen to discuss that further, including of course detailed discussions with the bodies concerned. I reiterate that members of the Committee who have expressed an interest in the protocol as currently drafted will receive an invitation to discuss it in more detail with me. Those letters should go out in the next 24 hours. I hope that after the Recess we can have a more detailed discussion about that protocol.
	The Government expect police and crime commissioners, community safety partnerships and other criminal justice bodies to co-operate in order to deliver the best service to local communities across the force area. Their priority should be tackling crime and disorder for the benefit of the local people. Therefore, they should work together to overcome any particular issues. Clause 10 sets out in legislation a reciprocal duty to co-operate for police and crime commissioners and authorities comprising community safety partnerships. It also requires police and crime commissioners and other criminal justice agencies within their force area such as the probation, prison and court services to make local arrangements to work effectively together.
	We want to establish a framework that enables commissioners to develop strong relationships with these key local partners. Those relationships will be critical to commissioners in order to make the most sustainable impact on crime and community safety. The clause sets the foundations for that framework and we expect commissioners and local partners to build on that through strategic engagement and dialogue. They will work together to provide the most effective and efficient response to the needs of their local communities. It is important to see Clause 10 in the context of other measures to advance joint working in the Bill, such as grant-making powers, provisions to elevate crime and disorder strategies to a force-wide level and to commission reports to examine any element of those strategies.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Henig, asked specifically about payment by results. I hope that she will find it agreeable for me to write to her on that issue. I know that she focused on Clause 10.
	I do not think it necessary to further labour the duty with a memorandum of understanding which has the potential to become burdensome on the professional and experienced services that certain amendments within this group are seeking to bind in law. We have agreed a way forward with the protocol and I hope that noble Lords will avail themselves of making their views on specific issues known to me. However, I want to keep that light touch because there is a danger if too much detail is set into the protocol it will become a burden. That is not what we want it to do.
	The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, was concerned that an individual would carry the power and responsibility. But I gently remind the noble Lord that if they are elected by the public, that person, whatever badge they had when they stood for election, would have had to present themselves to the public and convince them that they were able to do the job. They would have to carry out those important functions not just in an honourable way but in a competent way. Therefore, they would have to gain the trust of the public.
	This is often the cause of debate. We say that we trust the public, but do we really? I do and I believe that our democratic process is such that if we give the public an opportunity to elect somebody to an important and responsible role such as this-as we do in other areas of our democratic process-we should trust them. The police and crime commissioners will of course have the scrutiny of the panel behind them who will hold them to account and who will be an important check and balance on the way in which they carry out their duties.

Lord Beecham: Does the Minister not see that, in all the partnerships that arise, there will be only one person-the elected police commissioner-who stands alone? In no other case will he be engaged with a single individual. He will be dealing with a properly constituted body, whether that is the Lord Chancellor's Department-he will not have a direct relationship with the Lord Chancellor-the Prison Service, the Offender Management Service or the youth offending teams.
	We will have a situation where an individual, elected as the noble Baroness said, deals effectively with a number of corporate bodies. Does that relationship not look odd constitutionally? My noble friend Lord Harris pointed that out. Is there not a danger that invested with that elected authority there may be a temptation, which may be difficult to resist, for an unprecedented-in our system-degree of pressure on other parts of the criminal justice system?

Baroness Browning: The Mayor of London might well be described as having similar power as constituted already and already elected. I was not aware at the time that that was an argument brought forward to oppose the powers of the Mayor of London. I do not know whether I am reading the noble Lord correctly. I understand why he is concerned but he has not yet persuaded me. I am sorry to tell him that.

Lord Harris of Haringey: I am not aware that the Mayor of London currently has powers in respect of the criminal justice bodies that are listed here.

Baroness Browning: I hear what noble Lords are saying. I am not persuaded of the argument because I believe that there are sufficient checks and balances as far as the police and crime commissioners are concerned to ensure that they carry out their duties, not only in a robust way but in the way that we would all expect them to carry them out in their relationship with all bodies, whether at a local or national level. I remain unconvinced, I am afraid, of the noble Lord's arguments in that area.

Baroness Henig: I also trust the public, but in the only cases that I can see that might be compatible-elected mayors-there have been one or two examples of extremely problematic situations in the past few years. If they were repeated in the policing sphere it would have the most serious consequences.

Baroness Browning: I understand why the noble Baroness says that which is why, of course, the checks and balances need to be in place. We are all frail as human beings, even the highest. That is why the Bill needs to ensure-and I believe it does-that there are checks and balances for police and crime commissioners. That is one of the things we might discuss in terms of our negotiations across the Committee before this Bill leaves it. However, I do not want noble Lords to think that I am persuaded that the principle of a democratically elected police and crime commissioner is something that we are going to depart from. It is the core of the Bill.

Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton: The Minister has, with a very welcome style, promised meetings before the Bill leaves the House. In my experience, those meetings would be most helpful prior to Report stage, because it is then much easier for Members with a detailed interest in this legislation to consider what their position will be on Report.

Baroness Browning: My Lords, I quite accept that and it would be my intention to do exactly that. There is a gap between Committee and Report and I hope that we can usefully fill the hours in between discussing these matters.
	The public, through a police and crime commissioner, will receive a stronger voice within the wider criminal justice system; moreover, the commissioner would act as an advocate for the system's independence. I do not believe there is a need to restate in this Bill the legal consequences were any individual, irrespective of their public position, to seek to undermine or frustrate the well established legal processes within England and Wales. As with the operational independence of a chief constable, no clauses in this Bill seek to undermine or influence the independence of the judiciary, the Crown Prosecution Service or the legal responsibilities and foundation of other criminal justice bodies.
	To that end, it is right and proper that we simply list in Clause 10, those bodies and authorities which the Government expect a PCC to develop a co-operative working relationship with rather than leave it to chance or allow for uncertainty and doubt or, at worst, preach to the converted and issue guidance on how the separate bodies should go about each other's business.
	I am most grateful to noble Lords who have spoken on the subject of the British Transport Police.

Lord Harris of Haringey: Now that the noble Baroness is leaving the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, perhaps she could tell us whether she is saying that the sole purpose of Clause 10(4) is to remind these paragons who are going to fulfil these roles in future that these are people they ought to talk to and collaborate with. In that case, it seems unnecessary to include the list in the Bill unless the Government have some further intention in mind going beyond simply saying, "Well, these are people you ought to talk to".

Baroness Browning: My Lords, the Government have no intention or expectation that they will go further in the way that the noble Lord has outlined. We just felt that it was important to put it in the Bill but not to the point of being prescriptive in any further detail than that. I can assure the noble Lord-if this is what is in the back of his mind-that there is no hidden agenda of mission creep here in terms of the powers. I do not know if I have interpreted what he has said correctly but if that is what he was suspicious of, I hope I can reassure him on that point.

Lord Harris of Haringey: My Lords, that is an extremely helpful comment. Let me put it round the other way. Does Clause 10 contain within it an expectation that those bodies listed will themselves collaborate? We have heard examples of where some of the individuals and bodies have stuck very carefully to what they regard as their independence and have not seen it as their responsibility to collaborate and work with other partners.

Baroness Browning: My Lords, we hope that with the election of police and crime commissioners there will be a real culture change in the way in which these bodies work together. We hope that we will break down Chinese walls where bodies do not co-operate and that they will work together where it would definitely be to the public's advantage that they do. One of the police and crime commissioner's duties will be to build these relationships and ensure that they advance the fight against crime. That is their objective. We do not want to be too prescriptive in the Bill but, on the other hand, we also want to make the intention behind the role very clear. I reassure the noble Lord that if there are problems at a local level-and there are bound to be, because we are talking about human frailties and people taking positions; we are all familiar with that-a police and crime commissioner will make it his or her priority to rebuild bridges and co-operate right across the piece to ensure that they fulfil the main objective of their job, which is to reduce crime and represent the people's view on crime reduction in their area. It may sound rather worthy but culture change is not always easy to bring about. It does not always happen simply by dotting every last "i" in the primary legislation.
	I turn to the British Transport Police. As I hope noble Lords will recall from exchanges during passage of the Policing and Crime Act 2009, some of the matters that have been raised tonight were to have been considered within the context of the quinquennial review of the British Transport Police Authority, which was to have been carried out under the previous Administration but was not progressed. Nevertheless, this is an opportunity for the Government to re-examine these proposals and to consider them within the wider context of the Government's plan to reform the governance of the 43 Home Office forces within England and Wales. I therefore undertake to consult my ministerial colleagues in the Department for Transport on the various issues raised by these amendments and to consider how they might best be progressed. Once I have done so I will write to noble Lords. I say particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester, that I have just had my ministerial duties defined this week, and alcohol and drug use are included in my responsibilities. I was very interested to hear what he said about the lack of British Transport Police involvement. I promise to take the matter away and consider it as I thought that he made a very strong point.
	I am grateful to those who contributed to the debate on these amendments, and I ask those who tabled them to consider not pressing them.

Lord Harris of Haringey: The noble Baroness has very helpfully addressed a number of the points. However, I am still not clear whether she has addressed the central point of some of these amendments-the call for a statement somewhere of the relationship between the new structures and the non-territorial forces. It is not part of the protocol about operational independence, about which we will no doubt have plenty of interesting discussions; it is about the relationship between police and crime commissioners, or whatever we end up with, and those other forces. For example, I raised some points about the Civil Nuclear Constabulary. I am not sure that the Minister addressed the point about the value of some sort of codification of how these relationships are managed.

Baroness Browning: My Lords, I am sorry if I did not make that clear in my remarks, in which I focused very much on the British Transport Police. The same would apply to other forces. We will look at it, and I promise to write to the noble Lord.

Baroness Hamwee: My Lords, I am not sure that the noble Baroness responded to my amendments on the role of victims and victim organisations and the contribution they can make in the two areas that I mentioned, or indeed to the amendment on community safety partnerships. I think that the word cornucopia was used about this grouping. If these amendments have somehow slipped out of her notes, I hope that she will nevertheless be able to look at the issue. I am particularly concerned that, although the Bill makes a reference to the role of victims and so acknowledges their place in what might be called-to use a term that is used quite often-the wider landscape, I read that as a little bit of a gesture. I would like to see those matters brought far more centrally into the way in which the new arrangements are to operate.

Baroness Browning: I quite take the point that the noble Baroness makes. I promise to write to her specifically on those matters.

Lord Stevenson of Balmacara: I thank the Minister for her helpful comments and responses to what has been a wide-ranging and very full debate-a cornucopia indeed, as has already been mentioned. I think that essentially four issues have been raised, although not necessarily by everybody, as we have gone through the debate.
	The first issue concerns the duties of collaboration. As with the last point that has just been raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I think that there would be room for the Minister to make the offer to write on that in a bit more detail. As my noble friend Lady Henig and the last speaker have pointed out, some of the details might skip out and not be caught properly, so I think that correspondence on those issues might help. The general concern is to flesh out some of the frameworks that are in the Bill so that we have a better understanding, when we go forward to Report stage, about how these things will work.
	In that context, there was an exchange between my noble friend Lord Beecham and the Minister on the rather subtle point-it may not have been given enough air to grow and flourish in the debate-about the difference between an individual dealing with a range of corporate bodies and a body corporate, should there be such, that was to have the same responsibilities. That is quite an important issue. Again, we would benefit from having a bit more flesh on why the Minister thinks that a single individual should have that capacity and would not get carried away as was suggested in the discussion. The point was made that, if elected persons such as mayors have a particular remit and take an aggressive stance on some issue, they tend to stray into areas that perhaps were not thought of when a democratic mandate was first given to them. We think here perhaps of the experience in Doncaster.
	The second point was about the direction of travel, on which there were also a number of exchanges. I think that we ended up at what is the right place to be, which is that the fact that the "criminal justice system" is explicitly mentioned in the Bill as an area with which the new structure will engage is not meant to mean anything other than is appropriate. On our side, we would like further clarification on that. The idea that there is some sort of creeping organism embedded in the Bill that will somehow express the Home Office's territorial interests has been rightly rejected by the Minister, but I think that the sense on our side is that we would like a little bit more on that, either in correspondence or perhaps in Hansard, to explain why those particular groups, rather than others, are mentioned and why the Government think that it is appropriate for those groups to be there. In her concluding remarks, I think that the Minister said that nothing should be read into this other than that it makes good sense for these bodies to collaborate.
	The third point was on the British Transport Police. I am very grateful for the support that my amendment received from the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, and from my noble friend Lord Faulkner. As I said at the beginning of my remarks opening the debate, the British Transport Police has a long history in policing. This may not be well known to your Lordships, but the phrase "the booking office" comes from the British Transport Police because, in the early days of rail travel, you had to go and book in your travel with the British Transport Police-equivalent at the time before you were permitted to travel. It became known as "the booking office" because the journey was written down in a book-

Noble Lords: Oh.

Lord Stevenson of Balmacara: If noble Lords like my erudition, I will continue. My second point, from my lecture this evening, is that we owe the very term "police station", and all that those words imply, to the British Transport Police because, in the days when the railways were being built, there were so many undisciplined chaps around causing trouble in the localities that stations had to be built-believe it or not-every mile along the track. Those became the British Transport Police stations, and the term became loosely associated with the police. So we owe a lot to BTP: it is in the DNA of our modern police.
	I am very grateful to the noble Lord for the points that were made about the need to discuss in more detail how we might, while respecting the differences, also seek to have a comparability of approach across the country. I think that that matters to ordinary people.
	I opened the debate by talking about the importance of having a memorandum of understanding. I thank the Minister for her willingness to engage with that proposal. There is a balance to be struck between having the detail, on the one hand, and safeguarding the essential verities that we want to see in our police force. We are not asking for enormous amounts of bureaucracy-we on this side of the House are not in favour of that-but we want the checks and balances that we think will be reflected by such a memorandum to be brought out a bit more securely. I look forward to our discussions and, if the Minister cares to write on that as well, we would be very grateful.
	I think that this has been a very satisfactory debate, which has raised a lot of points. I am sure that we will want to study the record to make sure that we have got everything right, but in the interim I seek to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 30 withdrawn.
	Amendment 31
	 Moved by Baroness Harris of Richmond
	31: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause-
	"Police Commission
	(1) There shall be a body corporate for each police area listed in Schedule 1 to the Police Act 1996 to be known as a "Police Commission".
	(2) A Police Commission shall consist of-
	(a) a police and crime commissioner, and
	(b) a police and crime panel.
	(3) The police and crime commissioner shall be appointed by the police and crime panel (from amongst its own members)."

Baroness Harris of Richmond: My Lords, in moving Amendment 31, for the avoidance of any doubt let me say that it was agreed by the Government that this amendment is consequential on my first amendment, which was agreed to on the first day of Committee, and I am most grateful for that.
	Amendment 31 agreed.
	Amendment 31A not moved.
	Amendment 31B
	 Moved by Lord Beecham
	31B: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause-
	"Deputy police and crime commissioners
	(1) There is to be a deputy police and crime commissioner ("the deputy commissioner") for each police area listed in Schedule 1 to the Police Act 1996 (police areas outside London).
	(2) The name of the deputy commissioner for a police area is "the Deputy Police and Crime Commissioner for" with the addition of the name of the police area.
	(3) The deputy commissioner shall be appointed by the police and crime commissioner for the area from among those members of the police and crime panel for the police area who are properly appointed as members of the panel.
	(4) The deputy commissioner shall have-
	(a) such functions that are performed by the police and crime commissioner for that police area, where the police and crime commissioner is unable or unavailable to perform them in accordance with this Act;
	(b) such other functions that are conferred by this Act or any other enactment.
	(5) A person must not hold the office of deputy commissioner and chair the police and crime panel at the same time.
	(6) If the police and crime commissioner appoints as deputy commissioner the person who chairs the police and crime panel, the person shall resign as chair of the police and crime panel.
	(7) Subsections (5) and (6) apply in relation to the deputy chair of the police and crime panel (if there is one) as they apply in relation to the chair of the police and crime panel.
	(8) A person shall cease to be the deputy commissioner if-
	(a) that person ceases to be a police and crime panel member;
	(b) that person, at any time, gives notice of resignation as the deputy commissioner to the police and crime commissioner's chief executive; or
	(c) the police and crime commissioner at any time gives notice terminating his or her appointment as deputy commissioner.
	(9) A person who ceases to be deputy commissioner shall be eligible for reappointment."

Lord Beecham: My Lords, the amendments in my name in this group relate to the situation in which a vacancy arises in the position of police and crime commissioner, which, for the purposes of this debate only, we will assume might eventually emerge as enshrined in the legislation.
	Such a vacancy could arise in a number of ways. It could arise because of incapacity or because of the resignation or death of a police and crime commissioner; it could also arise if the police and crime panel suspended the commissioner under Clause 30 of the Bill. Incidentally, the police and crime panel does not have to suspend the commissioner if he is charged with an offence carrying a maximum prison sentence of more than two years-that is an issue to which your Lordships might wish to revert later, as it seems rather odd that there is such discretion-but, be that as it may, the situation could arise under which a commissioner is suspended, and the period of the vacancy could be quite considerable. In the event of death or resignation, there would have to be an election of a successor within 35 days, which is a tolerably short period of time, unless the vacancy arises within six months before the due date for an election, in which case the vacancy would last for six months. However, I assume that, if there is a suspension, the vacancy could last for a considerably longer period, because the suspension would lapse if the charge was withdrawn or if the commissioner was acquitted, but that process could take many months.
	The extraordinary position arises under this Bill that the vacancy would be filled by a member of staff appointed by the police and crime panel. That is the procedure under Clause 62. It is quite remarkable that, presumably, any member of staff would be eligible to be appointed by the police and crime panel for that purpose. That is the opposite of the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government's desire to combine the position of elected mayors with that of the chief executive; this is the other way round, as an officer would in effect become the police and crime commissioner. It is as if Caligula, in appointing a horse as his consul, had to appoint a police horse. It is quite a remarkable concept and is, really, entirely unsatisfactory.
	My amendments, therefore, seek to create the position of a deputy commissioner who would be chosen from the police and crime panel-it could not be the chairman but it could be another member. Under these amendments, the deputy commissioner would in effect have the powers of the police and crime commissioner whose position had been vacated permanently or temporarily. Otherwise, under the Bill as it stands, the position would be exercised by a paid officer. Curiously, the Bill provides that in the event of incapacity, the incapacitated police commissioner's views should be sought about which member of his staff, appointed by him in the first instance, would be appointed. That is again a rather curious concept-that somebody incapacitated for one reason or another should designate a successor in that way. Given the nature of the duties that would fall on an acting commissioner, which is the Bill's phrase, it seems inappropriate for that position to be held by someone appointed in the manner currently prescribed by the Bill. It would be much better if it were a member of the police authority; the amendment provides for it to be a councillor member of the police authority-that is to say, somebody with a democratic mandate. That seems appropriate, particularly given that the period during which the deputy served could be many months. Obviously, he could have a whole range of duties including quite possibly determining the precept, bringing forward the crime plan, and so on.
	This is not in any way a destructive amendment, but one which I hope the Government will consider carefully, because the proposal before the House is in my recollection quite unprecedented to be made in the way that the Bill prescribes. It certainly does not engender confidence that accountability would be served. So I hope that the Minister will look sympathetically at a way of improving the provision in order to cover those occasions when a vacancy might arise.

Lord Shipley: My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 212, which I hope has the status of a drafting amendment since its aim is simply to make sure that any enactment in relation to an acting commissioner includes this Act. It would have the additional benefit of bringing the wording in line with that of Amendment 31B, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, which I find extremely helpful because it imposes a very important check and balance on the police commissioner. It would mean, put simply, that the deputy cannot be a member of the police commissioner's own staff, appointed to their substantive job by that police commissioner. Rather, it must be a member of the panel who can be appointed as a deputy by the police and crime commissioner. That seems a much better approach to providing a deputy role and cover for incapacity. It is much clearer to the general public; it would occur at an early stage and it would mean that an elected not an unelected person would have the mandate of being a deputy.

Baroness Henig: I rise to support the amendment. Given that thus far with the amendments that have been moved there has not been that much sense of give in the Government's responses, I would like to know what the thinking was on this provision. I find this whole area of the Bill quite extraordinary and quite out of line with anything else that I have experienced in policing or local government. Given that it is seen by many of us as an extraordinary suggestion, would someone explain where the idea has come from? It is so unprecedented, in my experience. If the response follows the same pattern as on previous amendments and the Minister stands up and tells us why the arguments that we are putting forward are not going to work and why what is being proposed is absolutely perfect and that therefore we should not be challenging it, in this particular case I would like to probe why this provision is in the Bill. It seems bizarre to a lot of people.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: I support the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and my noble friend Lord Shipley. My first question is whether we need a deputy for the PCC. My contention is that it is absolutely essential and that that person must be chosen from within the police and crime panel, who will in the main have been elected by the local community. How utterly bizarre it would be for an elected PCC to appoint his or her deputy. That could be absolutely anyone from the PCC's own staff, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has outlined. What a recipe for corruption that might be. How will that person be chosen and what criteria will the PCC use to put so much political power into the hands of an unelected person? We absolutely must ensure that whatever befalls a PCC during its term of office, it must appoint a deputy from a properly elected body-the police and crime panel or, as I would prefer, the police and crime commission.

Lord Condon: I support the amendment as well. I fear that the thinking behind this provision was like something that I explored at Second Reading. It is almost as if the police and crime commissioner will be contaminated, or his office will be contaminated, if he is in any sort of collaborative arrangement or anyone else is drawn into the ambit of the police and crime commissioner in any way. I, too, think it would be totally inappropriate for the police and crime commissioner to nominate his deputy. Therefore, I support the notion of a deputy, if there needs to be one, being drawn from a police and crime panel, or some other body with more legitimacy than just the touching of the shoulder-figuratively speaking-by the crime commissioner of someone who happens to be working within his office.

Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington: I also support the amendment, because if the argument is that police commissioners are elected, surely the deputy must also be elected if he acts in their place. There is nothing more bizarre than if someone was appointed to the power, bearing in mind that a commissioner might be ill for six or nine months. That surely would be a recipe for disaster.

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath: My Lords, the Minister spoke earlier about recognising the need for checks and balances, and I regard this as a very important issue. I do not think that we can let the Bill stand as it now rests on the appointment of an acting commissioner. Clearly, the reason for it must be the architecture. Of course, the architecture is of the concept of an individual, a corporate sole, having huge powers. One can see the difficulty: if you do not place it within a proper corporate governance structure, what do you do? The Government clearly have no answer so have come up with the extraordinary idea that if a commissioner becomes incapacitated or no longer holds office a staff member can take over that responsibility.
	Will vacancies arise in the circumstances of Clause 62(1)(a) to (c)? I rather think they will. As the noble Baroness said earlier, people are frail, and I am pretty certain that out of the 41 or 42 potential elected police and crime commissioners, one or two bad eggs will be elected. I am also pretty certain that the media will be very intrusive in looking into the backgrounds of people so elected. Given the position that they hold, they and their families will come under intense scrutiny, and it is likely in those circumstances that some elected commissioners will find themselves in a position to no longer hold office. Yet one of their staff members is to be appointed to take their place in those circumstances.
	What sort of staff are these elected police commissioners likely to have? I would have thought that they would be likely to be media people and people who will help the commissioner be re-elected. Who is it going to be? Will it be the chief media person or chief pal of the elected police commissioner? Will it be the chief of staff? Who knows? What is likely is that this person is woefully unqualified to be an acting police commissioner. When we come back on Report, I think the Government will find that the House will require them to be willing to amend the Bill in this regard. This is a very important part of the checks and balances that are required.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, we recognise that the whole question of checks and balances is a matter of much concern throughout the House and that a number of amendments which we will be discussing deal with the checks and balances built into these new arrangements, and with the relationship between the police and crime commissioner and the police and crime panel. We will be discussing those throughout several more groups from now on. The architecture of the Bill is in principle that one identifiable individual, elected and accountable, should be clearly responsible for oversight of the police. I think that noble Lords would all recognise the difference between an assistant commissioner appointed when there is a vacancy or due to incapacity, and a deputy commissioner who is appointed from the outset. That builds a very different relationship into the structure which we are designing.
	I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, on the amount of care that he has put into these amendments but I am sure he also recognises that having a deputy-particularly one who comes from the PCP-also builds a potential basic tension into a structure which has been designed to do something rather different. The checks and balances should come between a separate police and crime panel and a directly elected police and crime commissioner, rather than blurring the relationship between the two. The panel is appointed by local authorities and, under our model, is clearly distinct in its origin and role from the police and crime commissioner.
	The provision which we have put into Clause 62 is intended to provide a reasonable one for a temporary expedient when the elected police and crime commissioner is unable to act. We have conceded that, in such circumstances, as set out-

Lord Condon: If the Minister will forgive me for interrupting, he talks about a temporary expedient. Does he accept that it could be, in certain circumstances, many months or perhaps even more than a year?

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: Yes, we accept that and it is something which we will have to consider further and discuss with noble Lords who wish to pursue the issue. Nevertheless, we are concerned about blurring the relationship between the panel and the commissioner. We have conceded that the panel should make the temporary appointment, as the most suitable single body for an event that might arise from a multitude of different causes, but the principle of the Bill is that there should be a definite dynamic which depends on direct election and a high public profile. I am reminded that the Bill states that six months is the maximum for an assistant commissioner and that there would then be a by-election.

Lord Beecham: Surely that would not be the case, would it, in the event of a suspension? The suspension could clearly last for more than six months in the circumstances to which I referred-for example, a trial on a charge carrying a sentence of more than two years' imprisonment.

Baroness Berridge: My Lords, perhaps I might add to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, in that this is not just blurring the distinction between the police and crime panel and the police commissioner. What the amendment proposes is that a power of patronage be given to the police commissioner over the panel whose purpose is to be a check and balance and to call him to account. Surely that does not extend the logic which I have heard so often in your Lordships' House: that power is being concentrated in one person. This amendment would in fact give even more power to that person and confuse the relationship even further between the commissioner and the panel.
	I submit to the Committee that it would only make sense to have some kind of election within the panel which would keep the roles distinct. In the circumstances mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham-of suspension on the grounds that the commissioner has been charged with a criminal offence-surely the patronage that was previously exercised to appoint someone from the panel to deputise could, in the eyes of the public, be polluted by the fact that the commissioner is now standing charged with a criminal offence. Therefore, the function of deputy could again be polluted. To have the panel itself perform some kind of election is a matter of regret, having heard so many representations about the need for independence in policing. It seems from the Committee's discussion of this amendment that co-opted, independent members would not be eligible to be the deputy commissioner, so I query the logic behind this amendment. It could pollute and give even more power to the commissioner in those circumstances.

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath: My Lords, perhaps it would help if I came in because that was an interesting point about the issue of pollution and people being tainted if the police commissioner had to stand down, or was suspended or incapacitated in any way. Take the example of a police commissioner where the charge was corruption: the idea that a member of that person's staff could then be appointed the police commissioner is just not going to run. Would the Minister be prepared to take this away? I accept that my noble friend Lord Beecham has put a suggestion forward as to how you emerge with a credible acting commissioner. There will be other suggestions; I do not think he is suggesting that he has all the answers and I do not think that anyone does. What we are pretty convinced of is that the approach in the Bill will just not do.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: I thank the noble Lord for that intervention. We may agree that appointing or electing the deputy commissioner at the outset may well not be necessary or desirable, but we will look at what happens if there is a long-term suspension. There are precedents with directly elected mayors and others that we will want to look at. We will reflect on this and discuss it off the Floor and, on that basis, I ask if the noble Lord would care to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Beecham: I withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 31B withdrawn.
	Amendments 31C and 31D not moved.
	Schedule 1 : Police and Crime Commissioners
	Amendment 31E
	 Moved By Baroness Henig
	31E: Schedule 1, page 106, line 9, leave out "Secretary of State" and insert "police and crime panel"

Baroness Henig: I shall speak also to Amendment 32B to 32F in this group. I will try to be brief as I hope that these amendments are relatively straightforward. The substantive amendment is Amendment 31E; the others are largely consequential upon it. These amendments are designed to align the provisions in Schedule 1 about the payment of salaries to police and crime commissioners, along with allowances and pensions, to the new structure now incorporated in the Bill of a police commission with two component parts-the commissioner and the panel. My main amendment suggests that the panel, not the Secretary of State as provided in the Bill, should set the salary of the commissioner. The consequential amendments, however, allow the Secretary of State to make regulations about commissioners' salaries. The remaining amendments provide that the police commission will pay the commissioner's salary and be responsible for paying the pensions of ex-commissioners.
	I am uncomfortable about the Home Secretary being directly involved in setting the pay, allowances and pensions of individual commissioners. That looks to me like micromanagement, not the greater devolution and localism to which this Government say they are committed. These amendments therefore propose that the Secretary of State can still set the general parameters and exert influence over salaries through making regulations but would put her at arm's length from the immediate decision. This is a more appropriate arrangement, which allows local accountability to be more meaningful and more flexible.
	I am aware that the Senior Salaries Review Body is looking at an appropriate level of remuneration for commissioners. That does not prevent its findings being included in the arrangements that I have suggested through this amendment. These findings could be included in a national framework set by the Home Secretary, which would allow local flexibility in determining what salary is appropriate to a particular area or particular circumstances. These amendments would also provide for the police commission as a body corporate, and not the incumbent commissioner, to make pension payments to ex-commissioners.
	Similarly, the commission, not the commissioner, would pay the allowances and expenses of the commissioner. This seems a much more satisfactory arrangement than that currently proposed, which is effectively that a commissioner should pay himself or herself. This might be appropriate for a person who is self-employed but it is completely inappropriate for a public servant. It raises the possibility that governance of public finances-in this case police finances-will be perceived as suspect. At best, it may have a whiff of the gravy train about it, at worst the taint of corruption. At present the British policing model is widely regarded as one of the cleanest and least corrupt in the world. It must be of concern that provisions such as this could leave it vulnerable to a different perception. That worries me. It is an important issue. I beg to move.

Baroness Hamwee: My Lords, I have several amendments in this group: Amendments 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 47, 48, 63, 64, 94 and 135. Amendment 32 would restrict the salary of the police and crime commissioner to no more than one-third of that of the chief constable. I expect a bolt from the blue for suggesting such a meagre amount but this is a probing amendment. We know that the SSRB is to advise but I understand that it will advise only. As the noble Baroness has just said, it is proposed that the decision will be that of the Secretary of State. However, the SSRB and we will need to understand several factors that are relevant to the recommendation. There is not only the responsibility carried, as one reads in the Bill, but the workload. What workload do the Government expect of the new commissioners? I am sure it will be different for different police areas. Perhaps the Government can assist the House with some sort of general advice or ballpark figure. It will not necessarily be a good thing for the commissioners to be full-time. Will that not bring them into a position of challenging the role and authority of the chief constable? There are some sensitive and complex issues buried within this. As I say, this is only a probing amendment but it is not a frivolous one.
	My next three pairs of amendments are also probing, but they probe only the drafting and are very much third-order matters. Amendments 33 and 34 deal with incidental powers, including entering into agreements. I want merely to understand why it is necessary to word it in this way. Does "legally binding" mean enforceable through legal mechanisms? Is it necessary to cover all the bases by giving these examples of incidental powers? Amendments 47 and 48 to Schedule 2 are rather similar. They relate to the chief constable. The distinction is that the chief constable is an existing post. Do chief constables not already have these powers? Are these provisions necessary because of some new functions in this schedule?
	I have two further pairs of amendments: Amendment 35 and 36 to Schedule 1, and Amendments 63 and 64 to Schedule 2. These paragraphs deal with protection from personal liability. I have no problem with that but I am a little puzzled by the terminology. Is not the position that there should be no personal liability for an act or omission unless it is not in good faith? The words that I am looking at are "shown to have", which must mean something. I can think only that this is about the standard of the burden of proof. I have warned the Bill team that this is what is in my mind. My alternative to "shown to have" is simply "has". One would have to provide evidence but there must be some distinction. There is something here that I do not understand but I would like to. It might be quite significant.
	Amendment 94 would delete Clause 15(3), which provides that commissioners may not enter into agreements with each other about matters that could be the subject of a collaboration agreement. My question is: why not? Why not give the local bodies discretion? Is it not up to the local body to find the most efficient way?
	Amendment 135 would transpose paragraphs 19 and 20 from Part 3 to Part 4 of Schedule 6. This is very esoteric stuff, for which I apologise. It is so that we might understand whether paragraphs 19 and 20 are not of general application-the general provisions are contained in Part 4-or relate only to the panels established by the Secretary of State, which are the subject of Part 3.

Lord Harris of Haringey: My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has not raised esoteric points; she has raised two fundamental issues. In one case I agree with her very strongly. In the other I disagree with her almost more strongly. As I understand them-I appreciate that they are probing-Amendments 33 and 34 effectively remove the power of the police and crime commissioner or commission, or whatever else we might have, to enter into contracts. That is an extremely dangerous amendment. It takes away one of the very powerful mechanisms or levers that whatever we end up with-the elected police and crime commissioner or the police and crime commission-will have in terms of its accountability responsibility. If the commissioner does not enter into these contracts, it must presumably be the chief officer of police who does so. This amendment further shifts the balance of responsibility away from the elected or indirectly elected body that holds the police to account to the chief constable. That is an extremely worrying principle. There is already too much in the Bill that places additional powers and responsibilities on the chief officer of the police and takes them away from the body that is supposed to hold the police to account. Given that the police have tremendous powers and responsibilities, some countervailing mechanisms are needed. That is what I thought the Bill was supposed to be about. I disagree; it has sold a pass in one or two instances and given excessive powers to the chief officer of police. However, this amendment would make it worse.

Baroness Hamwee: It might be helpful if I respond to that to save the Committee going down an avenue which I am certainly not suggesting that it should go down. My amendment would leave the right to enter into agreements but it seeks to understand the distinction between contracts and other agreements, whether legally binding or not. That is the simple thrust of my amendment. I am certainly not suggesting what the noble Lord indicates. One of the problems with probing amendments is that they sometimes seem to indicate something far more significant than is the case.

Lord Harris of Haringey: I accept that the noble Baroness is merely trying to elucidate what it means. It seems to me that in this case the Government are entirely sensibly trying to cover all the various types of agreement and contract that might exist. That seems to me what that part is about, and in my view that is why it should remain.
	I turn to easier ground and to that part of the noble Baroness's remarks with which I strongly agree. I find it bizarre that the Bill prohibits an elected policing body entering into a collaboration agreement with another. Surely, this is precisely what we hope would happen. I hope to see all sorts of networks of agreements between policing bodies around the country, perhaps to share back-office facilities or an agreement that one police area will develop an area of policing expertise and other police areas will agree that that body will take the lead in that matter. That seems to me eminently sensible. I find it strange that the Bill appears to prohibit that. I do not understand why the Government have gone down that road. If this is a probing amendment perhaps the Minister will tell us that we have completely misunderstood what the schedule is about. However, it seems to me that it cannot be interpreted in any other way. I thought that it was government policy to encourage this collaboration.
	The Conservative Party, and probably the Liberal Democrats although I cannot remember their precise position on this issue, were deeply opposed to the idea of mergers of police forces when it was raised by previous Home Secretaries. They felt that this was a terrible diminution and that people would be affronted by changes in the hat badge if police forces in different parts of the country were merged. Their response was that they would want to see this sort of collaboration. Indeed, I recall the Minister for Police Nick Herbert pointing out at a conference that the proposals and discussions that were then-as I understand it-going on extremely slowly between police forces about how they might share helicopter services were a test case to establish whether police services and police authorities could collaborate under any circumstances. The message that I took from his comments was that if there was a failure to share helicopters in that instance, where there seemed to be an overriding case for doing so-however, the chief constables who wanted their own helicopters might argue differently-the Government would try to make that mandatory. I hope the Minister has received the advice that she needs on this point and that we will be told that that is not the Government's intention. However, if it is the Government's intention, perhaps they can explain why that is the case.

Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville: My Lords, I rise to make a short comment on Amendment 31E, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, and to add a gloss on the earlier debate that we had in the context of Amendment 32, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
	On Amendment 31E, the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, spoke out for localism in deciding what these salaries should be. I find myself frequently reading in both the national and local press about the extreme distress caused by the salaries that are paid to the chief executives of local authorities, which seem to be totally out of order when compared with the salaries paid in a neighbouring county. Here we are talking about an office which is not elected, but where the decision is taken by the local authority itself. I understand the noble Baroness's argument about localism but I recall doing these exercises from the centre for four years between 1985 and 1989, when the then Chancellor, my noble friend Lord Lawson of Blaby, delegated to me responsibility for the pay and conditions of the Civil Service. I negotiated with a number of people who now sit on the Benches opposite in connection with those matters. I recall that some jobs in public bodies went beyond purely the Civil Service and that in those cases the Treasury reserved the right to decide what the salaries would be. It was a difficult task and one which I think we discharged with reasonable consistency, accuracy and honour. I would be happier with something of that order rather than the provision which the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, suggested.
	In the context of Amendment 32, I heard my noble friend Lady Hamwee say she did not believe that the police and crime commissioners would have a full-time job. I recall that on the previous occasion we debated these matters my noble friend Lord Eccles pulled up the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and asked him where the Bill stated that it would be a full-time job. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, had made the perfectly reasonable assumption that it was likely to be full time. However, here we are on Amendment 32 going back to the situation where it is not likely to be a full-time job at all. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire whether the Government expected the job to be full time and received an immediate answer. I go back to a mild comment that I made on the previous occasion when I said that there was some danger of entering an Alice in Wonderland scenario if we did not keep track of the matters that we were discussing, particularly given the way in which we are dealing with the Bill.

Lord Rosser: My Lords, my noble friend Lady Henig and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, have explained the purpose of their amendments, which we are discussing. I want to refer only to one or two aspects.
	This group of amendments seeks to address the considerable powers that are given virtually unchecked and unchallenged under the Bill to police and crime commissioners, while very little meaningful power or responsibility is given to the new police and crime panels. As my noble friend Lady Henig has said, the Bill provides for the Secretary of State to determine a commissioner's salary. We know very little about how the Secretary of State might do this. At one stage, certainly in the media, there were suggestions of six figure salaries, though it now appears that the Senior Salaries Review Body may be called in.
	However, that raises the issue of why the Secretary of State wants to determine directly the salary of a police and crime commissioner. As has been said, the approach seems at odds with the Government's declared stance of devolving responsibility as far down the line as they can. Is the view that Whitehall knows best on this issue? Is the Secretary of State of the view that each commissioner should be paid the same irrespective of the geographical size and diversity of the area covered, the population of the area, the size of the budget and of the force and the levels of crime? Or is the Secretary of State of the view that commissioners' salaries should differ? If so, what factors does she consider should be taken into account? How will she take into account any specific local or area factors? Does she intend to take into account the views of the police and crime panels or, indeed, the views of anybody else other than those of the Senior Salaries Review Body, if that is to be used?
	I acknowledge the concerns that the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville, and probably others, have about some of the salaries that are paid to chief executives of local authorities. But if you devolve responsibility and you believe that that is right, you have to accept the consequences and not simply say that because you are concerned about what might happen you will automatically keep everything at the centre. Of course, the salary of a local authority chief executive is, in that sense, determined by the local authority members, as are the salaries, if any, to be paid to council members and the council leader. One of the amendments spoken to by my noble friend Lady Henig provides for the salary of a police and crime commissioner to be determined by the police and crime panel. The panel should be in a better position than the Secretary of State to know what salary will be appropriate to the responsibilities and complexities of the position, and what salary is likely to be needed to attract appropriate candidates for the position. It could be argued that that would also enhance the position of the panel and provide a check by the panel to the largely untrammelled authority and power given to a commissioner under the terms of the Bill.
	We have discussed other amendments relating to the ability to enter into contracts. As was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, the amendments were intended, at least in part, to probe what powers the Bill seeks to give or to remove. We have heard concerns expressed by my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey about some of the amendments spoken to by the noble Baroness.
	I hope that because most of my comments related to the determination of the salary the Minister will recognise the concerns behind the amendments on salaries, reflect that in her response, respond to the concerns expressed by my noble friend Lord Harris about the provision that appears to prohibit an elected policing body from entering into a collaboration agreement with another elected local policing body, and explain the Government's thinking behind that.

Baroness Browning: My Lords, the Bill provides for the Home Secretary to determine the salary of Police and Crime Commissioners. These are unique positions, being directly elected. The Home Secretary has asked the Senior Salaries Review Board to make recommendations to the appropriate levels of pay by September this year. The SSRB is now calling for evidence to help it to decide on its recommendations. Furthermore, the SSRB will consult with partners as it considers appropriate, and this will ensure further that its recommendation takes into account the views of relevant groups.
	Specifically, the Home Secretary has asked the SSRB to recommend pay arrangements that are adequate to encourage, retain and motivate candidates of sufficient quality; recognise the extremely challenging fiscal climate and wider constraints of public funding; meet the demands and expectations of the public in terms of getting value for money; reflect the essence of the role as an elected public figurehead and ambassador; provide transparency and robustness in determining PCC pay levels; recommend an approach to establishing PCC pay levels that is simple to administer and is based on a range of single salary points pay structures; and take account of, where applicable, the salary levels and responsibilities of other similar roles in the wider public sector, including elected executive mayors, MPs and MEPs. We believe that these requirements will ensure a fair pay level for PCCs, which I believe is the concern expressed by noble Lords.
	The salary payable to a chief constable is one benchmark, but only one. There are other criteria that must be considered, such as demographics. In any event, the job of a chief constable is very different to that of a PCC. The SSRB provides independent advice to the Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Defence on the remuneration of holders of judicial office, senior civil servants, senior officers of the armed forces, and other such public appointments as may from time to time be specified. We believe that the SSRB is the right body to provide independent advice on the levels of PCCs' salaries. Noble Lords have said that these are probing amendments, and I therefore ask for them to be withdrawn or not moved.
	I turn now to contracts. The wording used in the Bill,
	"contracts and other agreements (whether legally binding or not)",
	is designed to make it clear that the mayor's office and the PCC can enter into contracts-in other words, agreements creating legal rights and liabilities, and agreements with no legal force, such as memoranda of understanding, protocols or service-level agreements. If the proposed amendments were made, the Bill would merely refer to "agreements". Because a legally binding contract is a kind of agreement, we would say that the PCC would still be able to enter into a contract and there would not actually be any effect on the scope of the PCC's powers.
	I turn now to the amendments in relation to protection from personal liability. I understand that the intention is to reduce the protection available to the office of the PCC and its staff by reversing the burden of proof in relation to whether a questioned act or omission was done in good faith. Under the Bill as it stands, a person who challenged an act or omission of the PCC would have to prove that it was done in bad faith. The effect of the amendments would be that it would be for the PCC to prove that the questioned act was done in good faith. The concern here is with civil proceedings where the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. Whether it is the claimant who has to prove that it is more likely than not that the PCC acted in bad faith, or the PCC who has to prove that it is more likely than not that it acted in good faith, is unlikely to matter in most cases.
	I should also stress that these provisions are concerned only with the personal liability of the person holding the office of commissioner for policing and crime and their employees. The provisions do not restrict the liability of the office itself, and a claimant harmed by an act or omission of the PCC or their staff in the exercise of their functions would still have legal redress against the office.
	Bearing in mind the high-profile nature of the role of the PCC and the difficult issues that it will have to deal with, it may be a tempting target for legal challenge. We would not want the office or its staff to carry out their duties in a defensive fashion, out of fear of attracting personal legal liability for their actions. Rather, the Bill as drafted strikes the right balance in allowing the legitimate claimant legal redress, while giving the PCC a sensible level of legal protection.
	Much has been said about the supply of goods and services. I should stress that Clause 15(3) merely replicates Section 18(3) of the Police Act 1996, which applies to police authorities at present. The provision is not new. Noble Lords asked particularly about this, and perhaps I may examine what the amendments would do. We do not believe that there is a particular advantage in using the Local Authorities (Goods and Services) Act 1970 with policing partners instead of the Police Act collaboration agreement provisions. The 1970 Act simply allows for agreements to be made about the provision of goods and services. However, when both parties concerned are policing bodies, making an agreement under the 1970 Act would circumvent the safeguards in the police collaboration provisions of the Police Act 1996, which would take priority. For example, there would be no requirement to have regard to any guidance issued by the Home Secretary to provide advice on best practice in drawing up agreements, and there would be no requirement for consultation with the relevant chief constables before making the agreement.
	Other noble Lords have raised the matter of panels in this group of amendments. Although I recognise the intention to ensure that all panels, regardless of how they are established, are treated equally in the provision of financial resources, that is already the case. It is for that reason that I resist the amendments. Funding for all panels will be borne by the Secretary of State, regardless of whether they are established by local authorities or by the Secretary of State. For panels established by local authorities, paragraph 11 of Schedule 6 makes clear that it is for local authorities themselves to decide how that money is paid to or distributed between themselves. The Secretary of State will provide funds amounting to those required for a scrutiny officer and to cover running costs of meetings, which will be distributed at the discretion of the legal authority. That leaves local authorities the freedom to establish their own processes.
	For panels established by the Secretary of State, in the case of Wales, or where no panel was formed under other circumstances, it cannot be left to local authorities to make those arrangements. In those cases, the Secretary of State will work directly with the panel to provide financial resources. That is what paragraph 20 of Schedule 6 provides. The liabilities of police and crime panels established by local authorities will be borne by the relevant local authorities, as they are with other local authority committees. The liabilities relating to panels established by the Secretary of State will be borne by the Secretary of State.
	If I have not answered any specific questions, some of which were quite technical, I apologise and I will ensure that they are responded to by letter. I hope that, under the circumstances, the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

Lord Harris of Haringey: I seek a little more clarification about Amendment 94 and the response given about elected policing bodies not entering into collaboration agreements. I understand that that takes forward a heavily amended bit of the Police Act 1996. I think that I am right to say that there is no consolidated Police Act available for us to refer to, so it is difficult to track through the changes. The previous Government had a policing Act at least once a year, so there were always changes to confuse one.
	Is it being said that the prohibition is here because other arrangements permit the same thing to happen between elected policing bodies? Is the wording of police authorities changed in the Police Act 1996 to permit that?

Baroness Browning: I do not want to venture into territory where I may in any way mislead the noble Lord, but my understanding is that Clause 15 provides support for more effective collaboration arrangements between forces by securing that where an arrangement can be properly made by a collaboration agreement with another force rather than contracted out, the collaboration agreement should take priority. That is already established in statute.

Lord Harris of Haringey: I am grateful to the noble Baroness. If it is the case that collaboration agreements are entered into between what under this terminology would be the elected policing bodies, that is helpful. I was slightly surprised that one reason given why that was the preferable arrangement was that it removed a requirement to take account of guidance issued by the Home Office on how such arrangements might operate, given that I understood that the intention of government policy was that there would be far less guidance from the centre in future and that it would all be left to local action by the elected policing bodies.

Baroness Browning: I hope that I can assist the noble Lord by telling him that a police authority may not enter into an agreement with another police authority under Section 1 of the 1970 Act in respect of a matter which could be the subject of a police authority collaboration agreement. If I have understood that correctly, the collaboration agreements take priority.

Baroness Henig: I thank the noble Baroness for her response on the financial issues. She was so kind as to say in our previous setting that she was a listening Minister; we all appreciate that. I reiterate that I have no problem with the national framework but what I wanted was some local variation within it. I have no problem with the Senior Salaries Review Board undertaking its work; that is absolutely appropriate. I have no difficulty with the points made by the noble Lord. I want a national framework, but I am asking that within it, there should be the possibility of local variation.
	The reason for that is straightforward. The whole purpose, as I understood it, of the introduction of commissioners is to empower the public in local policing. One area that the public will be interested in is the salaries of those individuals. If there was some way in which there could be a local dimension in setting the salaries within a national structure, that would be helpful in enabling local people to feel involved in the whole exercise. I was trying to bring an element of localism into this, while of course not ruling out that there should be a national framework in which it will operate. I listened carefully to the Minister and will happily withdraw my amendment.

Baroness Browning: I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, but a thought has just occurred to me. There is always the danger with salaries, particularly with someone who is elected, that a Dutch auction ensues of who will do it for least. We want to get value for money in setting the salaries, but we want the salary to be fair. With elected positions, there is a danger in how the candidate might canvass the electorate in trying to bid themselves down. That will give an advantage to people with a lot of personal wealth or a lot of money behind their campaign. I think that the Home Secretary, with SSRB recommendations, is a much more stand-apart arrangement and would mean that we would not go down that route.

Lord Beecham: Does the noble Baroness's statement that we should trust the electorate to choose not extend to their capacity to distinguish the cases to which she referred?

Baroness Browning: The noble Lord is quite right to chide me. In fact, as I was saying it, I remembered my words to him earlier; they were ringing in the back of my mind. This is not about the electorate; this is about the motivations of the candidate who is not as worthy as we would like to apply for these positions. If the salary has been set by a body such as the SSRB, through the Home Secretary, it is complete and divorced from anything that a candidate might say in seeking to put themselves forward or any questions a candidate may be asked during their selection.

Lord Rosser: I hope that the noble Baroness would accept that even if the Secretary of State was determining the salary, someone could fight an election knowing what the salary was and running their campaign on the basis that they would send half of it back.

Baroness Browning: Off the top of my head, given that many people's salaries are set by the SSRB-I declare an interest that for many years mine was-I do not recall any of them sending any of it back.

Lord Rosser: Does that not show that the fears just expressed by the Minister are unlikely ever to occur?

Baroness Browning: No, my Lords, because in another place, where I served for nearly 20 years, it was not an uncommon practice-not when one appeared before the electorate but in the selection process-for people to be asked about their financial position with a view to that influencing the selection process. I think it is much healthier to have that professionally assessed and divorced from anything to do with either the selection or the election of the police and crime commissioners.

Baroness Henig: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 31E withdrawn.
	Amendments 32 to 34 not moved.
	Amendment 34A
	 Moved by Lord Beecham
	34A: Schedule 1, page 107, line 44, at end insert -
	"( ) The police and crime commissioner must exercise these powers in consultation with the police and crime panel.
	( ) The police and crime panel may amend or reject the police and crime commissioner's decisions to use these powers if the panel agrees to do so by a two-thirds majority."

Lord Beecham: My Lords, we are now moving into the territory of checks and balances, which, as some noble Lords have indicated, lies very much at the heart of the concerns expressed around the House at Second Reading.
	Amendment 34A relates to the incidental powers of the proposed commissioner contained in paragraph 9 of Schedule 1, which declares that the,
	"commissioner may do anything which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the exercise of the functions of commissioner",
	including,
	"entering into contracts ... acquiring and disposing of property",
	and "borrowing money". The amendment would require the police and crime commissioner, in exercising those powers, to consult the police and crime panel, which would have the right on a two-thirds majority vote to reject or amend the proposed exercise of those powers.
	It was generally the view of your Lordships' House that the checks and balances claimed for the Bill were more apparent than real. I believe that we must flesh out the functions of the police and crime panel to give it a real say-although not one which would be likely to be exercised because, as I have indicated, the amendment proposes a two-thirds majority as being requisite-in critical decisions of the very broad kind that the schedule gives the police and crime commissioner. In any event, it is surely reasonable for the commissioner to consult the panel on such important matters.
	A second amendment in this group, Amendment 85A, concerns information. The Minister and others before her as the Bill has been debated have referred to the huge interest shown by people in consulting the crime statistics for their area and in doing so online. Very many people, including, as we have already heard, Members of your Lordships' House, have done that. Of course, I do not think-although I stand to be corrected-that information about what they have been looking at is available. I suspect that most people will have looked at the statistics for their immediate locality. Based on my experience as a local councillor, to which I have referred more than once in this House, it is unlikely that people would look very much beyond their immediate locality. They would be very unlikely to look at the statistics for a whole area, and they would be least likely of all to look at the information at force level, although of course some people will do that. Therefore, it seems all the more necessary to consider the provision of information-and, indeed, to require the provision of information-at the appropriate levels.
	For most people, the appropriate level will be the very local, or neighbourhood, level. The amendment suggests that such information should be provided at that level and that, in effect, the neighbourhood should be determined in conjunction with the local authority, which is in a very good position to ascertain reasonable measures of area and population. Above that, although I suspect that, again, fewer people will be interested in it, you need to have information at a divisional or basic command unit level-in London it will be the borough level. I think that we have two divisions in my city of Newcastle, although obviously in large county areas there may well be more. However, it seems appropriate to provide the information at that level for people who are interested in it and, finally, at force level.
	It is fair to say that many police authorities now provide information online, in annual reports, at public meetings and at a very local level. Certainly in my experience-and the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, will confirm it from his perspective-Northumbria Police is very good at providing accessible, readable information at very local level, and that is to be commended. The amendment seeks to ensure that that takes place across the whole force.
	My final amendment in this group, Amendment 123C, talks about the need for transparency and accountability in relation to the police commissioner-a matter to which many of your Lordships have referred. That goes to the heart of many of the concerns about the Bill. However, it is equally necessary for the police and crime panel to be transparent in its operations and to be accountable, and that is why the amendment proposes that meetings of the police and crime panel should be in public. That would accord with practice and we might hear more about it if and when we receive the Bill on NHS reform-for example, with regard to GP consortia, if they survive the current consultation. I think that there will be moves to ensure that they meet in public as well, which seems appropriate.
	In addition, there is provision in Amendment 123C for a call-in procedure, which would effectively give police and crime panels the same rights as non-executive members in local authorities to call in decisions of the executive. I cannot see any reason why the same principle should not apply to both. It would not mean that that procedure would allow a decision to be overturned; it would require the person making the decision-in this case, the police and crime commissioner-to consider it and explain it, and to answer questions about it. It seems highly desirable that the mechanism provided for local government-whether it is a mayoral model or a leader and executive model-should also apply in the context of police authorities.
	These three amendments by no means cover the entire ground of checks and balances-there will be many more; there are some on the Marshalled List today and there will no doubt be others as the Bill goes forward-but they represent the beginning of an attempt to strengthen the checks and balances applicable, whatever system we have. However, they will be particularly necessary if we revert to the concept of the elected police commission. I beg to move.

Baroness Hamwee: My Lords, I have a number of amendments in this group and I shall give the numbers as I come to them. The noble Lord has, for the first time in our proceedings, raised the subject of the level of veto that should apply, reducing it from three-quarters to two-thirds. Depending on the size of the panel, that would make a difference of only one or two members-none the less, a significant difference. The normal world-perhaps I should not suggest that we are not operating with a degree of normality-would consider a decision taken by 50 per cent plus one to be adequate. I was a member of the London Assembly, which had the power, if two-thirds of us agreed, to block the mayor's budget. I remember when the previous mayor, sitting in the public gallery, listened to the Assembly debate his budget. It was rejected by the Assembly but not quite by two-thirds and, from the public gallery, he shouted out "Agreed". I think that at least one other Member of your Lordships' House was there and there is another Member who may not be surprised at what happened on that occasion. It is very counterintuitive to have a veto applied by such a high proportion of the membership.
	My Amendment 84 deals with information to be provided to the public under Clause 11 and suggests that not only should that be specified by the Secretary of State but that it is thought "necessary" by the police and crime panel. I do not know how one challenges the "necessary" or what is more generalised. I am suggesting widening it to,
	"or required by the relevant ... panel".
	Amendment 85 deals with what is necessary or required to assess the "performance". I am deliberately dealing with these amendments quite fast. This amendment suggests that the,
	"treatment of victims of crime",
	should be one of the factors assessed within "performance".
	Amendment 86 is about the contents of the annual report, and I have based this on the arrangements within the Greater London Authority, applying to the mayor, that the annual report should include information which the relevant police and crime panel has notified the police and crime commissioner that it wishes to see included. This will not necessarily be contentious but it is part of the scrutiny process and part of the check on the commissioner. Amendment 88 would allow the police and crime commissioner to provide the panel with the information that it requests. Amendment 87 would limit the information that would be withheld on grounds of security and confidentiality by suggesting that it could be provided in an alternative form. Only if it could not be provided in an alternative form would it be limited.
	I have a number of amendments to Clause 29 about requiring both the attendance of individuals at meetings of the panel and information. For the panel to do its job it is essential that it has the tools, and many of the tools are information. Some of that is best obtained by asking questions but sometimes one needs to have people at meetings to question them and to follow a line of questioning in public. I can anticipate that the Government might say that panel meetings should not be turned into some sort of circus, but occasionally that might happen because of the subject matter. Sometimes you find that a meeting has an item on the agenda that has become extremely topical, and people pour in and the press and media crowd round. I am not suggesting putting officers on trial in proposing that they could be required to attend meetings, but they may have information that is essential to the panel doing the job.
	Holding the commissioner to account, most of all, means getting information into the public domain, and to do that, requiring the attendance of relevant chief constables, senior officers and anyone to whom the police and crime commissioner has delegated functions. These are Amendments 140 to 141, and 142 to 145, which also refer to the production of relevant documents. You cannot hold the commissioner to account without getting information on some occasions from others who are part of the wider story. I do not want to equate the operation of the panel to a court of law, but I do not think any court or a Select Committee of Parliament would say that the only evidence necessary will be what is produced from one side. My amendments would require senior officers to attend, as in the London context, in Amendment 166; and Amendment 165, tabled by my noble friend Lady Doocey, is in the same vein.
	Amendment 168 would require the panel to be consulted on the commissioner's arrangements for local engagement. This is a rather different flavour, but it is important that those who are elected locally across the force area and who know their own patches are consulted on these arrangements. It would be nonsense for them not to be, but then sometimes nonsense happens. Amendment 169, to Clause 36, deals with reports from the chief officer and the panel should have a copy of these. Amendment 232 deals again with collaboration agreements under Schedule 12 and decisions about efficiency and effectiveness. Again, surely the views of the panel should count for something. Indeed, they should be sought. If we are to have panels, we need strong ones and should use them to the best effect.
	On Amendment 123C, I offer congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I was struggling with how to deal with a call-in right and could not see where it could be called in to. I am glad to support his amendment because it deals with it very neatly.

Baroness Doocey: My Lords, I have two amendments in this group and I would like to speak briefly to both of them. As this is the first time that I have spoken in this stage of the Bill's passage I need to declare an interest as a member of the London Assembly, a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority and a member of the Home Office Olympic Security Board. I am pleased that I do not have to say all that every time I stand up to speak.
	I shall deal first with Amendment 156 and then go on briefly to Amendment 165. The purpose of this amendment is to clarify the powers of the London Assembly to co-opt independent members to the police and crime panel, which might otherwise be subject to legal challenge. The Bill establishes police and crime panels throughout the country but there are different arrangements for London. Outside London each police and crime panel will consist of 10 or more members of the local authority plus two independent members who are co-opted. Within London the police and crime panel will be one of the Assembly committees, formed as a panel, and it may co-opt independent members. To make this possible the Bill removes the restriction in the Greater London Authority Act which provides that only Assembly members may serve on ordinary committees of the Assembly. However, I believe that the Bill is very unclear on certain aspects. It does not make it explicit that the London Assembly could appoint independent members. It also does not make it explicit that if the London Assembly did appoint independent members, it could allow them to vote. There is no provision in any of the other legislation that gives the Assembly such powers, so if the Assembly were to appoint independent members to the police and crime panel it could be open to legal challenge.
	This amendment would remedy that deficiency by giving the London Assembly the specific power to appoint independent members to the panel, thereby removing the possibility of legal challenge. The amendment is important regardless of whether the current London Assembly wishes to appoint independent members because it would make the Bill sustainable in the long term. I should add that the amendment would not give special treatment to London; it would merely try to treat London in the same way as the rest of the country.
	My noble friend Lady Hamwee has covered many of the points on Amendment 165 and I do not intend to repeat what she has said. I would just agree wholeheartedly with her assessment that it is essential that the panel has the right to summon the Metropolitan Police in London and senior members of the police staff to give evidence. For example, if the Mayor of London identifies neighbourhood policing as a priority, the panel will need information about the allocation of resources within the Metropolitan Police, and about its performance, in order to inform its deliberations. As the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, said so powerfully the other day, we on the Metropolitan Police Authority hold the commission and the police to account in public. We question police officers, including senior police officers, and we receive and publish information provided by the Metropolitan Police. It is very important that we continue to do this, and that there is openness and transparency. It is important also to point out that the amendment enjoys the support not just of my party but of all parties on the London Assembly.

Lord Harris of Haringey: My Lords, I put my name to Amendments 156 and 165, which deal with the panel arrangements in London. It is worth reflecting on the way in which the London arrangements will be substantially different from those in the rest of the country. The Bill replaces the panel responsibility on the London Assembly. Therefore, one will not be able to make-in the way that one will elsewhere in the country-the automatic assumption that every relevant local authority will be represented on that forum. There will be representatives from various parts of London, but it is possible that some parts of London will not be represented on the London Assembly panel. Therefore, it is worth remembering that the London arrangements for the panel are significantly different.
	This highlights also the importance of Amendment 156 in dealing with co-opted members. It is not designed to frustrate the Government's intention, but to tidy it up. If there are such co-opted members, they should be appointed by a resolution of the whole London Assembly, which would avoid some of the complexities that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, highlighted. I support the points made by her and by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about who could be summoned to a panel. This is a particularly important issue, not just in London but around the country.
	In the past, I talked about two particular difficulties with some of the arrangements in the Bill. First, where is the visible answerability of the police service in any particular area to those who are holding it to account? I understand the Government's argument, which is that in London the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime will hold the police service to account, and that outside London it will be the police and crime commissioner-or the police and crime commission, if the House's preferred option goes forward. However, the scrutiny process will be very strange if the only scrutiny that is possible will be of the actions of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime-or the deputy MOPC, because the mayor will almost certainly appoint a deputy-and, in areas outside London, of the police and crime commissioner.
	There are a number of problems with that. It will mean that the entire focus of discussion will be about political debate. One elected politician will appear before a group of other elected politicians, possibly with one or two independents. Discussion will focus on the political decisions that the policing and crime commissioner, or the mayor's office, have taken. That is all well and good: people may say that that is as it should be. However, I suspect that one will lose a lot of the granularity around what has happened in the police service in that area in the intervening period with which the panel is concerned.
	We are told that the chief officer of police-the commissioner of police in the metropolis-may attend meetings of the panel. However, they will not be obliged to attend, but may attend by their own grace and favour. The importance of Amendment 165, and parallel amendments, is that they would ensure an expectation that certain senior police officers could be required to attend. That will be critical to ensure that the discussion moves away from the political knockabout that all of us in Committee enjoy and have participated in at various times in our life, and towards scrutiny of important policing issues. The panel will have the power to call before it senior police officers who are responsible for the area of policing that is being debated. This will be critical to remove some of the political knockabout that will otherwise happen and to provide at least some, though not all, of the visible political answerability that is so necessary to policing.

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath: My Lords, I am very sympathetic to many of the amendments, particularly concerning the need for recall and, as my noble friend Lord Harris said, clarity on the ability of panels to summon people to appear before them, particularly chief officers of police, in order to ensure that serious discussions take place. If the conversation is only between elected councillors who are members of the panel and the elected police commissioner, two things will happen. First, as my noble friend said, the discussion will become almost entirely political. Secondly, if it is only the elected police commissioner who stands or sits before the panel, they will be drawn into discussing detailed operational matters of policing. That is why we are so fearful of the Bill. It will be essential as a matter of course for the chief constable and other chief officers in their own right to appear regularly before the panel. I hope that the Government will be sympathetic to that.
	The amendments concerning the openness both of the panel and the elected commissioners are important. An important point was raised about co-opted members on the London panel. I will focus in particular on Amendment 34A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Beecham. The incidental powers given to the commissioner in paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 are considerable. It is right that there should be scrutiny, and that the panel should be able to question the commissioner and, if necessary, amend or reject decisions. Those are the kinds of checks and balances that we wish to see.
	We will come later to other amendments that deal with the panel's responsibilities in relation to the appointment of chief constables and to precepts, where it will have veto powers. The problem is that the exercise of that veto will become almost impossible if the threshold is put at 75 per cent. It is not even 75 per cent of those present and voting, but 75 per cent of panel members. Therefore, I was very glad to see my noble friend's suggestion that, particularly in relation to the incidental powers contained in paragraph 9 on page 107, the threshold should be reduced to a two-thirds majority. That takes us some way towards a more realistic relationship where there would be at least some possibility of the panel being able to act as a check and balance on the elected police commissioner. Whether two-thirds is sufficient, I do not know. I would be tempted to reduce it to 60 per cent. Indeed, I find it difficult to disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who suggested that 50 per cent plus 1 would be a more reasonable figure.
	I hope that we can have further discussions on this matter. What I am clear about is that, in relation to the incidental powers, the panel should have a role in scrutiny and, in some circumstances, be able to exercise a veto. However, although the Bill provides for a veto, the figure of 75 per cent needs to be reduced to make it a realistic veto.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, this has been a very useful debate on a lengthy collection of amendments. Having complimented the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, on his skill in drafting amendments, I should add my compliments to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on her deeply conscientious and detailed scrutiny of all aspects of the Bill.
	We are discussing with considerable care the right balance between the PCC and the PCP and the distinction between accountability and scrutiny. I know that is a concern across the whole House. We need to strike the right balance between the need for the police and crime panel to scrutinise effectively and the police and crime commissioner being inundated with requests for information to the point that his, or her, ability to discharge his duties effectively is limited. In the design of this Bill, it is the role of the police and crime commissioner to scrutinise the chief constable and the role of the police and crime panel to scrutinise the police and crime commissioner. The intention of the Government and the elected House is that policing is for the chief officer of police to deliver and it is for the locally elected body-the PCC or the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime-to ensure that public priorities are met and that performance is appropriately high. That is the dynamic of a single individual responsible for this to the electorate. It is not intended that he or she will share this role with the police and crime panel. Its role is to advise and scrutinise the police and crime commissioner, especially in respect of the annual policing and crime plan.
	The details of how one works out that relationship and exactly what reporting is required are what these amendments investigate further. The public already have access to street-level police performance information thanks to the introduction of a police website. It is, and will continue to be, the role of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary to provide the public with information on force performance, including an annual report on the state of policing nationally.
	Amendment 87 is scarcely necessary because of course the principle should be that everything should be made public except matters that relate to national security, personal safety or the prevention or detection of crime, which are the only caveats in the Bill. Otherwise, the exemption does not apply.
	The majority of the work the panel will undertake will be done in public and will remain accessible to the public. The Bill states that the panel must hold a public meeting to review the annual report it receives from the police and crime commissioner, must publish all reports and recommendations it makes to the police and crime commissioner and must hold public confirmation hearings for new chief constables prior to making recommendations for their appointments, but there may be good reasons why the panels will, on occasion, want to meet without the public present. None of us would wish to block that completely.
	We will need to write about some of the further amendments. There is nothing in the Bill that prevents the panel requiring the police and crime commissioner to explain and justify any decision that he or she has made. That is a natural part of the relationship between the two, but-

Baroness Hamwee: I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend, but surely the problem is on the other side. There is nothing to stop the panel requiring. It is the obligation on the recipient of that request or requirement to respond. Will the Minister take that away and think about it?

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath: My Lords, might you not have a situation where the elected commissioner has made it clear that he does not expect police officers to go to the panel? That would permeate through, and even though police officers received a summons, they would know that they would incur the wrath of the commissioner in going. Some people who were elected might very well take the view that because they were pursuing what we might regard as perverse or bizarre policies they would not want senior police officers to appear before the panel because the police officers would disabuse the panel about the policies being pursued by the commissioner. I worry if the only relationship is going to be between the commissioner and the panel. Surely we must have senior police officers at those meetings.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: I appreciate that concern. It was evident in the debate and is clearly something that we need to take away and consider further. The exact relationship in this triangle, the extent to which we maintain the operational independence of the police and the relevant accountability and scrutiny, are at the heart of what we are all concerned about with this Bill. It is a fundamental principle of this Bill that the buck stops with the police and crime commissioner. The police and crime commissioner can delegate functions to others, but cannot delegate responsibility.
	There are some very useful amendments here on the London Assembly, which I think I should probably not delay the Committee with, but we will consider further whether the police and crime panel should be a particular committee of the London Assembly or whether the London Assembly as a whole should take a range of decisions. We argue that it is for the London Assembly as a democratically elected body to decide for itself how the membership of the panel should be chosen and that the existing arrangements are sufficiently robust for the scrutiny of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime.
	We will have further discussions on some of these issues off the Floor. I thank noble Lords for the careful and often detailed and technical contributions to this debate. I ask the noble Baroness not to move her amendment.

Lord Beecham: I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
	Amendment 34A withdrawn.
	Amendments 34B to 36ZC not moved.
	Schedule 1 agreed.
	Amendment 36A not moved.
	Clause 2 : Chief constables
	Amendments 36B to 37A not moved.
	Clause 2 agreed.
	Amendment 38 not moved.
	House resumed. Committee to begin again not before 8.39 pm.

Libya
	 — 
	Statement

Lord Astor of Hever: My Lords, the Statement is as follows.
	"We constantly review our military options to ensure we can continue to enforce UNSCR 1973 and prevent Gaddafi from attacking the Libyan people. As the Foreign Secretary has said, it is now,
	'necessary to intensify the military, economic and diplomatic pressure on the Gaddafi regime'.
	Attack helicopters are one tool for doing that. The use of attack helicopters is one of a range of capability options under consideration. However, we have made no decision yet on whether to use our attack helicopters in Libya".

Lord Rosser: My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating as a Statement an Urgent Question that was allowed in the other place. We have always been clear that we support the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 in order to protect Libyan civilians and implement a no-fly zone. We have also said that we support the Government's actions and that we scrutinise their actions. I note that the Minister has referred in the Statement to the Foreign Secretary's comment that it is now,
	"necessary to intensify the military, economic and diplomatic pressure on the Gaddafi regime".
	However, the Minister went on to say that, while the use of attack helicopters was one of a range of capability options under consideration, no decision has been made yet on whether to use our attack helicopters in Libya. The Minister in the other place also said that once they have, Ministers will come back to inform the House.
	Certainly, an inference might be drawn from the phrase, "once we have", that the decision is more about when rather than if. But if the words simply refer to once we have made a decision, is the Minister saying that if the decision is not to use our attack helicopters in Libya he will also be coming back to tell the House? When does the Minister anticipate coming back to inform the House, bearing in mind that a short recess is imminent? Is no decision likely before the date that this House resumes after the Recess?
	I should like to refer to the reports in the newspapers this morning. The Guardian, which may not be the Government's favourite newspaper, said, without any ifs or buts that Britain and France are to deploy attack helicopters against Libya and said that the French Foreign Minister had confirmed that his country had dispatched a dozen helicopters. Indeed, the dispatch of 12 French helicopters to Libya on 17 May was reported in yesterday's Le Figaro newspaper.
	The Sun, which certainly is one of the Government's favourite papers, said that the Government would announce the deployment of Apache attack helicopters today. The Daily Telegraph, which sometimes seems to be better briefed on the Government's thinking and intentions than some Cabinet Ministers, said that British attack helicopters would be in action in Libya within days and would fly in from a Royal Navy warship. It said that the operation will take the allies closer to a full ground operation. The report went on:
	"Whitehall officials said that, by the weekend, the Apaches will begin flying missions from HMS Ocean ... Their use was authorised by David Cameron at a meeting of the National Security Council".
	Those newspaper reports bear the hallmark of concerted briefing since they all say much the same thing. Will the Minister tell the House who was responsible for those briefings? I hope that he will not tell us that such briefings have not taken place. Will the Minister also say why briefings of this kind, which are not far removed from a running commentary on our imminent military intentions, are given to newspapers before anything is said in Parliament? Is that not another example of the way in which the Government are seeking to marginalise Parliament's role of being able to question, to challenge and to call the Executive to account?
	Will the Minister say whether a meeting of the National Security Council has recently taken place and if decisions on the use or otherwise of helicopters were made, as confidently asserted on the front page of the Daily Telegraph today? The French Defence Minister was quoted yesterday as saying:
	"The British, who have assets similar to ours, will also commit. The sooner the better is what the British think".
	In view of the statement by the French that they have dispatched a dozen helicopters, and in the light of the Government's Statement that we have made no decision yet on whether to use our attack helicopters in Libya, how well is the close military co-operation between ourselves and the French in relation to Libya and in other areas of activity going?
	On the face of it, an announcement by the French that they have made a decision to dispatch helicopters at a time when we are still considering a range of capability options and have made no decision yet on whether to use our attack helicopters, does not suggest that the co-operation is quite as close as it might be. It could be inferred that there is not always unanimity over the advantages of acting in concert either on what to do, when to do it or how to do it, or over the appropriate timing of announcements. Is this a matter that Ministers intend to pursue with their French counterparts?
	Does the Minister accept the view that the deployment of helicopters by the French, and possibly by ourselves, represents an escalation of the conflict? While helicopters will add to firepower and give precision targeting, they are more vulnerable to ground fire than high-altitude fighter jets and thus, if we deploy them, will potentially put British personnel in greater danger. If we do deploy the helicopters, would it be the Government's intention that the British personnel involved will also receive the operational allowance that their colleagues in Afghanistan do?
	The Minister referred to the Foreign Secretary's comment on the necessity for intensifying military pressure on the Gaddafi regime. If the Government are still considering a range of capability options, what are the objectives that are not being achieved now in pursuit of UNSCR 1973 that the Government seek to achieve through the use of one or more options now under consideration, including possibly the deployment of attack helicopters?
	The Government need to be clear about how their ultimate objectives in Libya will be realised without the conflict becoming something other than that which was stated at the outset. When the Government do the right thing, we will always support them. So far they have, and so they continue to have the support of these Benches. But the events of the past 24 hours have raised a number of concerns about how matters are being handled rather than the decisions being made or considered. I hope that the Minister will now be able to address those concerns.

Lord Astor of Hever: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his reconfirmation of the Opposition's support for the Government's position on the United Nations mandate. We cannot keep up a running commentary on every tactical change that we make. Our operational timetable is to support UNSCR 1973 and it is not driven by the parliamentary timetable. We have debated this important issue many times in your Lordships' House and the Ministry of Defence has provided background briefings to many noble Lords. My intention is to continue to keep noble Lords aware of developments through both briefings and formal statements. I stress that no decision to use Apaches has yet been taken but I can confirm that three Apaches are on HMS "Ocean" in the Mediterranean, taking part in exercise Cougar and would be available should we decide that we need their formidable capability.
	The noble Lord mentioned various articles in the newspaper. All I can say is that he should not believe everything he reads in the papers. I am not aware of any briefings to the newspapers that have taken place. We are not ready to make this decision. I can confirm that a meeting of the National Security Council has taken place, but no decision on the operational use of the Apaches has been taken. The noble Lord asked about relations with France. I can confirm that they are very good on operational terms; the French may have made a decision, but we are not yet ready to make a decision on the deployment of our Apaches.
	The noble Lord asked if this was a significant escalation of the conflict. While I stress again that we have made no decision on the use of the Apaches, we do regularly update and review our military options and tactics to ensure that we can continue to enforce UNSCR 1973. The deployment of the Apaches does not translate to an escalation of the campaign.
	The noble Lord asked about the possible risks to the Apaches. These are flown by very well trained pilots; in Afghanistan they face daily threats from hand-held grenades and machine gun fire, so I have complete confidence in their ability to deal with similar threats in Libya. Looking around the House, I see some noble Lords who have seen the work of the Apaches out in Afghanistan. They can of course take advantage of the terrain-the lie of the land-that fast jets cannot, and they can lurk while remaining hidden and then engage their target with their missiles.
	The noble Lord asked what the Government's objectives were. NATO air strikes have been successful in reducing Gaddafi's ability to attack his people, but he continues to target civilians in clear contravention of UN Security Council resolutions and international law. We have moved on significantly in the last two weeks: the regime has had to pull back from Misrata, Gaddafi is in hiding, and there were further defections and desertions. The coalition is resolute and time is not on Gaddafi's side. We must keep up the pressure on him, and Apache is one of the very highly capable weapons that we have to do this.
	Finally, the noble Lord asked me whether we would extend the operational alliance. This is a matter we are looking at very seriously; as I say again, we have not made any decision on Apaches, but if we did, that would obviously be a matter we would look at carefully.

Earl Attlee: My Lords, I remind the House of the benefits of short questions, because I suspect we have several very experienced noble Lords who would like to get in on this Statement.

Lord Gilbert: My Lords, no one would criticise this Minister for failing to keep colleagues informed of what is going on in Libya. The decision about the Apaches is clearly taken above his pay grade; no criticisms attaches to him for our not being told about that. However, I do have some other questions to which we need some answers.
	First, it seems sad that, once again, we are being led by the French. I do not think that is doing our standing in the world any good at all. In addition to the list of questions that my noble friend put so succinctly to the Minister, I would like to know when we are going to have an explanation of that brazen breach of the no-fly zone by some of Gaddafi's helicopters a few days ago. On whose watch did that happen? Who is responsible for it and why have we not had an explanation? Finally, will the Minister tell us how many working helicopters are available to Mr Gaddafi at this time?

Lord Astor of Hever: My Lords, taking the noble Lord's last question first, I do not think Gaddafi is in a position to use any helicopters at the moment. The no-fly zone would ensure that no helicopters were able to be operational. The noble Lord asked me the other day about the helicopter that was supposed to have taken off. I am not aware that this categorically took place, but I will look into the matter, report back to him and put a copy of my letter in the Library. It is a very important question and I am not able to answer it at the moment, but I will get back to him as soon as possible.
	Finally, we are not being led by the French: no decision has yet been taken. We want to put the pressure on Gaddafi, and if a decision were taken to use Apaches, it would be for that reason-not because we were being led by the French.

Lord King of Bridgwater: My Lords, I certainly echo the tribute paid to the Minister for the efforts he has made to keep this House briefed on the situation in Libya. However, does he recognise that it is extremely difficult-in spite of the excellent briefing-to get an accurate picture of what is really happening on the ground and the way this event is moving? Against that background, I found that the noble Lord who spoke for Opposition made an interesting point. Presumably, the decision to send Apaches did not originate with a decision of the National Security Council; it must have originated in a request from the NATO commander on the ground. I imagine that is where it originally came from, and not the other way around. Will my noble friend comment on that?
	Also, are we to have a situation in which, if one French Apache or attack helicopter gets involved, then there has to be a British one as well, and then we have to have a parallel approach in this? My understanding was that individual nations would contribute to this effort the resources they thought most appropriate and had most available. If there is to be a limited attack helicopter effort, it is probably much more sensible if it is done by one country than by trying to do a bit from one and a bit from the other.

Lord Astor of Hever: As far as the last point is concerned, my noble friend makes a very good point. I thank him for his kind words about trying to keep the House involved: I do my best to keep all noble Lords involved and I am open to any suggestions about how I can continue to do that. If anyone feels that I should be doing more, I would be grateful to hear about that. As for my noble friend's question about who requested the Apaches, I am afraid that I am not in a position to answer that.

Lord Palmer of Childs Hill: My Lords, military intervention in Libya was mentioned as being led by the French, but in fact, military intervention in Libya began on 19 March, with actions by the French air force. British submarines then fired over 100 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Two months further on, the use of Apache helicopters is being considered. Will the Minister say whether this is a move from desert warfare to urban warfare, and will he also comment on the use of Apache helicopters in Libya putting a further strain on UK efforts in Afghanistan? Will he also comment on the intensification of military pressure in Libya affecting the procurement policies of the Ministry of Defence?

Lord Astor of Hever: My Lords, as I keep on saying, we have not made any decision on Apaches; however, if we were to authorise use of Apaches in Libya, it would have no effect on our operation in Afghanistan. I can reassure my noble friend on that point. As for his question on the French, I make no apology for working very closely with the French. They are our closest allies in Europe and they bring a lot to bear. Having said that, we also-for the benefit of noble Lords sitting opposite-work very closely with our American allies.

Lord Lea of Crondall: My Lords, is it not the case that, as the Minister has just said-and here is a point of emphasis with my noble friend Lord Gilbert-ever since Somalia we have been going down the line of closer and closer co-operation with the French at every level? As for the idea that there is a proposal that it must be one of ours and one of theirs, I would like to hear whether that was conceived or not. However, we must not get paranoid about operations of a slightly asymmetrical nature one way or another with the French. It is to be welcomed.

Lord Astor of Hever: My Lords, once again, I say that no decision has been made on the use of Apaches-I cannot go on repeating that. That, I think, answers the question on "one of ours and one of theirs". We are working very closely with the French and will continue to do so.

Lord Craig of Radley: My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. He mentioned that the Foreign Secretary was anxious that further military, economic and other pressure should be kept on Gaddafi. Does that mean that there are other members of the NATO group working with us who also want to add to the military pressure? If so, what contribution are they likely to make? As far as the helicopters are concerned, I presume that some form of risk assessment will be, or has been, made. Perhaps the Minister would like to talk about what risk is envisaged if the helicopters are to be used in Libya.

Lord Astor of Hever: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and gallant Lord for his questions. We do not comment on the military contributions of other nations to the campaign. However, we are grateful for them. He asked me about risk assessments. Before we take any operational decision, we make a full risk assessment to understand the environment in which we require our personnel and equipment to operate. We will look particularly at the regime's capability, not least its surface-to-air missiles.

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer: My Lords, I declare an interest as a board member of UNICEF UK. If we are to have helicopters and ships in greater number in the area, have any further instructions been issued on what to do with boat-loads of refugees who are fleeing the situation? I am sure that, like me, the Minister does not want to see any more of the disasters that were seen previously.

Lord Astor of Hever: My Lords, as I understand it, there is an international stabilisation response team in Benghazi looking at this issue. Of course, the United Kingdom will continue to provide medical and emergency food supplies.

Lord West of Spithead: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for repeating the Statement. It is clearly quite right that we should review options all the time. It is also worth bearing in mind that we need to get rid of Gaddafi, which needs to be factored into everything that is done. We also need to be very wary. Three helicopters are not enough, if we ever use them. I am afraid that we are misleading people if we lead them to believe that they are not at greater risk than if the fast jets were there. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, is absolutely right that a proper risk assessment needs to be made. The Minister said that no decision had been made, but it is a slightly strange circumstance that we are in.
	My question relates to something about which, as the Minister knows, I feel very strongly. The best aircraft that we had for close air support, having been designed for that purpose, was the GR9. Many of them are sitting in a hangar and the pilots are still current up to the end of June. This is the last-chance saloon for being able to use those aircraft. It is not good enough to say that there is no money, as it is all from contingency funds. A huge amount of contingency money is being spent by the Treasury on getting the GR4 "fleet within a fleet" up to the right level and getting the Typhoon available to deliver a bomb, yet here we have an aircraft designed for the purpose and better than the Apache at it because it is less vulnerable. Will the Government take this opportunity to look again at this matter and perhaps change their decision? If the conflict becomes long and drawn-out, we will need them there to be able to put the right pressure on.

Lord Astor of Hever: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for acknowledging that we are right to review the options and reaffirming the need to get rid of Gaddafi. There is always a risk in using attack helicopters-although, as I have said, we have not made any decision on them. I am afraid that I must disappoint the noble Lord by saying that we have no plans to look again at the use of the Harriers.

Lord Soley: The Minister keeps many of us informed, for which I am grateful. He will know from discussions on Afghanistan that there is a difference between using the Apache there and using it in some of the urban areas in Libya. Are reports correct that one of the reasons that the French and British are looking at the possibility of deploying it is that Gaddafi's army has discarded uniforms and is using civilian trucks and clothes? Is that the reason for the close attack?
	We have a squadron of UAVs, or drones as they are popularly known. Are we considering using them in Libya, or they committed totally to Afghanistan?

Lord Astor of Hever: My Lords, I well remember my visit last year to Afghanistan with the noble Lord. We managed to see quite a lot of our different weapons out there. The noble Lord asked me about Gaddafi's forces shedding their uniforms. They are doing that. They are also using civilian vehicles and hiding armour in buildings, including hospitals and schools. If we were ever to use the Apaches, they might target mortar batteries, light military vehicles and individuals including snipers and commanders.

Lord Selkirk of Douglas: To what extent are foreign mercenaries a threat to civilians in Libya? Is this a significant consideration?

Lord Astor of Hever: My Lords, I cannot really answer that question. Gaddafi's mercenaries from different parts of Africa are obviously a threat to our allied forces. We deal with them as we do the regime's soldiers.

Lord Judd: Will the Minister restate for the House the very firm political undertaking given by his ministerial colleagues at the beginning of this intervention that the ultimate solution must be genuinely Libyan and is for the Libyan people to reach? Will he also confirm that our role is limited to protecting people who are in danger and under attack? Will he therefore assure us that, while it may be necessary to do everything possible, including, if need be, using helicopters, to achieve that objective of protection, there is no danger not only of military creep but of political creep? Are we absolutely certain that the aims of this mission are the same on the part of the French and the UK Governments?

Lord Astor of Hever: My Lords, the answer to the noble Lord's last question is yes: they are exactly the same. We want a genuinely Libyan solution. This is about upholding UNSCR 1973 and its remit to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas. That is what the French want and that is what we want.

Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville: My Lords, in the context of the press comment alluded to, and referring back to a previous Anglo-French alliance, does my noble friend recall the episode in The Guns of August by Barbara Tuchman leading up to taxis of the Marne, where the French chief of staff was having dinner in the Champs-Elysées with a friend and they heard the couple at the next table say one to another, "The situation is so serious that the chief of staff is leaving for the front tomorrow"? As the chief of staff's friend smiled and raised an eyebrow, the chief of staff said, "That, my friend, is how history is written".

Lord Astor of Hever: My Lords, I am afraid to say that my noble friend is better read than I am, but I shall have a word with him afterwards and find out the source of his comments.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: My Lords, the Minister has been very clear that the action that we are taking is in pursuit of UNSCR 1973. That resolution did not say that seeing the back of Gaddafi was a principal point, although I have a great deal of sympathy with those who think that it is a means of delivering on UNSCR 1973. But it is not specific and we have to be careful about how we talk around that issue in the coming days.
	Does the Minister accept that what my noble friend Lord Rosser said about the briefings on the Apaches sounded very authoritative? I am prepared to accept what the Minister has said to us here in Parliament-that no decision has been taken. The French, too, have been giving very authoritative briefings, which sound as if they are very well rooted. Again, I believe the Minister because he has given us excellent briefings and he commands the confidence of all sides of the House in what he is saying.
	We are about to have a short break. Will the Minister assure us that, if the situation changes, there will be an authoritative Ministerial Statement making clear what is happening to British forces and to the deployment of our assets and that it will not be done through press briefings, which are unattributed?

Lord Astor of Hever: My Lords, taking the last question first, as far as the Statement is concerned, that is a little above my pay grade. I would very much welcome a Statement and I would imagine that that would be the policy of my department. I cannot see why not.
	I can confirm that we are not targeting Gaddafi, but if he happens to be in a command post at a bad time, he may get killed. That is a risk he takes. I accept the noble Baroness's point about the briefings appearing authoritative, but I say to the House again that we will not take any decision on the deployment of Apaches until we are ready. The noble and gallant Lord asked about risk assessments. They must be done and done properly. I am sure that the House would support the Government on that.
	Sitting suspended.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
	 — 
	Committee (3rd Day) (Continued)

Amendments 40 and 40A not moved.
	Amendment 40B had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.
	Schedule 2 : Chief constables
	Amendment 41
	 Moved by Baroness Henig
	41: Schedule 2, page 108, line 25, leave out paragraph 2

Baroness Henig: My Lords, I am going to speak to 24 amendments in this group that stand in my name and one to which I have added my name. First, I want to address Amendments 41 and 64A but I am also going to put forward some alternative proposals that are set out in Amendments 42, 46 and 64C and need to be taken together. These broadly relate to my concerns about using the construct of a corporation sole within which to encompass the functions of a chief officer of police and the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. I am then going to talk about Amendments 66A, 67, 67A, 67B and 234A to 234Q, and also say a little about Amendment 44 in this group, which I support although I did not put my name to it. These all relate to concerns I have regarding the creation of two chief finance officers and auditable bodies for one police fund. I apologise to the House as I will go into some detail and also for trying to put my own construction on this idea of corporation sole. I cannot claim to be an expert but looking around the Chamber there may be noble Lords who are more expert than me in this area, who might perhaps allay some of my concerns-or possibly add to them, I do not know.
	I start off with my concerns regarding corporation sole. I am extremely uncomfortable with this idea. Chief officers, to me, are meant to be police officers, not corporations or commercial enterprises. Amendments 41 and 64A remove the status of corporation sole from chief officers and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, while Amendments 42, 46 and 64C limit the scope of the status of a chief officer and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner as a corporation sole for the purpose of employment of staff only. I start by probing what this construct of a corporation sole means in practice and what the implications are for corporate governance of policing and the accountability of chief police officers.
	As I have already said, I am not a lawyer and I do not know a great deal about corporation sole, but even the name seems to be a contradiction in terms: a corporation suggests a collective body but sole most certainly does not. Putting aside for a moment what is said in the Bill about the accountability of chief officers of police, the very name corporation sole suggests that the incumbent is accountable to him or herself. What laws set rules about corporate governance within corporations sole? What general powers and duties do these laws give the incumbent and what do they say about the accountability of the incumbent for those powers and duties? Do any of those laws or any other common practice within corporations sole conflict with what is being proposed in this Bill, whether in relation to the powers and duties of chief officers, the corporate governance regime of policing, or the accountability and operational responsibility of chief officers?
	I am concerned that this construct creates technical difficulties in other areas of the Bill, for instance by creating two auditable bodies for one police fund-which are the subject of other amendments-or additional bureaucracy and expense in relation to transfer schemes. It might also create other intended consequences of which we are not yet aware. I am having a very hard time seeing what the benefits of this extra difficulty and expense will be.
	I shall briefly explain how things work at the moment. The governing body is the police authority, which holds all the assets, funding and land for the police force. It is also the employer of all police staff. The chief officer has operational independence and also has direction and control of all police staff and officers. As an aside, I think it worthy of note that police officers are not employed by either the authority or the force but hold warrants from the Crown, and this will not change under the proposed new arrangements. The police authority then delegates functions to the chief officer so that he or she can manage the force and police funding on a daily basis. The delegation framework is a flexible document that can contain freedoms or restrictions on the functions delegated according to what is appropriate to the context. Typically, a scheme of delegation would contain limits, for instance, on the value of contracts that a chief police officer could sign before he must refer it to the authority for approval. This enables the authority to give chief officers freedom to exercise their professionalism, unless they give cause for concern, but also enables the authority to have the final say, as the governing body, about how public money is spent.
	It seems to me that this current practice is both more flexible in practice and more robust in terms of corporate governance and accountability than the artificial construct of corporations sole. I am completely unclear, for instance, how this new arrangement will enable funding to be passed from the elected policing body to the chief constable or Metropolitan Police Commissioner to manage the police force yet still give enough traction to the elected policing body to determine how that money should be spent. How can a corporation have any influence over how its money is spent once it has been given to another corporation? Surely the money passes out of its jurisdiction and control.
	I ask the Government to explain how this arrangement fulfils the policy intent and why the existing arrangement, whereby the chief officer has operational independence, command and control of police staff and delegated functions, is inadequate. Frankly, I have to say that I think that the Government have tied themselves in several knots in an effort first to create powerful individuals, in the form of police and crime commissioners, and then to set about limiting the powers of the police and crime commissioners for fear that they will have created a monster. One way in which the Government have done that is by creating equally powerful chief police officers; another way has been to deprive the police and crime commissioners of the powers and duties that police authorities currently have as employers of all police staff.
	This brings me on to my alternative amendments, Amendments 42 and 64C. It is clear that the Bill intends that employment responsibilities for police staff should be passed to chief officers, but it is less clear whether that also includes powers for chief officers to enter into contracts, borrow money and so forth, and the extent to which chief officers will need the permission of the police and crime commissioner, or the equivalent in London, if they wish to do so. I apologise for the lengthy quotation that follows, but this is an extract from what the Policing Minister said to the Public Bill Committee in the other place:
	"We recognise the operational independence of chief constables, as we have discussed, and we believe that they should have the professional freedom to employ their force staff directly ... we have made it clear that it is the police and crime commissioner who owns the assets and passes them to the chief constable to manage on a day-to-day basis. After all, it is the police and crime commissioner who has the democratic mandate to decide on the advice of the chief constable and on behalf of the people in the force area how their money is to be spent. ... the question is whether the provision is too widely drawn. It is intended only to apply to the employment of staff; it is not intended to give a wider power to chief constables on assets ... I would, therefore, like to look again at whether we should provide further clarification of the measure. I agree with the general view of the Committee that it is important that we provide clarification where we can. I immediately make it clear that it is absolutely not our intention to cut across the decision that assets will be held by the police and crime commissioner".-[Official Report, Commons, Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill Committee, 27/1/11; col. 252.]
	It seems to me that no such amendment has been made, so perhaps the noble Baroness could explain why in her response.
	I am very apprehensive about giving a corporate status to chief officers, but if we must do so because the Government have tied themselves in knots over police and crime commissioners, I am keen to see that such a status is strictly limited and is only for the purposes of employment. There are a number of reasons for doing so. Currently, paragraph 7 of Schedule 2 and paragraph 3 of Schedule 4 enable chief officers, and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, to own all assets except land. That would include intellectual property, contractual assets, fleet and IT. Those paragraphs also enable chief officers, and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, to enter into contracts without recourse to the elected policing body-with no limitation at all. That would include multimillion-pound contracts for the provision of services such as IT and the supply of goods, where the chief officer does not acquire ownership of those assets. I am particularly uncomfortable with the current wording in these paragraphs, which provide that a chief officer of police,
	"may do anything which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to ... entering into contracts and other agreements ... acquiring and disposing of property ... borrowing money".
	Granted, the last two items in that list are subject to the agreement of the relevant police and crime commissioner, but the wording is exceptionally widely drawn.
	The effect of Amendments 46 and 67B would be to vary and to tighten considerably those incidental powers. If we accept that an elected policing body should have a mandate on behalf of local people to determine how police money is spent-and my earlier quotation suggests that the Government accept that-that is entirely inconsistent with the current wording of the Bill. The corporate status for employment only still leaves significant questions about accountability for how public money is spent as approximately 80 per cent of police budgets are currently spent on people. But it would at least greatly simplify the transfer arrangements envisaged later in the Bill that will pass assets and contracts from police authorities to police and crime commissioners. It would avoid the major expense that would otherwise be incurred in listing and determining the ownership of individual assets; it would also avoid difficult and protracted negotiations about ownership between chief officers and their governing bodies locally, both present and future. These amendments are central to clarifying the respective roles of the elected policing body and the chief officer.
	The next amendments are concerned with the duplicate chief finance officer roles created by the current drafting of the Bill. Having a chief finance officer for both the force and the police and crime commissioner is a recipe for confusion. Different titles and different status are needed. Amendment 66A proposes a different title of finance director for the Metropolitan Police Service, while Amendments 44 and 67 deal with the key issue of having two statutory finance officers. It is debatable whether the force chief finance officer really needs statutory powers, but phrasing these under the Local Government Finance Act 1988 as currently proposed is unworkable and could be disastrous.
	The Act requires the chief finance officer to act in the event that a body is about to enter into unlawful expenditure or exceed its available resources. It gives powers to the chief finance officer to stop expenditure in such circumstances. Clearly, this is a power that should rest ultimately with the elected local policing body, or someone who is directly accountable to him or her as the individual responsible to communities for safeguarding how public money is spent. I do not believe that it is a power that should rest with the chief officer or someone who is accountable only to a chief officer. The creation of two statutory chief finance officers would also have the consequence, whether intended or not, of creating two separate auditable bodies. This cannot surely be correct for what is a single police fund. It also raises real concerns about the access that a police and crime commissioner would have to financial information or the ability that they would have to check how money is being spent if it is held in separate corporations sole and subject to a separate audit regime. For this reason, Amendments 234A to 234P remove references to a separate statutory chief finance officer for the force.
	Lastly, and very importantly, Amendment 234Q removes the current proposed amendment to the Audit Commission Act 1998, which would set up chief constables and the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police as auditable bodies. The Bill would have the consequence of creating two statutory finance officers and duplicate audit arrangements again for one police fund. That would be a complete waste of resources and blur the lines of accountability. This amendment will, I hope, make it clear that the local elected policing body is the auditable body. I beg to move.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: My Lords, I have added my name in support of Amendments 41, 42 and 46, which the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, has set out in very clear detail, so I will be brief.
	These are important amendments to test the implications of chief officers being corporations sole. Like the noble Baroness, I am uncomfortable with chief officers being given a legal status as corporations sole, and I look forward to an explanation from the Minister outlining answers to some of the questions that have already been asked about what this means for accountability and corporate governance.
	The alternative amendments here deal with limiting the status of corporations sole to powers of employment only. As I understand it, that would prevent chief officers from owning assets or entering into contracts not directly related to employment. I have to say that I also have some significant concerns about giving chief officers unfettered responsibilities for employment of police staff without any role for the governing body. At the very least the latter should have an oversight role in grievance and professional standards, or the chief officer will become both judge and jury in these matters. But I am sure we will return to this later in the Bill. However, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, that the most objectionable aspect of the current wording is the role that chief officers could play in determining how huge sums of public money should be spent, for instance through entering into multimillion-pound contracts or borrowing money in their own right. I hope that my noble friend the Minister can reassure me on this matter.

Lord Harris of Haringey: My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 64B, which differs only in a minor fashion from one or two of the others, and in support of Amendments 66A, 67, 67B and 234A to 234Q, to which I have added my name. I want to say why all this stuff matters. It no doubt seems like a terribly arcane set of arguments, but I rather suspect that some of our discussions on this group of amendments will determine whether what the Government are trying to do on police accountability actually happens. The way that the Government have framed all this is a recipe to undermine police accountability rather than strengthen it. I am sure that that is not the intention, but I suspect we have ended up here almost by accident.
	Let me explain what I mean: it relates to the amendments dealing with corporations sole. The Government have decided that it would be appropriate for chief officers of police and the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis to have responsibility for the employment of police staff-a function currently carried out by police authorities. I think that is the wrong decision because it places too much power in the hands of a single individual. It is the argument that we have about policing and crime commissioners, and everything else. However, it is particularly difficult in a policing context.
	There is a tendency among some chief officers of police to have around them a group of blue-eyed boys and girls who they see as their favoured supporters, and who they tend to promote in favour of others. One of the checks and balances that we have at the moment is that appointments at ACPO rank-commanders in the Met and assistant chief constables and above outside-are appointed by a panel from the police authority rather than simply on the decision of the chief officer of police. I am suggesting not that chief officers of police would use this power capriciously but that the temptation or tendency might be there. Having worked closely with a number of chief officers of police, I am well aware that some of them have extremely strong personalities and that they like to get their own way. This is about creating some checks and balances on those very strong personalities from getting their own way on every single occasion. It is going to be particularly important on employment.
	It is actually a protection for the chief officers of police not to be doing this or not to be taking sole responsibility. I lose track of the number of instances where there have been complaints following appointment processes in the police service-the police are a particularly litigious lot. The complaints were about whether processes have been followed properly, whether there has been favouritism or whether individuals have been discriminated against. For a chief officer of police to be able to say, "Actually, this was done through a proper equal opportunities process and properly documented by the police authority" is an important protection. However, Ministers in their wisdom have decided that the employment function for police staff, as well as for the appointment of senior officers, should pass to the chief officer of police.
	If that is the decision that the Government have taken, it is of course not too late for them to reconsider this matter. I do not believe that it runs to the centre of the main political headline that the Government wish to achieve by all of this, so they have that opportunity but they have made that commitment. To make that commitment work, as police officers have a particular status of being officers of the Crown, if you transfer responsibility for police staff across to chief officers of police you have to create the legal framework around which that can happen.
	The solution that the Government have come up with is to create chief officers of police as corporations sole. It might be "corporation soles" but I leave that for others with a more distinguished track record in the English language to determine. Creating them as a corporation sole is seen as a solution. The trouble is that the corporation sole is defined in this Bill not just in relation to employment purposes but in general terms. That gives the chief officer of police all sorts of additional power as has been referred to. There has already been mention of entering into contracts and all these other things. Therefore, you have transferred power from what is currently the body to which the chief officer of police is accountable to the chief officer of police. You have diminished the line of accountability.
	I am sure the Government would argue that, because in their preferred model the police and crime commissioner is directly elected, the extra authority of being directly elected will counterbalance the transfer of power that has been achieved by some of the other changes to the chief officer of police. I have to say to your Lordships that I am not sure that that is the case. Part of exercising power, responsibility and your role in terms of accountability is having a number of levers to operate and strings to pull. Some of those are about contracts and these other processes. This is about finance and the ownership of property.
	The noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, will recall an occasion when I was chair of the police authority and he was the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, when we disagreed on some point. I admit that I can no longer remember the precise nature of the disagreement. The consequence of this was that for an exciting 48 hours the Metropolitan Police Authority withdrew financial delegation from the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. This produced a dramatic reaction and much toing and froing. The Home Office was called in and there was all sorts of excitement. However, the point was made. It was the exercise of, if not soft power, semi-hard power by using the levers that were available. What the Government are in danger of doing is removing some of those levers. It will make it more difficult on occasions, when perhaps an amicable agreement has not been reached in the way it normally would. Most of the time our relations were extremely amicable. However, sometimes you need those powers and that facility.
	The Government are in danger of taking away all that. You will end up with elected police and crime commissioners, or whatever other model, if the Government ultimately have their way on this Bill. The expectation of the public will be that these individuals-or the commission, or whatever it turns out to be-have the power to hold the chief officer to account. However, it will be a case of the emperor's new clothes. Although you will have the elected authority, you will not have the mechanisms to make something happen in extremis. This is likely to lead to disputes. There will be areas where the question of what is operational, as opposed to what is the legitimate role of the body that holds the police to account, will come into sharp relief.
	I recall lengthy debates, mostly after my time as chair of the police authority, between the police authority and the Metropolitan Police about the use of Tasers. This is often a controversial area. We were concerned about the move to have Tasers more widely used within the Metropolitan Police district. Under the arrangements here, if you are not careful, the chief officer of police, holding out the protocol that the Home Office has carefully crafted, may say, "This is my operational decision". Not only will the chief officer of police be able to say that, he could also say, "Because I am a corporation sole, I have placed a contract for the delivery of 2,000 Tasers with a company and there is nothing that you, as the elected police body, can do about it". I rather suspect that when Ministers went down the road of strengthening police accountability they believed that there were some matters over which the elected police and crime commissioner could say to the chief officer, "I believe, as a matter of public policy, and as the individual directly elected by the public, that you should be much more cautious about the use of Tasers".
	One could give plenty of other examples but the same principles apply. By having such a broad definition of "corporation sole" so as to protect the decision that apparently has been taken with regard to the employment of staff, the Government are in danger of throwing away all the other mechanisms that the elected individual and the elected policing body can use to ensure that the police service is accountable. I do not think that that is what the Government want to do. That is why these amendments have been tabled. They are central to the thrust of the Bill. Irrespective of what the Government, this House and Parliament as a whole end up doing as regards the headlines of the Bill, this matter must be right because if the Government get it wrong they will end up with completely toothless bodies allegedly holding the police to account. The public will expect them to hold the police to account but they will not have the mechanisms to do so.
	I wish to say a few words about the amendments relating to the chief finance officer. Again, I suspect this is something that the Government have not thought deeply about. It is part of the same process of giving a little bit more to the chief officer of police and forgetting that you are throwing away some of the mechanisms by which he may be held accountable. The Government are creating-I am sure this is not deliberate-two parallel but totally separate financial systems and two statutory chief finance officers, one in the force and one in the policing body. That means that there will have to be two completely separate sets of accounts, audited for the time being by the Audit Commission while it continues to exist, but both will be externally audited separately. There will be separate audit departments. A whole series of separate arrangements will be put in place because that will be required.
	There will be an extraordinary situation in London if the Government bring forward some of these changes early there, which means that they may occur as soon as 1 October. A set of accounts will have to be produced for the period up to 30 September and then, by 1 October, two entirely separate financial systems will have to be set up. Those will be separately audited in order to produce two completely new sets of audited accounts for the period from 1 October to 31 March. If nothing else, this seems to me a cavalier use of public money at a time when we are told that every effort should be made to economise. I suspect that this duplication is unnecessary and unintended. I hope that the Minister will take this matter back, the Home Office will look at it again and that it can be sorted out without this unnecessary duplication.

Lord Carlile of Berriew: My Lords, I speak from a position of neutrality on these amendments. I wish to illustrate my remarks by recounting something that happened to me when I was a Member of the other place. A rave occurred in rural Montgomeryshire, which involved 10,000 people, loosely described as hippies, invading a couple of fields in the south of the constituency. As the local Member of Parliament, I made an arrangement with the police that I would telephone them late every evening for a report on what was going on in relation to public order around the rave and all the other issues that arose. One evening I telephoned at midnight from my then home in Berriew to the public line of the Dyfed Powys police. The telephone was answered by a man called Ray White, who was the chief constable of Dyfed Powys at the time. He was manning the public telephone line, doing his turn in the office of constable.
	I tell that anecdote because in my view whether a chief officer of police is a corporation sole and however we dance on the head of a pin about the legal definition of a corporation sole, I suggest that the overwhelming purpose of a chief constable-I look forward to hearing the Minister's response-is that he acts, albeit as chief, in the office of constable. I therefore urge the Minister to recognise that whatever grand titles are given to him, and whatever the legal technicalities of the matter-far be it from me to avoid legal technicalities; many of my learned friends make a good living from them-it should be recognised that in this legislation we are seeking to strengthen the role of the chief officer of a police force, not in the role of manager but in the office of constable at the head of his force.
	Having said that and having watched at close quarters the splendid Mr White, for whom I came to have enormous admiration, running his force, I realised in our many meetings that he was also the chief executive of an organisation that covered in Dyfed Powys a huge area and, like all police forces, had a massive budget and set of responsibilities. As it happens, Mr White had some good management qualifications that he had acquired along the way through his life as a police officer, and he put them to good use. I hope that my noble friend will confirm in her response that the purpose behind the Bill and the creation of a chief constable as a corporation sole is to enable him or her more effectively to be the chief executive of what is, in effect, a large public business, and to remove from that chief officer some of the inhibitions that may currently exist in running that business.
	I hope, too, that the Minister will confirm that the chief officer who is a corporation sole will have to pay extremely close attention to employment law and employment law standards as they are today. For example, it was suggested that a chief officer might surround himself or herself with chums-people who he or she likes because they happen to agree with him or her on most issues. As political party leaders learn quickly, it is actually a bad idea not to have among your top team people who are prepared to disagree with you on a daily basis and to act as devil's advocate in any event.
	However, in order to achieve a real top management team, whether or not they agree with the chief constable, I hope that the Minister will confirm that appointments standards will have to be high and that they will have to accord with the self-same standards that are required in the appointment of senior managers in companies. One can also look at the public sector for examples. The Judicial Appointments Commission has a transparent system for the appointment of judges that includes lay membership of appointment bodies. I hope that the Minister will confirm that fair interview techniques and appointment systems will conform to the very best standards in the public sector.
	I know that later we will debate matters of discipline, but it would help if at this stage my noble friend also confirmed that in conduct and disciplinary matters-a difficult area for chief officers of police-the same high standards that are applied elsewhere in the public sector will apply to police forces. I hope she can also confirm that a chief officer, albeit as a corporation sole, will never be able to act as judge and jury in their own cause. I promise the Minister that my learned friends will make a real killing if that is what occurs, because every such decision would be open to immediate judicial review, and the chief officer would lose if he or she did not act in a way that was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate.
	Finally, I wanted to say something about finance directors. I return to my experience of Dyfed Powys and of some other forces for which I have acted as an adviser professionally, either for the police force or for the police authority. I observed that the chief finance officer of the police force was an extremely important figure, who held a sort of honorary ACPO rank, although he or she was not a police officer. The chief finance officer of the police force and the accounting officer of the police authority seemed to carry out completely different roles. The chief finance officer of the police force was really the chief accountant of a very big business. The accounting officer of the police authority carried out a much more restricted role, because the turnover of the police authority was inevitably much smaller-at least as regards its functions, as opposed to those of the force. Duplication would be unwelcome, and I hope that my noble friend will confirm that if there are to be separate finance officers, they will not carry out duplicated roles. Perhaps she will explain to the House what their different roles will be, at least in outline.

Lord Harris of Haringey: Does the noble Lord accept that it is possible to construct a situation where you have a finance officer in the force and a finance officer in the authority, the commission, commissioner or whatever it is, with different roles, so you do not have duplication; but you have removed from the commissioner, authority or whatever the opportunity adequately to control the financial matters which, as the body to which the chief officer of police is accountable, it should control?

Lord Carlile of Berriew: I am always prepared to defer to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, because he is a much greater expert than I am on how police forces are run. I see the potential for constructive tension, if it has to be tension, between two finance officers carrying out different roles. I see them as providing a check and balance on one another and their roles as being markedly different in any event. That is something we can learn from the current situation in which, as I said, the chief finance officer of a police force carries out a major managerial role and the accounting officer of the police authority a very different function.
	Can the Minister confirm that the Government feel satisfied that we will not have a high degree of duplication and that the role of the finance officer in the force will be related to operational matters and that of the other finance officer to the rather different strategic matters? There, perhaps, we have the answer to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Harris, about Tasers. Tasers are the sort of thing which may well be strategic and one would expect to be discussed by the commissioner and those to whom he is accountable, whatever structure we end up with at the end of the Bill. The deployment of such Tasers as are purchased at any incident is plainly an operational matter, which must be left in the hands of the chief officer. That is an example of how different functions will deal with different aspects of police activity.

Lord Dear: I was going to speak at length about the points that have been very adequately covered by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, and, not for the first time, I find myself in complete agreement with what he said. I will just pick up one or two of the points in an effort to be brief. Let us get a sense of reality back to this. I have heard phrases such as chief officers getting their own way and blue-eyed boys-by which I assume we mean blue-eyed girls as well. As has been said, no chief officer today or in the past 15 to 20 years could get away with that sort of piratical approach to policing. They have to prefer discussion and challenge. Of course, they like winning but I think that if one gets used to winning all the time, there is an in-built problem with the management style.
	As for blue-eyed boys and girls, I suppose that loosely you could say the same thing about generals, captains of industry or the judiciary. The whole point is that if, as I think will be demanded under the new regime, you have a system with independent assessment and/or a proper board structure but, above all, transparency which in the final analysis is defensible in the courts, there is nothing to lose. I, for one, would not want to see the legislation being overprescriptive on this. You have to leave some room for balance and common sense, appreciating that, if you go past a certain line, particularly in the area of appointments, you are going to be challenged, so you do not tread over that line in the first place.
	I want to say a brief word about the finance officers. There are of course two in place at the moment-one in the police authority and one within the force itself. I am not sure whether I was the first but I was certainly one of the early chief constables who civilianised the old police role of assistant chief constable, admin and finance, bringing in a very well-qualified civilian. I put them on ACPO rates of pay and ranked them equal with ACPO. You would certainly find that model in many police forces up and down the country today. There is some risk of duplication but I think one has to avoid that risk. One has to recognise the two roles, as has already been said, and expect a constructive tension between them.
	I close by saying once again that I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and I am sure that this will not be the last time that I do so.

Lord Soley: Perhaps I may follow on briefly from what my noble friend Lord Harris said. He made a very thoughtful and, as usual, very forensic analysis of this part of the Bill. When he referred to the Taser issue, I was reminded that police forces have purchased contentious weapons on a number of occasions. Many years ago, there was a big argument about rubber bullets, for example. It is not immediately clear to me from the Bill but, as I understand it-I do not think I am wrong about this-when police forces purchase guns, which they have to have in store, there are very tight Home Office controls on what they can buy and in what number and so on. With the corporation sole model, to which my noble friend referred, I am not sure whether they would be able to choose the number of their weapons and, more importantly in a sense, the nature of the weapons, which can determine the outcome in certain critical situations. That may not change at all and the Home Office may retain full control over it. However, in view of my noble friend's comments about Tasers, I should like reassurance that there will be some control over the overall picture and that it will not be left to individual police forces to determine what they need.

Lord Shipley: What seems to be missing in this debate and in the Bill as a whole is a clear indication of the net cost of these proposals. There are existing costs both within a police force and within a police authority, but everything I hear and read suggests that the cost of police commissioners, with their offices and staff, will be significantly higher than the costs that we currently meet. There will be 41 full-time police and crime commissioners. They will have an undefined number of staff, with buildings to house them in, and they will have their running costs. Given that the police commissioner will work full time and, I understand, be paid a low six-figure sum of money, the implication is that the cost of a police and crime commissioner's office is likely to run into several million pounds a year. The figure is very hard to estimate and it is not clear from the Bill documentation what it is likely to be. It seems to suggest that the net cost will not be significantly different from current spending. We will see, but I have come to the conclusion that the total net cost of police and crime commissioners, with the structures that will underpin them, is likely to be somewhere between £100 million and £200 million. I could be out and it could be higher than that.
	It goes back to the nub of the issue about duplication, on which we have had a very good debate and I hesitate to repeat things. I have not understood who will be making exactly what decision on spending. I understand that there is operational and there is strategic, but there is also the challenge from the commissioner's office on day-to-day spending on the basis of the police and crime plan and the challenge from the finance staff of their colleagues on the operational side of finance about what money is being spent. The Bill says that a chief constable will have a chief finance officer. Words matter because a chief implies that there will be others as well. A chief constable will have a chief finance officer for the police force's financial affairs and the commissioner will have a chief finance officer for the commissioner's financial affairs.
	These are not different things. The commissioner is responsible for constructing the police and crime plan. That plan implies a budget as a budget is a statement of policy. The statement of policy is therefore the plan. There is the budget, the heads of expenditure and the precept. I find it hard to understand how you will not end up with conflict if you run two separate staffing structures on finance. There will be conflict and difficulty because there will have to be an assessment of whether the police and crime commissioner's plan, which is the budget, is being carried out operationally. That requires the staff to work very closely together. I think there is great cause for concern about how the structure is being put in place. At the moment the costs on the police authority side are comparatively low, and certainly a great deal lower than the costs on the force side.
	We are about to put up the overall costs of a public service at a time when there are major reductions in the numbers of police officers on the beat. The priority needs to be to keep neighbourhood policing at a high level rather than increase the costs of accountability. It is in that accountability between the two parts-the police force and the police commissioner's office-that we will end up with it not being clear who is in charge of what. That will cost money because people will be challenging it. There will be more meetings, more reports, more audits, more explanations, and so on.
	I am very concerned about this. Amendments 43 and 44 are probing amendments to see whether there is clarity on who would be responsible for what. I feel that some work now needs to be done to get these issues clear. That would start with a clear costing of the overall cost of this. That then would produce a definition of what the policy really is.

Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, talked about the office of chief constable and the business of corporation sole. I shall not take up the Committee's time longer than to say that it needs to be looked at in terms of where the office of chief constable and corporation sole stand in a legal context.
	It is one of the principles of policing in this country to be apolitical and independent in terms of delivery. A little bit of work could be done to ensure that your Lordships' House is more satisfied that there is no conflict between the two. The area in which I would ask for caution to be used is finance. The Metropolitan Police historically had two commissioners: one to deliver on the operational side; and the other who then became the received person to deal with the financial side. With a budget of more than £3 billion, which it was when I was commissioner, I had a delightful relationship with the noble Lord, Lord Harris. Being a pussycat we always got on together; I was the pussycat and he was the other. It was essential for delivery on the financial side that there was an expert on financing in the Metropolitan Police. More importantly, there had to be political accountability outside that for creating contracts, sometimes for hundreds of millions of pounds, which could have got in the way of delivering what we were doing over a period of time in the Metropolitan Police, namely driving down crime and keeping the terrorists away.
	There were similar lessons for me when I was Chief Constable of Northumbria Police, the fourth or fifth largest force in the country. It was essential for me and my top team to concentrate on the operational requirements in 1991, after the riots, when I and the police authority inherited Northumbria Police. A system of controlling, and being responsible for, highly complex contracts in a way that might take place now, is something that needs to be thought about with caution. We must consider accountability. Although it is very appealing to chief officers, when they think about it further, and think about delivery, they might not find it so.
	As far as concerns appointments, I am agnostic. I was an HMI, like the noble Lord, Lord Dear. I was involved in 17 appointments of chief constables and heads of the National Crime Squad and of the National Criminal Intelligence Service, as an independent adviser to HMIC. Each and every one of those appointments was the right one. I do not believe in blue-eyed boys or blue-eyed girls. Somewhere along the line, employment law must be followed and there must be an independent assessment. Most chief constables and chief officers will want to appoint their own top team. In my experience, I have never heard of a police authority that did not take account of what the chief officer wanted, and of what HMIC wanted. I urge caution on the Minister in relation to the business of finance. We must be absolutely clear that chief constables, chief officers and commissioners will not inherit a nightmare.

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath: My Lords, this has been a very interesting and important debate. My noble friend and other noble Lords raised very pertinent questions about the status of the elected police commissioner and chief constable as corporations sole, the financial consequences of the proposed arrangements, referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, and the financial relationship between the commissioner and the chief constable. I will start with that. Since it is the commissioner who will set the precept and ultimately sign off the plan, he will have considerable influence over the chief constable, because he who controls the resources tends to pull the strings. It will be rather like the relationship between Her Majesty's Treasury and the Home Office. My experience of friends in the Treasury over 10 years as a Minister was that they delighted in micromanaging the affairs of departments, which they did not think could organise a you-know-what in a brewery. It will be inevitable that the commissioner, who in the end will have total control over how much money the chief constable gets, will be able to exercise considerable operational control. We should bear that in mind when we consider the construct of the Bill.
	My other concern is about the lack of good corporate governance when it comes to the concept of corporation sole and issues of expenditure, contracts and the employment of staff. As I said on our previous day in Committee, it is puzzling that the party opposite, the Conservatives, who 20 years ago were very concerned about ensuring good corporate governance both in the public and private sectors, seem to have forgotten all this when they came to construct the Bill. This has been a very good debate and noble Lords have used their experience of how the police service currently operates to tease out some of the issues.
	The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, talked about the chief officer as chief executive. He thought that it was probably a good thing, provided that it was done in the right way. The problem I have with that is that, as I read the Bill, the chief constable, being corporation sole, is not just the chief executive; he or she is also the chair and the non-executive directors. It is the realisation of a Gilbertian fantasy: the Lord High Everything Else. The chief constable is not just the Lord High Everything Else; he is the Lord High Everything. Of course the noble Lord was right to ask the Minister whether there will be structures, such as good employment practice and all the other constraints and necessary safeguards, and I am sure the Minister will seek to give an affirmative response, but, in the end, it will be down to the chief constable as a corporation sole. As the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, said, in the end those who make, for instance, employment decisions will be employed by the chief constable, the corporation sole, and that must have an impact on their behaviour.
	This corporate governance structure, or the absence of it, would never be contemplated by the Government if this were a private sector operation. The idea that you can have one person without some kind of board structure and without non-executives to give the check and balance would not be contemplated. Why is this kind of structure being contemplated in this part of the public sector? It is a puzzle to me. I have always paid tribute to the previous Conservative Government for the emphasis they gave to good corporate governance, the encouragement they gave to the Institute of Directors and the CBI and the work by Cadbury. The previous Conservative Government encouraged all these things. Why are they ignoring that when it comes to this Bill?

Baroness Browning: My Lords, I am grateful. This has been a very constructive debate on a very important part of this legislation. In her opening remarks, the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, mentioned the corporation sole, and I shall begin by setting out where the Government are coming from on this. As Members of the Committee will know, a corporation is a body that has its own legal personality distinct from that of its members. This means that a corporation can own property, enter into contracts and take part in legal proceedings in its own capacity and that its assets, rights and liabilities are those of the corporation rather than the members. Typically, corporations have more than one member. Such corporations are called corporations aggregate. Local authorities are a typical example. However, a corporation can consist of only one person: the corporation sole. The sovereign is a corporation sole, as are various ecclesiastical figures, such as bishops, and various other public offices have been created corporations sole by legislation, such as the Treasury Solicitor, the Information Commissioner and the Children's Commissioner, so this is not something completely new that has been contrived for the purposes of this legislation.
	The amendments concerning this part of the Bill and particularly concerning the chief officer's status as a corporation sole remove or limit the status to apply to employment matters. They also remove the chief officer's ability to enter into other contracts and agreements, including the ability to borrow money and sell property. The Government are clear about the need to establish chief constables as corporations sole. This legal status will allow them to employ staff in their official capacity and thus have greater control over running their forces. We believe that it is a very important move for chief constables to be able to have that more direct link with the employment of the police. I accept what noble Lords have said about the status of existing police officers who are not employed as such by any one particular body. It is quite right that that has been mentioned. But this does not in any way detract from the oath that they take or from their status. They would go into a direct employment situation as far as the chief constable is concerned.
	My noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew clearly set out what I thought was exactly spot on as to why we want to do this. In terms of the increased capacity that the chief constable would have, particularly in the employment field, we want to ensure that a PCC is also enabled to focus on accountability rather than on running the force. Those two roles are quite distinct. We believe that the corporation sole allows the chief constable to fulfil that clearly defined role. The legal status that allows them to employ staff in their official capacity is very important in its vital function in the context of providing greater autonomy over the day-to-day management of the force. It is at the heart of clear operational independence, about which a lot has been said in our deliberations so far. This clearly, we believe, would contribute to it.
	However, noble Lords have raised issues that are of concern and I hope that I can reassure them. As currently drafted, there are parts of this part of the Bill that we intend to change. Perhaps I may set them out. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, and my noble friend Lady Harris raised the concern that chief officers will have significant powers to enter into contracts and agreements. It is our intention to consider this further. We will consider laying amendments which would prevent the chief constable from borrowing money and require him or her to obtain permission from the police and crime commissioner before entering into any contract other than a contract of employment. I hope that noble Lords will accept that we have already revisited this. They have made some important points around this aspect and at later stages of the Bill we will bring forward government amendments to try to correct this.
	The amendments tabled by my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Shipley and the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, would mean that, while the chief police officer would be able to appoint a chief finance officer, they would not be required to do so. Nor would they be required to appoint someone suitably qualified to hold that role. Currently, the Bill will require each chief police officer to appoint a chief finance officer of the force and require that person to be a member of a chartered financial institute. This is not about gathering chums around; it is about making sure that there is proper professional support for the role. I understand that the requirement for separate chief finance officers reporting to the chief police officer and the police and crime commissioner may on the face of it seem like duplication. Several Members of your Lordships' House have mentioned that tonight but I stress that this is not the case. The noble Lord, Lord Dear, made the point that there is a situation here with the police authority and the chief constable.
	The Bill makes key changes to the current system of financial governance for the police, flowing from the fact that it will be the chief police officers who employ the police staff currently employed by police authorities. The Bill provides for chief police officers to be corporation sole so that they can do this in their official capacity. As two distinct bodies both legally capable of holding moneys and entering into contracts, it is right and proper that chief police officers and police and crime commissioners both have suitably qualified people responsible for the propriety and efficiency of their financial affairs.
	The provisions in the Bill set up two distinct bodies whose financial responsibilities will have to be formal, clear and accountable in law and to the public. I want to clarify any confusion between the role of the two. The chief finance officer to the force will be primarily involved in the propriety of operational spending and employment. The PCC's chief financial officer will have the overall oversight of spending, including grant-making functions. I can confirm that there is no reason why there cannot be group audits of these two functions.
	I turn to the question of the cost of having two finance officers. As has already been mentioned, forces already have finance directors, so this is not that great a change. I stress here that it is the Government's intention that each chief finance officer be responsible for their corporation sole for ensuring the proper management of the corporation's financial affairs. This is the duty that Section 151 of the Local Government Act 1972 places on a local authority, which is extended to all police authorities by Section 112 of the Local Government Finance Act 1988. Therefore, it simply cannot be appropriate for a chief officer to have a discretion as to whether to have a chief finance officer with these important statutory duties. It is necessary for a safeguard to be in place which ensures that if the chief officer were to make, or plan to make, an illegal or unlawful transaction, then the chief finance officer would be bound by the legislation to which I have referred to make a report to the chief officer informing them of their view, and copy this to the accountable authority. In this case, the authority would be the PCC. I therefore respectfully ask that noble Lords who have tabled these amendments consider not pressing them.

Lord Carlile of Berriew: Before the Minister sits down-and I apologise for interrupting her-I have been slowly digesting something she said about the making of contracts. I well understand what she said about the Government reconsidering issues about whether chief constables could make contracts, but can she reassure us that there will be no inhibition on the making of contracts required for the best conduct of individual investigations? I am not citing "Cracker" as a good example of what occurs, because it does not occur; but sometimes it is true that one-off forensic science services are required for a particular investigation at short notice. Sometimes one-off accountancy services are required for investigations at short notice, and one can think of many other examples. Can she confirm that the chief officer will be able to purchase those services in such circumstances without having to go through elaborate consultation hoops on contracts?

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath: My Lords, I may have misheard her, but I thought that the Minister hinted or said that amendments would be brought forward which would make it clear that contracts would have to be approved by the police commissioner. I can see why the Government have come back with that proposal, but to my mind, it just gives the commissioner that much more control over the chief constable. Because the commissioner is being given so much power with regard to money, whatever a protocol says about the relationship between the commissioner and the chief constable, the fact is that the person who holds the dosh usually controls what goes on. I hope the Government will give this further thought.

Lord Harris of Haringey: I want to question whether my noble friend has got the correct nuance of the argument. We have to be very clear about what we are trying to achieve with this Bill. My understanding is that the Government are trying to achieve stronger accountability, and that the mechanism for accountability is an elected police and crime commissioner-or we may end up with some other model. The danger is that, inadvertently, that accountability will be weakened. While my noble friend is right to say that being able to set the overall budget and strategy provides some degree of control, it does not provide the full picture. If you have a situation in which the corporation sole status of the chief officer of police is untrammelled-I was very pleased to hear what the Minister said about putting some limits around that, and I think it would be helpful to see those sooner rather than later-the danger is that chief officers of police will ignore what the body to whom they are supposed to be accountable will say are the key strategic issues that matter to their local communities. We would not want every minor arrangement in respect of an individual investigation to be referred to the accountable body, but we should have some system that ensures that those key decisions lie clearly with the body to which the chief officer of police is being held accountable.

Baroness Browning: My Lords, I am very grateful for the further contributions that have just been made to the debate. I can assure my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew that if, for example, forensic science commissioning were suddenly needed, there would not be a time lag while permission was sought. That is not our intention. I also take on board what noble Lords opposite have said about getting the balance right. I can assure the Committee that we will bring forward an amendment that I hope meets the concerns that have been expressed.

Lord Soley: Would the Minister answer my question, which arose from the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Harris, about the number and type of weapons purchased? Does she need more time to find out what the situation would be if it is a corporation sole? Does she want to come back to the Committee, or can she answer the question now?

Baroness Browning: I hope that I can answer the noble Lord now. The situation will be as it is now.

Lord Soley: So the situation now would override the corporation sole nature of the body.

Baroness Browning: Yes, that is right. I ask noble Lords not to press the amendment.

Lord Harris of Haringey: My Lords, the Minister has given a very helpful explanation in relation to the chief financial officer. I do not think anyone is suggesting that the chief officer of police should not have financial support from somebody who was suitably qualified. It is told, no doubt apocryphally, that the Metropolitan Police, when it was under the control of the Home Office, had only two qualified accountants responsible for a budget of £3 billion, which may have explained why it did not have a system for knowing whether it had paid bills more than once. Having a senior financial person who is a qualified accountant is not the same as having a chief finance officer, which has a specific meaning in local government law. It is clear that the post is intended to have that specific meaning in local government law. I do not think that anyone is suggesting that we should move away from the situation that exists at the moment, where every force has a senior finance person, but the person who is clearly responsible for accounts and everything else resides within the police authority or, in this case given the Government's construct, with the police and crime commissioner.

Baroness Henig: It has been an extremely interesting debate which has teased out a number of important issues, many of which I am sure we will come back to. I am most grateful to the Minister for her response and for telling us that the Government will bring forward an amendment in relation to some of the issues. I am sure that we will have further debate at that point simply because so many important, technical issues relating to where the balance of power lies in different situations are still to be clarified. Given that we shall come back to a number of them, and given the important assurances that the Minister has provided, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 41 withdrawn.
	Amendments 42 to 48 not moved.
	Schedule 2 agreed.
	Clause 3 : Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime
	Amendment 49
	 Moved by Lord Harris of Haringey
	49: Clause 3, page 3, line 13, at end insert "and the City of London"

Lord Harris of Haringey: My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 53, 54, 55 and 56. I see that Amendment 55, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is in this group. I do not quite know what it means and I am not sure that it is meant to be in this group, but the noble Baroness will no doubt enlighten us later.
	The purpose of the amendment in my name is to extend the responsibility of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime to cover the City of London Police. I put this forward because I was sure that it would be a minor and non-controversial change to the Bill-something that would attract universal approbation and something that the Government would have done had they thought of it at the time.
	We are all familiar with the City of London Police force. Of course, it does an excellent and much-respected job. It has an annual budget of around £61 million, which is what the Metropolitan Police gets through in a week. The City of London Police force covers a population of 8,000 people, which is rather smaller than most local government wards in Greater London. There is of course a slight commuter issue in that some 300,000 people come into the area each day. The area covers just over one square mile. It has 800-plus police officers, 85 special constables, 48 PCSOs, a number of police staff and three police stations. It is the smallest territorial police force in England and Wales. It is something of an anomaly.
	The argument is that because of the economic significance of the City of London, it has historically had a separate police force. That argument has prevailed every single time in the past 180 years that people have considered whether there should be different policing arrangements in London, but I hope that it is something that we can consider afresh today. I looked at the figures from the City of London Police annual report. Apparently, the average monthly number of crimes recorded in the City of London Police district is 505. The Metropolitan Police force clocks that up in around six hours. That gives noble Lords some idea of the different scales.
	The noble Lord, Lord Condon, who is not in his place, is apocryphally said to have been asked on one occasion, "Commissioner, what would you do if you were given responsibility for the City of London Police?". I have never asked him whether he actually said this, but he is alleged to have replied, "I would put a sergeant in charge". I say that not to be pejorative about the City of London Police, but to highlight what a strange anomaly it is to have within Greater London this tiny enclave catering for a tiny population with the full panoply of staff. It has its own commissioner-a commissioner in the policing of the metropolis sense rather than in terms of an elected police and crime commissioner. The Bill is silent on whether there will be any changes in governance of the force. It will continue to be governed by the Corporation of London Police Committee with no changes whatever to reflect the general drift of government policy in this area, whether amended or not by your Lordships' House or Parliament.
	I hope that the Minister, in responding, will be able to enlighten us as to why the Corporation of London is exempt from the general provisions of the Bill. If one believes in the principle of seeing direct and visible accountability, what could be better than to say that the entire police service within Greater London should be accountable to the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime? Surely that is the way to do it. That is the way to make it explicit and demonstrate that the entire police service in London is the responsibility of the mayor's office.
	In an earlier debate in Committee, we talked about the problem of the confusion of members of the public. The City of London Police force goes to great lengths to ensure that its officers are distinguishable. The little squares on the cap band are red rather than black and the insignia and helmet are different, so it should be immediately apparent to members of the public that they are now being dealt with by the City of London Police as opposed to the Metropolitan Police. However, I rather suspect that this is a distinction-even though enormous efforts are made to demonstrate it-that will be lost on most Londoners.
	The point in putting forward this amendment is to say, for the sake of completeness, that Greater London contains the square mile of the City of London. Its 8,000 residents-who vote for the Mayor of London-should have the right, through that process, to see their police service being governed through the same arrangements as the rest of London, the mayor's Office of Policing and Crime as envisaged in this Bill. I am sure that the five people who were subjected to firearms offences in 2009-10, or the four instances of trade description offences that the force dealt with, or the two offences relating to obscene publications or the two offences of dangerous driving-and this is an area where 300,000 cars come in each day-would all be better served it if it was seen as part of a Greater London police force, accountable to the Mayor of London's Office of Policing and Crime. I beg to move.

Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, is using this group of amendments to seek to achieve, at a late hour and in Committee, the merger of the City of London Police with the Metropolitan Police, a matter that has been around not just since 1829 but goes back to 1785. The matter is frankly for the Minister to respond to, as the Minister in charge of the Bill, but I must put a small gloss on it, having been the Member of Parliament for the City of London for the third longest length of time since 1283. It goes back to 1785 because there was a genuine essay to secure a London police force that went wider than the City in the 1780s. William Pitt the Younger embarked on it because of the Gordon Riots, when he felt a police force was needed. The City of London Police-this is the one thing I concede to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey-did actually scupper that idea by saying that they would not themselves have anything to do with it. Pitt himself confessed to the House of Commons that this was a subject of which he was himself insufficiently the master and therefore he would not press the point. Thereafter, it was decided to create a police force in the city of Dublin and it was the existence of that force that prompted Peel, who served as Chief Secretary for Ireland between 1812 and 1818, to pursue the idea when he became Home Secretary on his return to London in the 1820s. Of course, from 1829 onwards, everything is history.
	I will fast forward from 1829 to 1977, when I entered the House of Commons at a by-election as the Member of Parliament for the City. I recall that before I had made my maiden speech, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, had moved a 10 minute rule Bill in the House of Commons to abolish the City of London Police, to which I was not allowed to reply because it was a controversial subject and you should not make your maiden speech on a controversial subject. The late, lamented Lord Finsberg opposed it himself. I have to remark on the coincidence that these Bills always came forward in the spring of a GLC election, because they were quite clearly intended to provide further grist to the political mill.
	Your Lordships' House will be glad to hear that I am not going to make a prolonged defence at this hour but I will say that I did think that the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, was a little selective in the observations that he made. There is no question at all that the City of London Police response to the terrorist outrages that occurred within the square mile was both prompt and efficient. I can recall long, long ago reporting to the House of Commons on the technology that the Corporation of London had developed so that any car approaching the ring of steel was photographed and, at the moment that it reached the ring of steel, the policeman on duty knew perfectly well who the driver was and who it was registered to et cetera. The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, made no reference to the expertise developed by the City of London Police in the context of fraud or to the international implications of the City of London and its police force nor did he allude in general to the terrorist issue to which the ring of steel contributed as a defence, but he did refer to the City of London's population, on which his figures were broadly right. The 8,000 residents do not all have votes, but I agree that that is approximately the right figure. He was certainly right about the number of commuters. The number of commuters is the reason why the European Commission says, erroneously, that the City of London, the City of Westminster and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea are the richest areas in the whole of the European Union. The reason why the European Commission's statement is ill founded is that, in the context of the City, it is the 300,000 commuters who contribute to the area's wealth rather than the 8,000 people who live there. However, in working out its calculations, the European Commission takes the GDP produced in those three local authority areas and divides the figure by the resident population rather than by the number who come in to work there, who make such an enormous contribution to the economy of this country.
	My noble friend Lord Eccles was present during our Committee stage debates on the Bill last week; I just want to allude briefly to his late father, who was the 1st Viscount Eccles, or David Eccles as was. In 1944, David Eccles moved an amendment to the Education Bill-no doubt it was also moved late at night-at a time when David Eccles had been in the House of Commons for a year. His amendment said that, once the war was over, all women teachers in the United Kingdom should receive equal salaries with all male teachers. The Division was the only one in the House of Commons throughout the war on which the Government were defeated. Rab Butler, who was the Minister in charge of the Bill, was not the fastest of movers and was actually not in the Chamber when the vote was taken, although he was proceeding towards it. The amendment was carried by 117 votes to 116. The next morning, Churchill sent for the Chief Whip and said that Herr Goebbels would make such an enormous profit out of this defeat for the Government that it had to be reversed on Report as a matter of confidence. The amendment was reversed by 417 votes to 25 and, thus, the Bill was restored to its original form. I tell that story in the context of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, because, once all that had been done, the then Prime Minister sent for David Eccles and-I shall not put on a Churchillian accent at this late hour-said words to the effect, "Young man, I have a great deal of personal sympathy with the underlying proposition and principle that you were advancing in your amendment, but to do so late at night on the Education Bill, in the midst of the greatest conflict the world has ever seen, is frankly the equivalent of putting an elephant in a perambulator". If I may say so to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, in my view that is what he is seeking to do tonight. I hope that he will be wholly convinced by the arguments advanced by my noble friend.

Lord Harris of Haringey: I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way-or perhaps he had resumed his seat anyway-but he has referred three times to the lateness of the hour. There is no desire on my part for us to be debating at this hour; we are doing so as an assistance to the Government, who have decided that the House should sit beyond 10 pm tonight despite the normal convention that we do not sit late on occasions when the House will sit early the following morning. I would have been much happier to have debated this at an earlier hour, when no doubt we could have devoted much more time to the particular arrangements in the City of London.

Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville: My Lords, I am deeply sorry if I have in any way offended the noble Lord, Lord Harris, but the fact remains that it is a late hour.

Baroness Hamwee: My Lords, it is a late hour, but that is not anyone's doing, and I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Harris, has sustained greater insults than that in his career.
	I am not sure, either, what Amendment 155 is doing in this group. It was in another group. I observed that it should be in a group on London and this is where it ended up. It is one of a number of amendments that say that the London Assembly should be able to decide its own procedures and how it works as a policing and crime panel. However, we will debate that point in another group.
	I have considerable sympathy with these amendments on the City of London. I am asking myself why there is a separate force and why the issue has not been brought within what seems entirely the right vehicle for addressing the matter. I can only assume that it is in the filing tray that has "too hard" written on it and that the Government are unwilling to take on the City. But it is an important issue. If we are being asked, as we are, to look at inserting democracy into the governance of our policing arrangements, the City should not be exempt from that. They have a lot of experience of elections in the City-there is no problem in carrying that out.
	There are so many anomalies, with the separate precepting arrangements and what has always seemed to me unnecessary bureaucracy and complication because of the division. The noble Lord, Lord Brooke, referred to expertise, and I accept that there is enormous expertise, but it is transferable and needs to be so, because whether or not the City likes it London's financial centre is not only where it used to be. It has moved eastwards, and the expertise in fraud and other matters specific to business are no longer, in the 21st century, relevant only to the Square Mile.
	This Bill is the right context for this debate. There is a considerable distinction between this issue and that of teachers' salaries in 1944, and I am sorry that the Government have not felt able to extend the new governance arrangements to the whole of England.

Lord Rosser: My Lords, this is clearly a perfectly legitimate amendment and this is clearly the time when the issues that this amendment raises ought to be discussed. They ought to be discussed as part of this Bill. Having listened to the complaint that this is not a matter that should be discussed late in the evening, I am not sure whether that means-if the Minister is not going to accept the amendment-that if it appeared at Report stage at five o'clock in the afternoon it would be universally welcomed and supported. I was not quite clear on the significance of the comment about the time of day.
	Clearly, the purpose of the amendment is to bring the arrangements for the City of London in line with the proposals for the rest of England and Wales-and one looks forward to the explanation that we will receive from the Minister as to why, one assumes, the Government are not entirely enthusiastic about going down this road. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made the interesting and relevant point that, if the argument is that you need a separate police force for the City of London because it is a financial centre, it should be taken into account that we now have around Canary Wharf another financial centre. Presumably, it is under the Metropolitan Police, unless I am to be told otherwise. If the Metropolitan Police is considered to have the expertise to handle the issues that might arise there, why is it not considered that it could encompass, by taking over or by merger, the City of London Police as well? The Metropolitan Police force has considerable expertise which is recognised internationally and which is used on a national basis in England and Wales, not simply confined to its area. Yet the inference through having a separate force for the City of London is that somehow the Metropolitan Police, despite the expertise that it has, would just not be able to cope.
	The other possibility is that the Government think, with their Localism Bill, that the City of London Police force is localism personified. You have a small area with its own police. Are they therefore going to extend that principle elsewhere? The noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville, said that it was an efficient police force and he may well be right. I am certainly not going to stand here and say that is not efficient but, equally, the efficient police forces and police authorities which we have at the moment are not being exempted from the legislation before us on the grounds that they are efficient. I am not sure what relevance the argument has that the City of London Police may be an efficient force, because that argument has not been applied to police forces in other parts of the country.
	I simply conclude that one looks forward with interest to hearing what the response is going to be. Finally, will the Minister say whether the Government seriously considered doing away with a separate police force in the City of London, through merger or takeover-or whatever word they want to use-into or by the Metropolitan Police? Or, as I think the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, was this considered to be so awkward and difficult that it was never even considered at all?

Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville: Would the noble Lord care to answer one thing? Will he comment on why the previous Labour Government, against what I would have thought were all their natural instincts, chose to confer on the City of London Corporation the right to have elections for democratic representation in the City, in which all businesses in the City were allowed to have a vote that was calculated in a particular way? Indeed, they pressed the Corporation to go down that route. Was it really not because there was a recognition that the City at large worked extraordinarily well and that fiddling around with it was not a very profitable use of time, not least in the context of the City of London's success?

Lord Rosser: I do not know specifically what the reasons were. They may well be those that the noble Lord has said. However, I am not sure that that necessarily applies to an argument about the City of London Police, which is what we are discussing, particularly in the context of the expertise which the Metropolitan Police has-and in the context that the City of London is no longer the only financial centre in London. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, the financial centre has moved further east to an extent and nobody has said that those responsible should set up or extend the powers of the City of London Police to cover those new centres, which presumably come under the Metropolitan Police.
	It is not irrelevant for this question to be asked when we are talking about a major reorganisation of our police forces, with a major change in how they are run and in governance. Maybe there is a good answer, and I am waiting to hear what the Minister has to say, but the question should be asked: did the Government look at the issue of the retention of the City of London Police and was it justified? If so, what were the reasons for coming to the decision that they did, bearing in mind that they think that all other police forces should be covered by the changes that they are putting forward in this Bill?

Baroness Browning: My Lords, this has been a very interesting debate. I am very grateful to noble Lords for the history that has been contributed. Not much of it appeared in my notes but it has helped me to put into context the City of London and the role of its police. I hope noble Lords will not mind if I begin by paying tribute to that police force. It is a small force but it has in recent times dealt with significant investigations and major incidents. It has dealt with them and acquitted itself extremely well. Because of its position it has a national role. I hear what has been said about the movement of financial services around not only the country but the globe. None the less, the force has taken a lead in tackling white-collar crime that continues today.
	When the noble Lord, Lord Harris, began, I thought this would be one of those sublime moments when, as a politician, one could sit back, listen to two arguments and make up one's mind as to which was the more persuasive. As a Minister, I do not have that luxury, as Members will know, more is the pity. It would be very nice to do so. However, the noble Lord, Lord Harris, lost me when he mentioned motoring offences in comparison with what my noble friend Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville said about the much more significant and recent role that this police force has played. Neither the Mayor of London nor the Metropolitan Police Authority has a role in the governance of the City of London Police.
	The position of the Common Council as the police authority for the City of London Police has, as we have heard, remained essentially unchanged. It was not altered by the Police Act 1996, which created the police authorities that currently exist outside London. Nor, I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, was it changed when his Government introduced the Greater London Authority Act 1999, which created the Metropolitan Police Authority. Therefore, when he asked me why we are not doing this and said that the amendments are reasonable, I noted that he did not refer at all to what his own Government did. I assume they, too, when they were legislating for London would have looked at this issue. There was no offering or crumb there to persuade me that the previous Labour Government looked at this and decided that it was an appropriate thing to do.

Lord Rosser: The Minister's argument is that she has been so overwhelmed by the decision of the previous Labour Government that it cannot possibly be challenged or questioned. Is that the argument for keeping the City of London Police?

Baroness Browning: Not at all, my Lords. We studied very closely the actions or lack of actions of the previous Labour Government. I assure the noble Lord that they are on our radar screen all the time. However, we have this situation not just because of the many years that the City of London Police has been in place but because of the exemplary way in which it conducts itself. The size of the population of the City of London has been mentioned. There are 8,000 voters but one must put that in the context of there being 25 wards in the City, of which only four have residents. To translate that into representation would be quite complex. The City of London is unique and has unique policing governance to recognise that fact. I suspect that various Governments down the years have looked at this and probably all came to the same conclusion. It operates on a non-party political basis through its lord mayor, aldermen and the members of the Court of the Common Council. The governance is tailored to the particular institutions and traditions of the City of London. I am sorry to disappoint your Lordships, but it is not my intention to change that tonight. I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

Lord Harris of Haringey: My Lords, I am enormously grateful to Members of the Committee for their consideration of the amendment. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, for his history lesson as it demonstrated the extraordinarily effective lobbying power of the Corporation of London over the past two and a bit centuries.
	Noble Lords have asked why the previous Labour Government did not address this issue. I was very engaged in the discussions that led to the creation of the Greater London Authority and I can let your Lordships into a secret: the then Prime Minister, who was renowned for his bravery in taking on international conflicts when other counsels might have prevailed, was not prepared to enter into a conflict with the massed troops of the Corporation of London. He did not wish to see tanks trundling down Ludgate Hill towards Westminster to try to suppress any uprising on the part of the unruly citizens of Westminster vis-à-vis the traditional powers and role of the Corporation of London.
	I am sure the Committee will recognise that my amendment is very modest. It does not propose subsuming the City of London Police into the Metropolitan Police. It merely suggests that the City of London Police should be accountable to the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime in the same way that the Metropolitan Police are. That would not necessarily mean any disruption of the City of London Police's excellent work, particularly on economic crime. It may have been unfair of me to refer to the heavy load of traffic offences with which the force deals. I was talking to a colleague in the House earlier this evening who remarked that the City of London Police dealt with a particularly high number of cases of indecent exposure, and that that factor should be taken into account when arguing for a separate force. However, the argument has always been about economic crime, certainly during my involvement in this area. We are talking about 213 new investigations during the past year, which is a comparatively modest figure.
	This was intended to be a minimalist amendment to try to bring the City of London Police into line with some of the arrangements prevailing in the rest of the country. London is already an anomaly in the Bill, as we shall discuss further in a few minutes. The amendment is not intended to destroy the City of London Police or its work; it simply tries to create a system of accountability which would at least be parallel to that in the rest of London, if not in the rest of the country.
	I note that the Minister is as susceptible as all previous holders of that office and, indeed, all previous Ministers in every other department of government, when it comes to the lobbying power of the Corporation of London, to which I defer. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 49 withdrawn.
	Amendment 50
	 Moved by Lord Harris of Haringey
	50: Clause 3, page 3, line 15, leave out subsections (3) and (4) and insert-
	"(3) There is to be a Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime for the metropolitan police district and the City of London.
	(4) The Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime is to be elected, and hold office, in accordance with Chapter 6.
	(4A) The person who has been given the title of deputy mayor and particular responsibility for policing and crime by the Mayor of London at the time this section is brought into effect is to be the occupant for the time being of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime."

Lord Harris of Haringey: My Lords, in moving Amendment 50, I wish to speak to an extremely long list of amendments which, because of the lateness of the hour, I will not proceed to go through individually and in detail.
	The purpose of this amendment is to try to bring some of the arrangements in Greater London more into line with the Government's original intentions in the Bill. The principle of the Bill was that there would be greater visible accountability of the police service through the election of a police and crime commissioner. That is what the Government have proposed everywhere in the country apart from London. However, it is proposed that because we already have a directly elected Mayor of London, the processes will not be the same in London as they will be elsewhere. Instead, there will be created the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime, which will be a functional body of the Greater London Authority. There is recognition of the very wide range of duties of the Mayor of London. Therefore, it is understood that he might not be able to fulfil the office of Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime-there is a very strange use of language in the Bill-but might appoint a deputy mayor of London to fulfil that role. There are clauses in the Bill that describe the functions of the deputy mayor for policing and crime; how they relate to the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime and to the Mayor of London; the arrangements for the appointment of that person who might or might not be an elected member of the London Assembly; the arrangements that would occur in the event of a vacancy in that office; what would happen if that person were disqualified or incapacitated; and so on. However, the real gap in those proposals is that if the Government believe, as they do, that the single act of election and the visibility of the person fulfilling the role of holding the police to account is the key element, why does it not apply in London?
	The purpose of the amendment is to try and achieve for the Government what they see as their objective elsewhere in the country. It proposes that on the same day that Londoners elect their mayor, they would also vote for the deputy mayor for policing and crime. The ballot paper would include two posts, and people would vote accordingly. The process of election would be the same as those adopted for the police and crime commissioners, if that is the direction in which Parliament were to choose to go, following your Lordships' decision on the first day of Committee. The elections would be held at the same time and Londoners would be choosing the person who would visibly be responsible for holding the Metropolitan Police Service to account.
	My amendments also provide for arrangements in the event of a vacancy. The amendments do not have the problems that were described earlier as to what happens if a policing and crime commissioner is incapacitated or disqualified for whatever reason. My proposal is that in the event of the deputy mayor for policing and crime being temporarily unavailable for whatever reason, the Mayor of London would act as his or her own deputy in respect of that function. While I do not think that it is possible for the Mayor of London to fulfil the role of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime for a full four-year term, the role could be managed during the period of a vacancy or while a new election was held.
	The remaining amendments are designed to bring into place an exactly parallel structure as that which the Government originally envisaged for the policing and crime commissioners. The principle is simple-Londoners should also have what the Government wanted to extend to everyone else in the country, which is the right to elect the person to be responsible for policing and crime. That person would be the deputy mayor for policing and crime.
	Why am I not proposing the creation of a separate police and crime commissioner for London? It is because I recognise that we have a Greater London Authority and the Mayor of London. In the same way that we have a transport commissioner, we would have someone in charge of policing. Indeed, if I were rewriting the Greater London Authority Act-although that would be inappropriate in terms of the Bill or at this stage-I would have looked to creating at the same time as the elected mayor a number of directly elected posts that would have been responsible for a number of different functions, because that system of direct democracy and accountability would have worked well. People raise the horrid spectre of what would happen if the Mayor of London were of one party and the person elected as deputy mayor for policing and crime were of another party. If that were what the people of London wanted, the elected politicians concerned would have to find a way of managing that.

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath: I am interested in the concept suggested by my noble friend of different people being elected to a position in the same authority. What does he think about the Government's proposal to appoint shadow mayors? Can I take him from the great city of London to the equally great city of Birmingham and the situation whereby the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government is intending to nominate Councillor Mike Whitby, the Leader of the Conservative-Lib Dem council, to be the shadow mayor of Birmingham at the very time when it is clear that he will lose control of the council next May? We have a bizarre situation of having a shadow mayor with all the powers of the mayor, and the council being Labour-led. What does my noble friend think about that?

Lord Harris of Haringey: I think that that is a consequence of extending discussion in your Lordships' House past our normal finishing time of 10 pm, when we tend to range more widely on subjects.
	My noble friend raises an important point. Neither I in my amendment nor the Government in their original proposal were doing anything as bizarre as seems to be suggested under the Localism Bill. Had they followed the same principle, no doubt we would have had chairs of police authorities all over the country suddenly becoming shadow commissioners of police and crime for their areas. Although many chairs of police authorities would no doubt have relished that transformation and enjoyed their brief period in that role, we are not in the Bill being offered the same arrangements that are being offered under the Localism Bill for the creation of mayors in major cities. The Localism Bill also envisages that there would then be a referendum of the local community. Some of us had hoped that we would have an interesting debate on that, but my noble friend chose to deny us that opportunity and is perhaps, by the back door, trying to give us the opportunity to have such a debate now. I shall not be lured down that path.
	The purpose of my amendment is that, if the principle is clarity-that the person who holds the police to account should be directly elected and visible in that role-that individual in London should also be directly elected. In the Bill, we have a system where the Mayor of London is elected but, effectively, will automatically delegate an individual who need not be directly elected-and certainly will not be directly elected to fulfil that function-to carry out the role of the police and crime commissioner. That is wrong. It is a mistake. It runs against the entire premise of the Government's proposals, which is that there should be a directly elected individual who holds the police to account. I beg to move.

Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville: I intervene very briefly. When I am attending your Lordships' House, I stay in a club in my former constituency. In the 1930s, a Duke was slumbering in that club after lunch one day when he became conscious that a man and a woman had entered the room. He waited until they had left and then pressed a bell. The club servant arrived and said, "You rang, your Grace?". The Duke said, "What was that?". The club servant said, "That, your Grace, was the club secretary and Her Majesty the Queen". "Thin end of the wedge", said the Duke, shut his eyes and went to sleep again.
	I will not expand on the point at this hour of the night, but I wanted the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, to know that I have noticed, as the thin end of the wedge, that the City of London again creeps into his Amendment 50.

Lord Rosser: One reads with interest the amendment, which, as my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey said, provides for the deputy mayor for policing and crime to be elected, on the basis that it ought to be done on the same terms as the Government proposed for everywhere else in the country under the Bill, namely, for the police commissioner to be directly elected. Clearly, as long as the Bill remains as it is, where there is no elected police commissioner, we will not press for the deputy mayor for policing and crime to be elected. We will be consistent and say that we will stick with the same arrangement in London as the Bill currently has, having been amended by your Lordships' House.
	If the Government are to make an effort in future to restore elected police and crime commissioners to the Bill, it would appear rather odd if they did not also say that, if that is what is to happen outside London, Londoners should also be able directly to elect the person who in reality will be responsible for policing. The arrangement that we appear to have at present is for an elected mayor to appoint a deputy mayor, who takes over the role that, if the Government get their way, an elected police commissioner will have elsewhere. I suppose the only parallel-although it is hardly a parallel-is that, if we had elected police commissioners and one were suspended or otherwise unable to operate, that elected police commissioner would, as the Bill stands, appoint someone from their own staff to act in their stead. As the arrangement that we appear to be moving towards in London is not that of the mayor waiting to be suspended or otherwise unable to act before appointing someone, then the mayor, immediately he or she comes into office, appoints someone else to act as the deputy mayor responsible for policing and crime.
	We look forward to the Minister's response on this. As I said, as long as the Bill remains as it is without elected police commissioners, we do not wish to be inconsistent by saying that the deputy mayor for policing and crime in London should be elected. However, if the Government intend to try to restore elected police commissioners to the Bill, we look forward to their explanation of why they think Londoners should not be able to elect the person responsible for policing as well.

Baroness Browning: My Lords, these amendments would prevent the mayor holding the mayor's office for policing and crime and would instead create an elected deputy mayor for policing and crime to hold that office.
	This Government's policy is to introduce a directly elected police and crime commissioner in every force area in England and Wales outside London but, as your Lordships are only too well aware, these provisions have been removed from the Bill. It therefore seems rather odd that your Lordships should now be debating whether those self-same provisions should apply to the Metropolitan Police Service. I noted the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about wanting to remain consistent. However, having struck out from the Bill the part that proposed elected police and crime commissioners, your Lordships now seem to be applying the same arguments to elect the deputy mayor for London.
	The Government had not intended to introduce a new elected person to hold the police to account in London for the very simple reason that the whole of London already elects a single person to take responsibility for strategic issues such as policing, and that of course is the Mayor of London. The mayor is in the unique position of having responsibility for a whole force area and, as such, it seems sensible for him to have overall responsibility for holding the police to account as well.
	The amendment would create a situation in which both the mayor and the deputy mayor had a direct democratic mandate across a whole force area, although they might have different ideas about what should happen. I do not think that that could work. It is right and fitting that the mayor should take on formal responsibility for holding the Metropolitan Police to account and, in turn, the mayor should be directly accountable to the public for how that is done. I am tempted to say to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, "Nice try", but I regret that I am not able to accept his amendment.

Lord Harris of Haringey: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords who have contributed to this short debate. As ever, the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, highlighted what he called the thin end of the wedge. There is a choice and it goes to the heart of the Minister's response to this. One can either envisage that the deputy mayor for policing and crime is elected by all Londoners on the same day and in the same manner as the Mayor of London, in which case the logic is that the 8,000 electors in the City of London should cast a vote for the deputy mayor of London as they vote for the Mayor of London. Alternatively, if the noble Lord preferred it and would be happy to support it on a later occasion, we could exclude the 8,000 electors from the Corporation of London area and have a deputy mayor elected on a slightly different franchise from that of the Mayor of London. That would, of course, completely undermine the Minister's argument about how difficult it would be if these two individuals were elected on the same basis. The Government cannot have it both ways-I am trying to-by saying that we should not include the City of London in this. If you do not include the City of London, you therefore require that the franchise for the deputy mayor of London should be different from that for the Mayor of London and the argument about having the same franchise, being elected on the same basis and possible conflict, disappears.
	The reason for including it was to try to achieve some consistency with the arrangements for the election of the Mayor of London. If it makes the Minister happier I am sure that we can construct the amendments in a way that excluded the City of London. That would then mean that she had achieved her objectives in terms of my previous amendment as well as this one. I am not clear that even had we altered the franchise slightly the Minister would have been happy with the amendment.
	I have to say that there is a difficulty. I do not believe through very close observation that it is possible for the Mayor of London to fulfil the full range of activities of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime. I was certainly clear when I chaired the police authority about the amount of time that that took up. The role of being responsible for the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime will take up more time than that, and it would be impossible to combine that with the other responsibilities of the Mayor of London. The present Mayor of London, who no doubt is the role model for which the MOPC is being created, tried for a period, having made a manifesto pledge, to chair the police authority as well as being Mayor of London. After a comparatively short period, he decided that it was impracticable and not possible. We now have the situation that the Mayor of London appoints the chair of the police authority.
	The difficulty is arguing that the arrangements will somehow be an improvement in transparency with current arrangements. Essentially, you are saying that the Mayor of London will appoint a person to fulfil the responsibilities in respect of holding the police service to account. That is the arrangement that we have at the moment. The Mayor of London appoints the chair of the police authority and that person, who is called the deputy mayor, although it is not a statutory title, fulfils those functions. That dilutes the principle of direct accountability. People might feel that the Mayor of London was doing a wonderful job on transport arrangements, introducing bicycle schemes, representing London on an international stage in such a way that all Londoners feel that the cockles of their hearts are warmed by seeing him perform. They might feel that or they might not, but they might have very different views about the conduct of the role on policing.
	Under these arrangements being proposed by the Government, people cannot differentiate between them. All of it is subsumed in the responsibilities of the single elected mayor and the mayor can distance him or herself from what happens in policing by the fact that they appoint somebody else to do it. That is a weakness. If the Government are intent on restoring the principle of direct election to the rest of the Bill they need to think again about restoring the principle of direct election to the position in the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime. If they are worried about duplication, they could take policing out of the Mayor of London's area of responsibility. That is not something that I would personally advocate. The proposals are intended to balance those different responsibilities.
	I will think carefully about what the Minister has said. When we know the Government's intent it will be clear whether something like this needs to be put into the Bill at a later stage. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 50 withdrawn.
	Amendment 51
	 Moved by Baroness Hamwee
	51: Clause 3, page 3, line 22, at end insert-
	"( ) Subsections (3) and (4) are subject to section (Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime: term of office)."

Baroness Hamwee: My Lords, Amendment 51, too, concerns London and to an extent follows the theme of the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey. Amendments 51 and 214 deal with the term of office of MOPC. I am aware that the pair of amendments is incomplete. In seeking to align the term of the London-elected commissioner with the terms of commissioners in the rest of England and in Wales, one faces the difficulty that under the GLA Acts the mayor's term is not limited. During the passage of both GLA Acts, I attempted to introduce a two-term limit for the Mayor of London, but I was unsuccessful.
	I drafted an amendment that would have dealt with that, because I realised that one cannot suggest that the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime-which is such a strange title for an individual-should be limited to two terms if the mayor, who is the same person, is not so limited. However, the Public Bill Office was not persuaded that it came within the scope of the Bill. Therefore, I accept that there is a problem. I would be interested to know why the Government did not attempt to deal with this matter. Again, perhaps it was too difficult and they did not want to disturb the GLA arrangements. However, there is an inconsistency and it is right that we should highlight it.
	Amendments 61 and 62 deal with the issue of who will be the deputy mayor for policing and crime. I am sure that my noble friend Lady Doocey will speak to this. A number of my amendments-this is just how things fall-are acting as trailers for her interventions, which are based on experience that is more current than mine. It is right that the deputy mayor should have a democratic mandate: that is the reason for the amendments.
	Amendments 70, 71, 74, 151, 157 and 158 deal with who in London should carry out the functions equivalent to those of the policing and crime panels elsewhere. As I said when we debated the last-but-one group of amendments, it should be for the London Assembly to determine whether the whole assembly carries out the panel functions. It should not have forced on it procedures dictated by central government. I do not know whether the Government's view is that it will be desirable for a committee of the London Assembly to develop expertise in this area. I am sure that the assembly has not changed very much in the past three years: in fact, it will have developed in this regard. It covers a lot of ground and does not have difficulty with individual members covering a lot of ground. It is of benefit that the assembly works in this way, because it is able to join up the issues: what it does is integrated. I know that my noble friend has tabled amendments in this area. I feel strongly that the assembly should work out for itself its own best procedures. It knows how best it operates.
	Amendment 72 is about the police and crime plan: the how as well as the what. The aim is to expand the process. Because of the hour, I am going very quickly; I know that the Minister will cover some of the explanation in her reply. The underlying reason for the amendment is to ensure that the process in London should be similar to that outside London in order to achieve a better product at the end of the day.
	Amendment 97 is on delegation-we seem to have strayed outside London here-and restricts it to a member of the police and crime panel. This is an important principle that has been alluded to in other contexts today. Amendment 103 also deals with delegation. Like my noble friend, I believe that it should be to an elected individual, a Member of the London Assembly. Amendments 99, 100, 101 and 107 are consequential.
	Amendments 98, 104 and 106 ask the Government what delegation means. Is it a transfer of function or of responsibility? I am concerned about this because as I read Clauses 18 and 19, I think that they may be going a good deal further than is appropriate or perhaps even proper. I have used as a device an amendment which refers to the commissioner or MOPC retaining responsibility, but this concern underlies my amendments.
	Amendment 109 addresses what can be delegated. Will the Minister justify the provisions that the amendment deals with by taking them out? Amendment 111 concerns the deputy mayor's functions. The trickle-down arrangements in this clause are just too much. What is envisaged? The provisions that the amendment would delete must be about more than handing over jobs to staff. If that is so, it all becomes far too remote. Amendment 114 is consequential, but if noble Lords look at Clause 19(8), which it addresses, I hope they will understand why I am concerned. It states:
	"If a function of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime is exercisable by-
	somebody else-
	"any property or rights vested in the Office may be dealt with by the other person".
	This moves quite a long way from the accountability through democratic election that is at the heart of the Government's proposals.
	Amendment 164 takes us back to vetoes, numbers and so on and would give the Assembly the right to approve or reject the police and crime plan, which I think it should have. The Assembly has rights and, more importantly, responsibilities to consider mayoral strategies, and I am doing nothing more here, I think, than bringing the police and crime plan into line with those other strategies. We have talked before about the linkage with local authorities and consideration of the other parts of the crime and disorder landscape-that is probably the current jargon. I am not sidelining the role of the boroughs in all this but we have a London-wide government which deals with a number of related issues. I think that it would be entirely proper for the Assembly to have this power.
	Amendments 179 and 180 are about appointments. I do not have direct experience of shortlisting and interviewing, to which I have referred here, for either the commissioner in the metropolis or for any other senior posts. But I have been aware of colleagues being involved through the MPA, and quite rightly so. An Assembly member should be involved and regard to that person's views should be had. This is an important role. I do not think that it is at all inconsistent with the separation between the commissioner and the panel, to which the Government have referred.
	Finally, under Amendments 183 and 184, which deal with the suspension and removal of the commissioner and deputy commissioner, I suggest that there should be a degree of consultation. I accept that these amendments could be criticised on the basis that these matters will be sensitive. There are HR-I guess that that will include human rights and HR in its more traditional sense-considerations. I am not suggesting some sort of public trial but again it is part of the role of the Assembly as the police and crime panel. It is in a good and proper place to contribute to these matters.
	In cantering through these amendments, I have still taken 12 minutes, which indicates that there are a lot of issues here. I am sorry to have had to ask the House to listen to that canter at this time of night. If noble Lords have followed it, they have probably done better than I have in listening to myself. But they are important issues and we have to get this right in London as well as in the rest of the country. I beg to move.

Baroness Doocey: My Lords, I should like to address Amendments 103, 105, 112 and 116, the four amendments in my name in this group. The purpose of the amendments is to ensure democratic legitimacy to the function of police and crime commissioner as exercised in London. I have no objection to the concept of the Mayor of London, acting as the PCC, appointing a deputy mayor for policing and crime. The issue that arises is the fact that the deputy mayor for policing and crime will not be an elected person. The mayor has the right to appoint anyone to this position.
	Mayors are not infallible. London has so far had two elected mayors. Both have appointed a range of unelected people to a wide variety of important posts, some of which have resulted in controversy, resignations and sackings. I recognise that no such mistake has been made in the appointment of the chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority or, in fact, any of the appointments, but the fact is that that very important principle still stands.
	However, I believe that there is a much more fundamental objection. Were the mayor to appoint an unelected person to the post of deputy mayor for policing and crime, it would negate the whole purpose of the Bill. How on earth can an unelected police and crime commissioner be accountable to local communities? Does not this proposal to hand the powers of the PCC to any unelected individual make a nonsense of the Government's argument about democratic legitimacy?
	Previously in Committee, my noble friend the Minister said:
	"Cabinet Office research in 2008 showed that more than two-thirds of the public wanted an elected person to hold the police to account ... It means an elected individual charged with being the voice of some of the most vulnerable people ... I believe that police and crime commissioners will be both visible and democratically accountable".-[Official Report, 11/5/11; col. 940.]
	My noble friend made the same comment earlier this evening.
	Therefore, I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, said earlier. Why on earth should every area outside London have a democratically elected individual carrying out the job of PCC, but not London? What rationale is there for treating London differently from any other part of the country? Whatever misgivings one might have about certain sections of this Bill, it is essential that the new legislation works in practice and does what it is supposed to do. But it must also be logically consistent and ensure the same degree of democratic accountability throughout the country. These amendments would achieve these objectives by obliging the Mayor of London, in delegating his functions as PCC, to choose a deputy mayor for policing and crime only from elected Members of the London Assembly.

Lord Harris of Haringey: My Lords, I will speak to an amendment that is in my name, to four other amendments to which I have added my name and to an amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. The amendment in my name is Amendment 110. I have to confess that this is possibly a refugee from what should have been another group. However, it could stand on its own here. It essentially deletes Clause 19(4), which is about the power of the deputy mayor for policing and crime to,
	"arrange for any other person to exercise any function of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime which is, in accordance with subsection (2), exercisable by the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime".
	This comes back to the issue that we keep raising in relation to policing and crime commissioners: their ability to delegate functions to people who are not accountable in the same way. The proposal is that, even though this is an activity which is specifically the responsibility of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime, and specifically should be carried out by the deputy mayor, it should not be possible to delegate this to any other person in such a cavalier way.
	I also wanted to speak to Amendments 103 and 116, which essentially say that the deputy mayor for policing and crime shall be a Member of the London Assembly. If your Lordships and the Government are not minded to accept the principle of direct election, then the second best must be that the person delegated by the Mayor of London must themselves be an elected person, a Member of the London Assembly. It really is extraordinary that the Bill gives such latitude to the Mayor of London to appoint someone whom they have not met and may have no personal direct mandate. One could create a justification as to why it would be inappropriate to have a direct mandate, but it seems to me that the main thrust of this ought to be that that the person who is acting on behalf of the Mayor of London in this very important role should themselves have at least been subject to the electorate for at least part of London, if not the whole of London. It is important that the deputy mayor of London for policing and crime should be an elected Member of the London Assembly, and Amendments 103 and 116 deal with this.
	I have also put my name to Amendment 105, which enables the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime to delegate to any person the functions that would otherwise be carried out by the deputy mayor for policing and crime. The issue is the same: whether it should be possible for these functions so easily to be delegated to people who are not elected. Amendment 105 would at least require the mayor to delegate them to somebody who was part of the structure of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime rather than to someone completely different. What would be the point of having a Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime if the mayor could say, "Well, one of these functions I am not having done by somebody who works for the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime; I'll have it delegated somewhere else"? I suspect that this was an unintended consequence of something else when the drafting was done, but it seems to be a very strange arrangement.
	Amendment 180 would involve Members of the Assembly in the appointment of police officers of ACPO rank other than simply the commissioner and deputy commissioner. I spoke earlier today about the importance of that responsibility being shared. It is an important issue of governance. It is also important that senior officers of the Metropolitan Police not only see the line of accountability to the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis but recognise the importance of democratic accountability. The involvement of Members in the appointments process would help facilitate that.

Baroness Browning: My Lords, there is a great number of amendments in this grouping. I shall try to do justice to as many of them as I can.
	Amendments 61, 62, 107 and 116 would prevent the mayor appointing as deputy mayor for crime and policing anyone who was not already a Member of the London Assembly. I understand the concerns that lie behind the amendments. It is argued that if PCCs elsewhere are directly elected to their position, the deputy mayor should have some democratic legitimacy. We touched on this in previous amendments. However, it is important to remember that the deputy mayor does not occupy the Mayor's Office for Crime and Policing; the mayor alone may hold that office. The mayor may appoint a person to whom to delegate the day-to-day responsibilities of the office, but I emphasise-particularly to my noble friend Lady Hamwee because she raised this matter-that the liability and accountability to the public rest squarely on the shoulders of the mayor, whatever the nature of the delegation. For that reason, I suggest that it is not necessary for the deputy mayor to be elected, although there is no reason why they could not be.
	To require the deputy mayor to be an Assembly Member would also limit the mayor's discretion to 25 people, many of whom already have important responsibilities. Until the Greater London Authority Act 2007, Assembly Members were not able to serve on the Transport for London board. While they are now able to do so, there is no requirement for any of the members or the chair to be an Assembly Member. In fact, none of the current members of the Transport for London board is also an Assembly Member; the accountability comes through the mayor. I therefore ask that this cluster of amendments not be pressed.
	Delegation is very important in any organisation. No one person, be that the mayor or the deputy mayor, can carry out all the functions of an organisation from making strategic decisions to replying to letters. The Bill sets out that the mayor may delegate to the deputy mayor, who in turn may also delegate functions.
	Amendment 109 would seriously restrict the mayor's ability to delegate to the deputy mayor, meaning that the mayor would have to carry out all the day-to-day functions of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime. With a role as large and strategic as the mayor's, it must be right that day-to-day functions are able to be delegated. As such, I ask that that amendment not be pressed.
	Amendment 105 would restrict the mayor's ability to delegate functions so only the deputy mayor or an employee of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime may have functions delegated to them. I would be very concerned that this would prevent the useful shared services that already exist in the GLA, as it would require that all of the mayor's functions in respect of policing and crime are performed by the staff of that office. In order to ensure that the mayor can make sensible decisions about the most efficient and effective way of working, I ask that this amendment not be pressed.
	Amendments 106 and 109 make it clear that the mayor retains overall legal responsibility for any function he or she should choose to delegate. This is a fundamental principle of the law on delegation. The mayor could not choose to delegate overall responsibility of his or her functions even if he or she should wish to. As such, these amendments would have no practical effect and I ask that they not be pressed.
	Amendment 114would forbid any person but the mayor from exercising any rights of his or her office or using any property. That would effectively be a bar on the mayor from delegating any functions, as nearly all functions would require that person to exercise some rights of the mayor.
	Amendments 110 and 111would prevent the deputy mayor from delegating any functions that he or she has been delegated by the mayor. This would mean only the mayor or the deputy mayor could carry out any function of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime. Were this the case then the mayor's office could have no effective staff, as every function from appointing a junior member of staff, to replying to a letter on behalf of the mayor's office would need to be carried out by either the mayor or the deputy mayor. Similarly, Amendments 103 and 112would prevent the mayor and deputy mayor from delegating functions to any person but a London Assembly Member. I do not think it is right that only the mayor, deputy mayor or a London Assembly Member are able to perform the basic administrative functions of that office. Any organisation needs to allow for effective delegation to be efficient, but the amendments would prevent that and so make the office bureaucratic, if not actually impossible. For that reason, I would ask noble Lords not to press those amendments.
	Finally, Amendments 97 to 101 make similar changes to restrict the ability of a police and crime commissioner in delegating functions. Your Lordships may care to consider what effect if any the amendments will have following the vote on the first day of this Committee. Had that vote not taken place, I would be arguing that PCCs also need to delegate, and it would be as inappropriate to expect police and crime panel members to handle a PCC's correspondence or to interview the staff.
	I would have made similar arguments in respect of a PCC as I have in respect of the mayor; that it is right that conflict of interest considerations prevent them from delegating functions to a police officer, and the law is already clear that they cannot delegate overall responsibility for any function. I do not think that Clause 18 has any practical effect any longer, and as such, neither do the amendments sought.
	To pick up on some of the other points raised, my noble friend Lady Hamwee mentioned the question of term limits on MOPC. As drafted, the amendment would mean that the current mayor would not be able to take on MOPC if successful in the 2012 election, as only the mayor can hold MOPC. That would leave the office vacant. This is probably not the place to open up the debate on how that problem might be resolved, but no one other than the mayor would be able to fill the role of MOPC and how that would be decided and how that situation would be dealt with is not clear in the proposals that have been brought forward.

Lord Harris of Haringey: The Greater London Authority Act provides for circumstances in which the office of mayor is vacant. It provides for arrangements in which the statutory deputy mayor under the Greater London Authority Act-not to be confused with the deputy mayor for policing and crime-assumes the functions of mayor. Surely those arrangements are covered under the Greater London Authority Act.

Baroness Browning: I am not up to speed with the Greater London Authority Act, but I would have hoped that in bringing forward amendments that created the circumstance, there would have been provisions to decide how to deal with the situation that I described and could well happen in respect of the sitting mayor and the elections due next year. So if the noble Lord does not mind I will not engage in the detail of that. Those proposals are simply not in front of the House today and I am going to move on to the role of the London Assembly.
	These amendments would establish the London Assembly as the police and crime panel for London. I appreciate the position that noble Lords have taken with this. Like them, I am keen to ensure that the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime in London is properly challenged and that its decisions are tested on behalf of the public on a regular basis. However, I see that the police and crime panel must comprise members of the London Assembly so as to ensure proper accountability.
	The first question to address here is why there should be a bespoke committee of the London Assembly called the police and crime panel rather than, as proposed by noble Lords, the functions being conferred on the London Assembly as a whole. The reason is one of practicality. Having a dedicated committee, representative of the wider London Assembly, will ensure that sufficient attention and scrutiny can be paid to delivering its policing responsibilities and would also allow for independent members to be brought on to the panel to ensure diversity and the right mix of skills. Independents would be appointed subject to the existing rules of the assembly.
	This smaller group will be able to focus its attentions on the important business of scrutinising, in detail, the actions and decisions of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime-particularly in respect of the police and crime plan. The requirement for the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime to produce a police and crime plan is a statutory requirement. It is right and proper that the London authority, through its police and crime panel, should have the appropriate opportunity to review and report on the draft police and crime plan. This is a very important element of its scrutiny role. However, given the statutory nature of the police and crime plan, and the accompanying requirements made of it by this legislation, it would not be appropriate for the police and crime panel to have the power to veto the plan itself.
	Finally, these amendments would introduce a role for the London Assembly in the appointment of the commissioner and the deputy commissioner, and their senior team. I will address these in turn. The Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police remain royal appointments, subject to the advice of the Secretary of State, due to the number of important national and international functions that they undertake. In making this recommendation, the Secretary of State must have regard to any recommendations made by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime.
	It has been proposed that the London Assembly should also be a part of these considerations. Requiring the London Assembly to do so, be that directly through the police and crime panel, would add an additional layer of bureaucracy to the process, which would delay the decision further. The proposed amendments would also establish a role for the London Assembly in the appointment of the assistant commissioners, deputy assistant commissioners and commanders of the Metropolitan Police. Such appointments under this legislation will now be made by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, in consultation with the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime. They will no longer require the approval of the Secretary of State, which reflects the Government's commitment to reduce interference from the centre and reduce bureaucracy.
	The Government feel that the commissioner is best placed to make decisions about the make-up of his top team. The role of the police and crime panel for London is to scrutinise the decisions taken by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime in London. It is not its role to scrutinise the decisions of the commissioner and neither it, nor the GLA more widely, as these amendments propose, should therefore have a role in the appointment of the commissioner's senior team.
	Furthermore, allowing the assembly to call in the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to give evidence will mean the commissioner having to answer to two masters. The commissioner is held to account by the mayor and the mayor by the assembly. These clear lines of accountability are needed.
	I have not been able to go into a lot of detail-we had a long list of amendments before us-but I hope that your Lordships who have tabled amendments will feel able not to press them.

Baroness Hamwee: My Lords, there is a long list of amendments because there are a lot of issues. I would have been considerably happier if we had been able to unpack this package somewhat. From listening to the Minister's reply-she has been saddled with this, I accept-it seems to me that some of the provisions are straining to apply to London the model provided for the rest of England and Wales. That feels very awkward and very inappropriate. I cannot see that we will finish the debate about London tonight, so I think that we will have to come back to aspects of it.
	On delegation, at one point I referred to that as "trickle-down", but I think that the Minister's reply vindicates that description. I have realised, a bit late in the day, that "Delegatus non potest delegare", as we all say-

Lord Carlile of Berriew: We say nothing else.

Baroness Hamwee: That is an important principle. I am really troubled that so much of this debate is described as delegation, whereas actually it is about getting other people to do a job in a way that, in other businesses, would be quite natural. That is not the same as delegation.
	On the term limit, had the Public Bill Office allowed my amendment, it would have addressed all the points that the Minister made. However, the Minister did not address the problem-or, perhaps it would be fairer to say, the question that I asked-which is, "Why is London different in this respect?".
	Let me mention two final issues. The first is about the arrangements that the London Assembly makes and the Government's insistence on requiring a bespoke committee. The Minister said that this is a matter of practicality. Well, there are practical considerations, but if central government is going to keep out of these things, central government should let the London Assembly work out for itself what the best practical arrangements would be. Frankly, I think that it is a bit paternalistic for central government to say, "You 25 people won't be able to cope, so let us tell you how best to do it". It seems to me that certain matters could and would be best handled by a committee, whereas some issues-the budget is obviously one of them-would be matters for the whole Assembly. The Government's proposal seems an unnecessary intervention.
	Finally, on the issue of appointments, although bureaucracy has been blamed, sometimes bureaucracy is a good thing. Actually, the point made is the one raised by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, about the lines of connection-I had better avoid words like "accountability"-which I think is the right approach. I do not think that one should be saying that, in the name of avoiding bureaucracy, we will make the process, frankly, rather dodgy.
	I am sorry that it must have been quite difficult for those Members of the House who are not directly involved in these matters to have tried to follow the debate, but certain themes have come out. I think that I look forward to-I anticipate with some sort of emotion-discussing these issues further with the Minister, because there are a number of points on which we have now teased out some of the Government's thinking, which I have found helpful to hear, that we will need to address further. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 51.
	Amendment 51 withdrawn.
	Amendments 52 to 59 not moved.
	Clause 3 agreed.
	Schedule 3 : Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime
	Amendments 60 to 64 not moved.
	Schedule 3 agreed.
	Clause 4 : Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
	Amendments 64A to 65 not moved.
	Clause 4 agreed.
	Schedule 4 : Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
	Amendments 66 to 67B not moved.
	Schedule 4 agreed.
	Amendment 68 not moved.
	Clause 5 : Police and crime commissioners to issue police and crime plans
	Amendment 68ZA
	 Moved by Lord Soley
	68ZA: Clause 5, page 5, line 9, at end insert-
	"( ) A police and crime commissioner must issue a crime prevention plan within the financial year in which each ordinary election is held."

Lord Soley: This is an important group of amendments dealing mainly with crime prevention, which is an important matter. It deals also with the way to vary the crime plan and the various people who could be involved in that. To synopsise, it could be people like those in Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary, the Home Secretary and others, to change or vary the plan or their powers to submit information on it.
	This is an important group of amendments, and it is a pity that we are taking it at this time of night. The Minister might be worried to know that I can wax lyrical for many a long hour on the importance and complexity of crime prevention, and if I chose to do so we could all end up by having breakfast on the Terrace, which would be a wonderful way to start Wednesday. So maybe I will do that.
	This is the crime prevention part of this Bill, and to me it is very important. In an act of great modesty, I say that Amendment 68ZA in my name is the most important. Some of the other amendments are probing, but they are all important because they deal with how the plan is structured, and so on.
	I have a couple of key questions, which I shall put in context for the Minister. First, are we to assume that the crime plan really does mean crime prevention? I would prefer if we actually gave a duty in Clause 5 to draw up a crime prevention plan. A crime plan could mean almost anything.
	The second issue that this covers is that if the assumption is that the crime plan includes crime prevention, it raises the funding of crime prevention. A number of references to funding are in this Bill. In Clause 9, a body can fund a message to combat crime and disorder. But if it is to be assumed that crime prevention is included in the plan, I have to say-and this is the other question to the Minister-are we really going to assume that all the other agencies that deal with crime prevention are also going to lose those functions into this? If they are, that is going to have profound financial consequences. If, for example, the Home Office gave up many of its crime prevention projects and plans, are they to go over to these localised-although they are not really that localised-police areas? Are the various organisations that operate under either funding from, or the direct organisation by, other government departments to be transferred, too? This is why I say that if the Government put in the Bill that there is to be a crime prevention plan, they can at least define what is in the plan, which powers are to be transferred and what funding is available to it.
	I want to put this in the context of the battle to reduce crime, if I can. I suppose that is always an ongoing battle, but over the past 10 years or so we have been remarkably successful in reducing crime. One factor is policing; the police are obviously important as a deterrent and in detecting crime. If you can increase the conviction rate, crime tends to reduce because one of the greatest deterrents is the certainty of being caught. However, the police alone cannot deliver and that has long been the history of this crime prevention strategy. Crime prevention is more than better locks on windows and doors. It is everything from parenting through to some of the special projects that go on.
	I notice that in some parts of the Bill-I paraphrase slightly because of the lateness of the hour-the Government refer to certain things that the panel can do. For example, it can fund measures to reduce disorder. That is fine but if you are to do that, how do you define what it takes on and fund that? There is an assumption in the Bill that the crime plan, as it is referred to, really means crime prevention, but without mentioning it. Yet it does not then deal with the funding issue. If the Government go down this road and are not clear about crime prevention, crime will go up again. It already is; burglary, the one that worries people an awful lot, is going up. Street crime will begin to go up again for other unrelated reasons, which I will not go into at this late hour, but the old crime of mugging-as it was called, although it is strictly robbery-will go up because as unemployment and other issues go up, it rises, too.
	One way we have been successful in reducing crime is by having all forms of intervention earlier. That of course involves some social aspects, such as children's centres and things of that nature. Yet the Government have produced a Bill which, leaving aside my other concerns about it, does not properly address crime prevention. We really will have a situation where crime goes up again unless we are clear about whose duty it is. There are two ways of doing this. One is to keep things much as they are now and be clear about what we devolve to these police commissioners. The other way is to say, "Right-we will shift as much as possible down". From what the Government say, they want to devolve but if they want to devolve much crime prevention, they really have to come clean on the funding. That is not being identified here through a proper crime plan.
	If in an area you get, for example, a number of hostels which are for people who are recovering from a mental illness, or who have been discharged from prison, or who have been through the court system, you will have a different type of problem there than in other areas. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, and one or two other Members pointed out that one danger of this structure is that because you have quite large police areas, the loudest voices will be heard most. Those will be from the leafy suburbs-the richer areas-while the voices of those in the poorer areas, where the crime rate tends to be much higher, will not be heard, although those areas are in most need of a crime plan, or crime prevention plan as I prefer to call it.
	I want to be clear about this. If we are to have these large police areas and an elected commissioner for each area, that person will have to relate to the high crime hotspots which will not necessarily have the loudest voices in the election. That point has been made several times in a number of debates on this over time. That is why my Amendment 68ZA would include in the Bill a duty to issue a crime prevention plan. That would then relate over the whole area, people would not have to speak up about it and it could be checked. There could be a situation, for example, where the individual MPs or councillors throughout the area say, "What is the plan for reducing crime on this estate or in that street?". At the moment there seems to be no thinking about that at all. It is just a police and crime issue without any definition of whether crime means a crime plan. I cannot overstate the importance of this. This is where the Bill is not well thought through. We have to be clear about crime prevention.
	Think of the blood, sweat, tears and toil that were spent by the police, various government agencies, the previous Government, and politicians at all levels and of all parties to get crime prevention right up front. It really was a struggle and we are in danger of losing it. That is why I want the requirement to produce a crime prevention plan included in the Bill. I would then want to see individual MPs, councillors and others saying, "What's the crime prevention plan for this area?". At the moment that is not there. All we are doing is saying that someone can vary the plan, that there are restrictions on who can vary it, or that HMIC or the Home Secretary can have an input. We have to be clear about this. At the moment we still have a pretty good crime prevention policy in this country. It has been working well but I am not at all sure that that will continue under this structure. I strongly urge the Minister to see if she can work out the dividing line between these bodies and the existing groups that organise crime prevention programmes. If she does that and does it well, I might be able to let her have breakfast at home. I beg to move.

Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville: I was hoping to intervene before the noble Lord sat down, but I will now put my question after the amendment has been moved. Although I am a bear of very little brain, there is the faintest possible ambiguity in the noble Lord's amendment. I think I know what he will say but, to put it beyond peradventure, does his amendment mean that the crime prevention plan should be moved before or after the ordinary election to which it refers?

Lord Soley: I am not too worried about that but my view would be that it ought to be before the election.

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath: My Lords, this has been a short but interesting debate. I am very grateful to my noble friend. This series of amendments concerns police and crime plans. These are clearly very important because they set the strategic direction for how the police force is to be run. Clause 7(1) sets out the requirements for matters to be put in the plan, including,
	"the elected local policing body's police and crime objectives".
	As my noble friend Lord Soley has said, there is no mention in Clause 7(1) of anything to do with crime prevention. The points that he raised are very pertinent and we look forward to a positive response to them. My noble friend is also right to point out that there has been a very encouraging reduction in crime over the past decade or so. However, those trends are being reversed. A report to the West Midlands Police Authority last week showed the first rise in crime for many years, which is an extremely worrying trend. I agree that crime prevention needs to be an important part of the focus of any police and crime plan.
	I have a series of amendments in this group, which are partly probing. I specifically ask the Minister about the rationale for Clause 5(4), the provision that says:
	"A police and crime commissioner may vary a police and crime plan".
	Of course, I understand the need to have flexibility. However, my concern is that the ability of the police and crime commissioner to vary the plan at will may be used to exert undue pressure on the operational decisions of the chief constable.
	In our first debate this afternoon when we debated pilot schemes-that seems a little time ago now-we heard from former chief officers of police in your Lordships' House that police chiefs were concerned about uncertainty and being left in limbo. Consequently, there were reservations about pilots. I wonder whether the same problem would not arise if the elected police commissioner were continually to vary the plan, as is allowed for in the Bill. I would like to understand why the Government feel that it is necessary to allow the commissioner to vary the plan during the year, and what safeguards might be in place to prevent the elected police commissioner having an "initiative of the month", varying the plan and leaving chief constables in an untenable position.
	None of my amendments would replace the requirement in Clause 7(1)(e) for the plan to set out,
	"the means by which the chief officer of police's performance in providing policing will be measured".
	However, I would like to change that to the performance of the force in general. Going back to our previous discussion about corporation sole, perhaps the Government feel that there is no difference between the chief officer of police's performance and that of the police force. We have heard that the police force is to be embodied in one person-the chief constable, who is a corporation sole. However, I think that the public want the performance of the force to be judged. Surely that is what the focus should be on rather than the cult of leadership, which the Government seem very keen on at the moment. I should be interested to hear the Minister explain why the police chief is mentioned in the Bill rather than the police force.

Baroness Hamwee: My Lords, I have amendments in this group. I will deal first with Amendments 76ZA and 76C as they are similar to the amendments to which the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, spoke at the end of his speech. What is to be measured? Clause 7(1)(b) refers to,
	"the policing of the police area which the chief officer of police is to provide".
	However, we should be looking rather at whether the police and crime objectives are being attained. Surely that is what should be assessed. I am uncertain as to what "policing" means in this context. It could be interpreted in a number of ways. For instance, policing is dependent on the budget, so how do you measure performance in the provision of policing? My amendments seek to direct attention to outcomes rather than outputs.
	My Amendment 69 seeks to require a variation of the police and crime plan to require the approval of the police and crime panel. Clause 5(6)(d) requires regard to be had to views and to a public response. I would like to see something stronger. The panel has expertise and experience with which to tackle the job of holding the PCC to account. The plan must be one of the most important pieces in the jigsaw. The term "have regard to" can sometimes be influential, but the noble Lord, Lord Harris, while not using this terminology, said earlier that it is obviously best if you do not pull the trigger, but you need ammunition and a gun-perhaps held behind your back, but known to be there-on certain occasions.
	My Amendment 123 would amend Clause 28 by giving the panel the right to approve or reject the plan, and the panel would be deemed to have approved the plan unless it is rejected by a majority of two-thirds. That goes against my instincts in terms of proportion, but the right of approval is important.
	Amendments 75 and 76 are London issues again. They would extend Section 32, whereby consultation on the plan includes the voluntary organisations to which I referred today and last week.
	Finally, on the provisions for the Secretary of State's guidance on the content of the plan, Amendments 78, 79, 78A and 80ZA provide that the Secretary of State should consult representatives of police and crime panels and local authorities, and have regard to their views. Guidance to those who have a duty to comply with the plans should state that representatives of local authorities should be consulted. I hope that at this hour I do not need to spell out why the input of local authorities is important in this context.
	That takes us back fairly neatly to some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Soley, when he introduced this group of amendments.

Baroness Doocey: My Lords, I should like to speak briefly to the amendments in my name in this group-Amendments 73, 152, 159, and 160 to 163. Their purpose is to make the provisions of the Bill consistent with those proposed in the Localism Bill. That Bill will change the relationship between the London Assembly and the Mayor of London, as set out in the Greater London Authority Act 1999, because it will give the London Assembly a new power to reject by a two-thirds majority the Mayor's statutory strategies.
	However, this Bill makes no equivalent provision. As it stands, it would not allow the Assembly to reject the Mayor's draft policing and crime plan. Consequently, once both Bills have become law, the London Assembly would have the power to reject every one of the Mayor's strategies, with the sole exception of the police and crime plan. This discrepancy makes no sense. There are no substantive differences between the police and crime plan and other mayoral strategies that would justify it being excluded. These amendments, which are supported by the Mayor of London and all political parties on the London Assembly, would remedy this discrepancy.
	The amendments also propose that the power to reject a draft police and crime plan would be exercisable by the whole Assembly. I am very aware that the Bill's provisions suggest that none of the functions of the police and crime panel should be carried out by the full Assembly. However the whole point of vesting this specific power in the full Assembly, as opposed to in a committee of the Assembly, is to provide consistency with the provisions of the Localism Bill in relation to mayoral strategies.
	These amendments would ensure that accountability arrangements within the Greater London Authority are coherent and internally consistent.

Lord Harris of Haringey: My Lords, I have put my name to the amendments to which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, referred. It is extraordinarily anomalous that two Bills that we will be considering at the same time in your Lordships' House have such very different provisions for the role of the London Assembly and the strategies of the mayor. It seems sensible that they are made consistent. The proposal that the London Assembly has the power to reject-or, when it comes to the Localism Bill, perhaps even amend-the plan is extremely important and it would be sensible if the power was consistent across the two pieces of legislation.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: We have another complex and technical set of amendments here. I listened with great interest to the noble Lord, Lord Soley, although I was not quite sure when he came to his conclusion whether he was referring to organising crime prevention or organised crime prevention.

Lord Soley: Organising crime prevention.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: We are all clear, and it is clearly the intent of the Bill, that the police and crime plan will be one of the core documents which will govern the relationship between the police and crime commissioner and the chief constable and will provide the basis for scrutiny by the police and crime panel. It is a core document. However, we insist that it should not be governed by an absolutely fixed calendar that, on 1 April every year, there must be a new annual crime plan, which is what is suggested in the amendment.
	The intention behind the Bill is that, on being elected to office, a new police and crime commissioner should prepare and publish, in consultation with a range of others-including the chief constable and the police and crime panel, of course, but not exclusively them-a police and crime plan which may last for the full term of office but which may be varied. That is to allow a degree of flexibility. It is not intended that he should vary it every week; indeed, it states clearly in Clause 5 that, in variation, a number of people have to be consulted, including the chief constable. If you wish to vary the plan, you naturally again consult the appropriate people, including those whom you expect to carry it out.

Lord Soley: Can the Minister clarify one question I asked him? Does the crime plan mean crime prevention plan or is it something else? If so, what does it mean?

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: It is clear throughout the Bill that the reduction of crime, which involves the prevention of crime, is core to everything. Clause 7(1)(a) states that the plan must include the PCC's police and crime objectives. Later, Clause 7 defines police and crime objectives as including objectives for crime and disorder reduction. In Clause 102, crime and disorder reduction is defined as,
	"reduction of crime and disorder (including antisocial and other behaviour and adversely affecting the local environment) ... combating the misuse of drugs, alcohol and other substances, and ... reduction of reoffending".
	I recognise that part of what the noble Lord, Lord Soley, wants to get at is the range of other agencies involved in crime prevention beyond the police. We all recognise that crime prevention in the broadest sense, as well as the reduction of reoffending, is not a matter for the police alone and involves much of the work of community safety partnerships working with a range of other agencies, some public and others in the voluntary sector. That is a problem we have in all aspects of government: however you draw the line for the number of the tasks that you wish to perform, you must always co-operate with others.
	We had not anticipated that the question of funding would come into the debate on the amendment but, as the noble Lord is well aware, crime prevention is funded partly through the police, partly through local authorities and partly through the Ministry of Justice and Home Office budgets through a range of channels, in which community and safety partnerships play a large role. In recent months, I visited a number in Yorkshire. They are examples of different agencies, including the police, working together to reduce inner-city crime, burglary, drugs-related crime and alcohol-related crime and so on. That is very much part of what has been practised over the past 15 or 20 years, and much of what happened under the previous Government contributed to that. As we all know, alcohol and drug-related crime is a very serious problem, and we will touch on some aspects of that during later stages of the Bill.
	A police and crime plan is of course a plan about reduction and prevention in the broadest sense. It requires intervention as far as possible in the early stages of anti-social behaviour and so on, and it is also very much concerned with reducing reoffending and preventing the development of persistent and prolific offenders, with whom I am afraid we are all too familiar.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, referred to local authorities, and I think that one or two noble Lords raised the question of how this Bill relates to the Localism Bill and other aspects of legislation currently under way-something with which we must all be very concerned. We will look at the references to local authorities across the Bill to see whether that needs to be re-examined, and we will certainly look at the Localism Bill to see how far the two are meant to be compatible. That also applies to what the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, said about the discrepancy in the powers to reject London strategies.
	I end by saying simply that the core business of policing is to reduce crime. The Bill encourages police and crime commissioners to consult widely with others. They will clearly include not only police and crime panels but local authorities and other voluntary and public agencies, as one would expect as the plan is developed and varied. I hope that noble Lords will accept that the plans may well need to be varied when circumstances change. I encourage the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Baroness Hamwee: My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Soley, replies, I wonder whether the Minister is in a position to respond to my question about the assessment of policing. I do not want to go through the arguments again but they relate to my Amendments 76ZA and 76C. If he is not able to respond, perhaps he would write to me about it. My question covers very similar ground to that covered by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, so, with safety in numbers, I think I can claim that this is a genuine concern.

Lord Soley: That was a disappointing reply. I really do think that the Government need to go away and put crime prevention in the Bill. We all want to reduce crime but simply saying that we want to do so is apple pie and motherhood. This is an important matter because, if you simply have a crime plan under an elected system, the loudest voices will decide what is done. The crime prevention plan needs to be drawn up on the basis of the crime statistics throughout the police area. If that does not happen, the loudest voices in any electoral system will make the decision and they will not address the type of crime that is most prevalent in the poorest areas.
	We will, to some extent, come to the other matter that is not addressed when we reach Clause 9. We can see what is going to happen-indeed, the notes on the Bill give it away in a sense. They say, as does the Bill, that the money can be paid into a scheme to reduce crime. We know what will happen. The Home Office will currently be funding one plan, or this or that organisation will be funding it, and will then say, "It is over to the police and crime plan now". Where will the money come from? You have to have a crime prevention plan that actually addresses those issues and allows MPs to look at it as well and say, "If the Home Office is going to stop funding this, will the crime plan fund it instead?".

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath: I am grateful to my noble friend for giving way and am sorry that it is so late but is not the point that the Government are doing that to get them out of responsibility for crime issues? It is clear that crime will go up over the next few years and that the Government will wash their hands and say that it is the responsibility of elected police commissioners. That is what it is about.

Lord Soley: My noble friend anticipates me because I was going to finish on this. It is a relevant point. Leaving aside some of the wider issues of accountability, election and so on, my fear is that we will lose what has been gained over many years by many groups, including local authorities under different party control. We will lose that if we do not have a clear requirement for a crime prevention plan. This is when amendments from Back Benchers are not as good as government amendments. We must address the issue of crime statistics in the area, not simply rely on the electorate to tell the chief officer what they want done. Does the Minister not see the problem that the loudest voices will determine the priority, instead of the statistics of the crime perhaps determining the policies towards reducing those crime patterns? Do I make sense?

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: I can half see the problem but I am not fully persuaded that crime is quite so pocketed in one area. I am conscious that in West Yorkshire every weekend, very well off young people pour into the middle of Leeds, Wakefield and elsewhere and there is quite a lot of alcohol-related crime, which is focused in one area. It is not where they live, so things spill out from one area to another. The reduction of crime in some of the rougher areas of the region has benefited areas elsewhere. People do not always carry out burglaries in the places in which they live. They move to other areas as well. The noble Lord may be exaggerating the problem that the level of co-operation that we have among different agencies and between local authorities and the police is likely to be severely damaged by this development. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, adds, as a sort of conspiracy theory, that the Government are trying to shovel off responsibility. I suggest that neither of those things is correct.

Lord Soley: I ask the Minister to sit down and talk with his own noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond, who does understand this. I agree that patterns of crime are widely varied and that is why you should work on the basis of statistics. If your main aim is to please an electorate you deal with the loudest voices. That is the reality of elections. It is not just in inner-city areas. You get a pattern where people are worried and set up Neighbourhood Watch-a good thing which nobody is against-and do all these other things, such as coming to meetings with the police to ask them about a particular burglary, or whatever. In the poorer crime hotspots, where burglaries are more common, there is little addressed on that unless you have a very good local authority which then does a range of things, such as putting in caretakers, and all the other things that go with that. What we are doing here is saying that there is a crime plan and that we will fund some of the things, as indicated in Clause 9, but giving no indication of what will happen when other organisations, most notably the Home Office-or a local authority, for that matter-withdraws the funding and says that it is over to the crime plan to replace that.
	As my noble friend on the Front Bench said, I would almost predict that crime goes up again and continues to go up if we do not give a clear direction to those organisations to take on crime prevention in a very clear way, based on statistics of crime. An MP in an area can then look at the different aspects, not just in relation to the election of the police commissioner but focusing on those statistics and reducing them in each area. If you do not do that, it will be the electorate who are most interested in the issue, in middle-class areas where crime is lower. In working-class areas with high rates of crime they may rattle the bars of councillors but they will not necessarily get the same crime prevention plan. That is what has happened in the past-we do not need to look in a crystal ball-and that is what we must avoid. I ask the Minister to look at this again. If he wants crime prevention to be done by another body, or to keep it as it is, we need to be clear about that. The alternative is to give it to these bodies but recognise the financial implications.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, as it happens, next week I will be taken round one of the poorer areas of Leeds by the head of the neighbourhood police. The police there are extremely proud of what they have achieved through the neighbourhood police forum and through neighbourhood policing. It is absolutely what we need to continue. I will reflect on what the noble Lord has said, both before and after my visit. We are all aware that neighbourhood policing, and working with local communities-poor as well as better off-are very much part of the future of policing and what we all want to do. I do not see the problem at which the noble Lord is gnawing, so to speak.

Lord Soley: I will wait to see what happens. I simply say to the Minister that crime prevention policy should be based primarily on the statistics of crime and should not depend on who votes for whom and when. I urge the Minister to be aware of the danger in the Bill of not having a clear policy on crime prevention. It is extraordinary that the Bill does not mention crime prevention as a core issue. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 68ZA withdrawn.
	Amendments 68ZB to 69B not moved.
	Clause 5 agreed.
	Clause 6 : Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime to issue police and crime plans
	Amendments 69C to 76 not moved.
	Clause 6 agreed.
	Clause 7 : Police and crime plans
	Amendments 76ZA to 79 not moved.
	Clause 7 agreed.
	Clause 8 : Duty to have regard to police and crime plan
	Amendments 79A to 80ZA not moved.
	Clause 8 agreed.
	Clause 9 : Crime and disorder reduction grants
	Amendment 80A not moved.
	House resumed.

House adjourned at 12.14 am.